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THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
IMAGES AND IMPACTS 
by 
Robert C. Kiste 
The six papers that follow are concerned with projections as to what the 
Pacific region will be like a decade and a half from now. In order to provide 
an historical context, it is my task to examine what Westerners have thought 
and written about the Pacific. Essentially, this involves an examination of 
Western perceptions of the Pacific Islands and their people since initial 
contact between Europeans and Pacific Islanders and the impact that the 
Pacific has had upon certain aspects of Western thought. Lastly, I attempt to 
relate what has been perceived and thought in the past to what may occur in 
the future. My biases are probably quite evident; I write as an American 
anthropologist who has some knowledge of Pacific history. 
Western Images of the Pacific 
It ;s common knowledge that Magellan crossed the Pacific from east to west 
and by accident came upon Guam in 1521. His own perception of the Chamorros, 
who liberated all pieces of iron from his ship that they possibly could, is 
clear: Magellan named the Marianas the Islands of Thieves. During the 17th 
and 18th centuries, the Spanish and Portuguese were particularly active in the 
Pacific, but there was little impact in Europe. Indeed, both nations hoped to 
make great fortunes from the island world, and they were secretive about their 
voyages. 
Excitement about the Pacific had to wait until the voyages of exploration 
by Bougainville and Cook, and it was they who triggered off a great reaction 
in Europe and America. Cook was the more important of the two. R. A. Skelton 
(1969:25) has commented that before Cook's time, the Pacific was almost a 
closed book to Europeans. New Zealand biologist H. Newton Barber (1970:88) 
has indicated that the first of Cook's three voyages was significant in at 
least three ways: 1) the development and demonstration of new precision in 
navigation; 2) the major island discoveries that were made; and 3) the 
precedent that was set for taking scientific observers on voyages of 
exploration. Sir Joseph Banks, the naturalist abroad the H. M. S. Endeavour, 
went on to become famous in his own right. 
To place the voyages of Bougainville and Cook into context, it must be 
recalled that in the 18th century there was the somewhat popular notion that 
at an earlier time, humans had existed in a purer, a better, a more innocent, 
and more happy state. Of course, I am referring to the notion of the "noble 
savage" that J. Rousseau had done so much to promote. Bougainville had read 
Rousseau, and when he arrived in Tahiti in mid-1767, he thought he was the 
first European to land there, and he was certain he had discovered paradise. 
(Actually, the British explorer Samuel Wallis had beaten Bougainville to 
Tahiti a few months earlier.) Bougainville reported that the climate of the 
islands was all that could be desired. He was under the impression that the 
land provided a bountiful sustenance and the people were not required to 
work. Bougainville found the Tahitians to be physically a beautiful and 
handsome race, and the sexual availability of women did nothing to change his 
opinion. 
2 
Bougainville named Tahiti New Cythera after the Greek island where 
Aphrodite, the goddess of love, had risen from the sea. Later, Sir Joseph 
Banks was also overwhelmed with Tahiti. As Bernard Smith (1960:26) has 
written: 
Banks was just as enthuSiastic; to him as to 
Bougainville, Tahiti was the Golden Age come 
again. The sexual freedoms of the people filled 
him with admiration and delight, but in his English 
way, he was more circumspect about it than the 
Frenchman. 
Smith also reminds us that there were two contrasting notions about the 
nature of the "noble savage." On the one hand there was the view of "soft 
primitivism" which was represented "by the Tahitians. Life was portrayed as 
:,~:, being easy, and people were pure and gui leless. Their lives were fi l1ed with 
pleasure and uninhibited sex. On the other hand, there was "hard 
primitivism." It was represented by people who lived in harsher climates 
which made them tough and Spartan. They supposedly did not need or want all 
of the material goods considered necessary by Europeans, and thus they were 
better off. In the Pacific, indigenous people of Australia, New Zealand, and 
Terra del Fuego were thought to represent this type. 
It goes without saying that the image of the "soft primitive" made the 
greatest impact upon Europeans. It was the image that appealed. Perhaps all 
humans could find their Tahiti, or in a broader sense, what came to be taken 
for Polynesia as a whole. 
A little over a century after Bougainville and Cook, a certain J. G. Wood 
published a tome with the title The Uncivilized Races of Men in All Countries 
of the World, and he commented on another group of Polynesians: 
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Being savages, the Samoans have many of the 
imperfections which necessarily accompany savage 
life, but at the same time they approach nearer to 
the "noble savage" of the poet than most races of 
men. They are hospitable, affectionate, honest, 
and courteous, and have been well described as a 
nation of gentlemen. Toward strangers they display 
a liberality which contrasts greatly with the cruel 
and blood thirsty customs of the Papuan tribes 
(1878: 1008). 
These idyllic images of Polynesia and Polynesians came to be incorporated 
in and sustained by popular literature. In his book The Mentor published in 
the 1920's, Frederick O'Brien, a former editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, 
offered this view: 
I have roamed from Sakhalin to Tonga. Above all, I 
have loved Polynesia and shall remember it 
longest. In it are the most lovable and handsomest 
untutored men and women that grace the earth 
(quoted in Wolfram 1984:49). 
The romantic myth about the islands is what is conjured up by such phrases 
as the "South Seas," and the "South PaCific." It is the stuff that movies are 
made of and the range has been great, from Dorothy Lamour in her sarong of the 
1930's to the third and latest film version of the Bounty. To those of us in 
Hawaii, it is obvious that the myth sustains a tourist trade. And myths die 
hard. After more than a dozen years of the extremely popular TV show Hawaii 
Five-O, with viewers watching Jack Lord chaSing the bad guys around in a very 
urban Honolulu, tourists still arrive expecting to see the mythical islands 
and not the high rise bUildings which fill the sky line. Perhaps the epitome 
of the myth appears in the Broadway musical version of James Michner's Tales 
of the South Pacific and one thinks of the lyrics from the song Some Enchanted 
Evening. 
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The nature of J. G. Wood's reference to the Papuan tribes should remind us 
of another image about the Pacific and its people. Something else enters in. 
Certainly Europeans responded positively to Polynesians, while the lesser 
known Micronesians were either ignored or lumped with Polynesians. In both 
areas, Europeans could relate to paramount chiefs at the apexes of stratified 
societies. Albeit inaccurately, these were seen as the same or similar to the 
kings and nobles of the Old World. The oral histories about great voyages and 
battles stimulated the imagination. The freer sexuality found most places 
certainly had its attractions, but it was also very important that the 
Polynesians and their Micronesian cousins were of the "right" color. They are 
the lighter skinned peoples of the Pacific. 
In contrast, the Melanesians represented what Europeans did not prefer or 
understand. As their very name indicates, the Melanesians are the 
black-skinned peoples of the region. The fragmented and small polities with 
their respective "big man" leaders were difficult to deal with and did not 
make sense to early Europeans. The prevalence of magic, sorcery, and in some 
instances, cannibalism, were an anathema to the white interlopers. The very 
geography of the large Melanesian islands made them more difficult places and 
their less healthy environment made them less attractive. It is not an 
accident that Douglas Oliver's book of some thirty-five years ago, The Pacific 
Islands, consistantly referred to the Melanesians as "savages." The book, 
like all other things, was a product of its time. 
The point is, Europeans had a strong tendency to idealize Polynesians, and 
eventually, the latter were even sent to missionize parts of Melanesia. The 
combination of all these factors gave the Polynesians a sense of superiority. 
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Understandably, this has caused resentment among Melanesians, and these 
emotions affect regional politics today. Sentiments related to what is 
sometimes referred to as the IIMelanesia alliancell are real and have some 
depth. Further, a sense of a common racial heritage and the sharing of 
Melanesian pidgin in the Solomons, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu are all 
variables which tend to promote a certain cohesiveness among the Melanesian 
states. 
The above mention of the mission effort reminds one that there was another 
important and powerful perception held by many Europeans about Pacific 
peoples. It was the opposite of the IInoble savage" notion, especially that of 
the soft variety. The pagan could not be noble. As the islanders were living 
without knowledge of Christ and the God of the Hebrews, they were living in a 
state of pathetic sin. From the missionary view, the islanders were enveloped 
in an age of darkness. They had to be converted and Westernized. 
The unconverted could only be ignoble, and the thoughts of Hiram Bingham 
as expressed in his mid-19th century book A Residence of Twenty One Years in 
the Sandwich Islands make this perfectly clear. Reflecting on the early days 
of the mission effort in Hawaii, Bingham reported: "Darkness covered the 
earth and the gross darkness of the peoplell (1855:2). 
His overall view of Hawaiian culture and society is reflected in the 
following: 
Polygamy (implying plurality of husbands and 
wives), fornication, adultery, incest, infant 
murder, desertion of husbands, wives, parents and 
children; sorcery, covetousness, and oppression 
extensively prevailed.... The heathen system, 
therefore, tends to immeasurable evil (Ibid.:21). 
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No sooner had islanders been identified as noble or ignoble savages, 
another perception about them emerged. This is the notion of the "fatal 
impact," the subject and title of a well-known book by Alan Moorehead, and it 
saw the destruction of Pacific cultures and the depopulation of the 
indigeonous peoples as inevitable consequences of European contacts. By his 
third and final voyage, Cook himself was convinced that introduced diseases, 
the creation of new wants, and the general disruption of island societies were 
tantamount to their death toll (Howe 1974:138). Mission activity came under 
fire from proponents of the view. For example, the Russian explorer Otto von 
Kotzbue was extremely critical of the disruptive activities of individuals 
like Bingham (Ibid.:138-139). Early anthropologists, working in the Pacific 
contributed to the general acceptance of the fatal impact view. In his 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski expressed his opinion that the 
subject matter of ethnologists was rapidly vanishing (1961 [original 1922]: 
xvi ). 
During the 1920's and 1930's, the conviction that Pacific peoples were 
doomed to extinction remained firm even though there was mounting evidence 
that populations were recovering. R. W. Robson founded the magazine Pacific 
Islands Monthl~ in 1930, and he predicted the Pacific would soon become a 
"whiteman's lake" with the demise of Pacific islanders. Robson was the first 
advocate of regional cooperation, but his concept of regionalism was far 
different from today's. Robson had in mind associations of European planters 
(Fry 1979:46-47). 
Immediately prior to World War II, it was becoming. increasingly evident 
that Pacific populations were not dying out. Felix Keesing called for a 
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change in view. He noted that island populations were not only recovering, 
but that they were increasingly youthful ones. 
During the nineteenth century and even into the 
twentieth century virtually every commentator 
foresaw no future ahead of the South Seas peoples 
except a more or less speedy decline to 
extinction. So widely was this mournful picture 
publicized that most people accept it as holding 
true today. Actually, however, from before the 
turn of the century, depopulation has been stayed 
in an increasing number of Oceanic groups, and the 
trend has usually been reversed in the direction of 
marked increase (1941:37). 
In a lecture on the University of Hawaii campus in the fall semester, 
1984, historian K. R. Howe pointed out that the fatal. impact era of thought 
also involved a particular viewpoint by writers of history. These are issues 
that Howe has touched on in an earlier article (1974) and his recent book 
(1984). In his lecture here, Howe suggested that we might conceive of Pacific 
history as falling into three periods. In the first two periods, Pacific 
islanders were not only thought to be on the road to extinction, they were 
also seen as being of little importance in shaping their own histories since 
European contact. Islanders were viewed as passive, on the receiving end of 
changes initiated by Europeans, and not initiators of innovations themselves. 
Howe suggested that there was first "imperial history" which was concerned 
with the "official agents" of colonial powers, i.e., explorers, missionaries, 
colonial administrators, and perhaps military types. Second to appear, there 
was a history of "European expansion" when it was realized that "unofficial 
participants" had to be written into the scheme of things past. Such 
unofficial actors included beachcombers, whalers, traders, etc. From this 
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perspective there were waves of various categories of outsiders, and hence the 
title of Howe's recent book, Where the Waves Fall. Howe's history includes 
the responses and actions of islanders, however, and that places his work, in 
the third period of Pacific history. This era was launched under the 
direction of J. W. Davidson of Australian National University (ANU). It 
recognizes that islanders were not passive in the wake of the arrival of 
Europeans, and that they were often as not creative and important actors in 
shaping the course of post-European events. As an anthropologist, I do not 
find this to be a startling insight. Under Davidson's influence, Pacific 
history at ANU became interdisciplinary in nature and graduate students began 
to include ethnographic style fieldwork as part of their doctoral studies. 
In a review of Where the Waves Fall, Peter Hempenstall tells us that: 
"The Davidson age is over ••• ," but he does not tell us what the future holds 
(1984:44). 
The Pacific as Scientific Laboratory 
I need to jump back to Cook's time. I noted earlier that on his first 
voyage, a precedent was set, that of taking scientific observers on exploring 
expeditions. This precedent helped to launch a revolution in biological 
thought and helped lead the way to the theory of evolution. The aformentioned 
Sir Joseph Banks, a naturalist, collected specimens of all sorts. He later 
became president of the Royal Society and was instrumental in establishing the 
policy that scientists would be regular fixtures on the exploring ships of the 
British Royal Navy. Banks was followed by a long line of scientific 
observers, up to and including Charles Darwin on the voyage of the H. M. S. 
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Beagle, which sailed on England's probes into the Pacific region. Darwin's 
observations, particularly those in the Galapagos, greatly influenced his 
thinking. To him, each island appeared as a laboratory experiment. The 
faunal species of each island differed in minute ways from those of others, 
and Darwin eventually concluded that successive generations had differentiated 
themselves from ancestral forms as new adaptations to isolated and local 
island environments. In another development, Darwin's theory about origins of 
coral atolls has subsequently been demonstrated as scientific fact. 
Later in England and after the publication of On the Origin of Species by 
Means of Natural Selection in 1859, others defended Darwin. Two of his most 
prominent supporters were Joseph Hooker, an eminent botanist, and Thomas 
Huxley, the self-proclaimed "bu 11 dog of Darwinism." Like Darwin, both had 
spent their formative years on voyages in the Pacific (Jastrow 1984:230). 
While scientific inquiry in the Pacific had lasting impact on the 
biological sciences, the Pacific has also greatly influenced my own academic 
discipline of anthropology. Modern anthropology has mainly been a product of 
British and American academia. In England, Thomas Huxley encouraged what was 
to be come the Torres Straits Expedition, conducted between 1898 and 1900. 
Its three principal members, A. C. Haddon, W. H. R. Rivers, and Seligman went 
to the field as practioners of other disciplines but all became ethnologists 
because of their experience on the expedition (Eggan 1968:128). The three men 
trained the next group of anthropologists to emerge in England, including the 
founders of the two varieties of functionalism which came to dominate British 
anthropology for decades. Bronoslaw Malinowski was a student of Seligman and 
others at the London School of Economics, and as those familiar with 
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anthropology well know, Malinowski set the standards for modern field research 
in the Trobriand Islands during World War I. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown was the 
first ethnological student of Rivers and Haddon at Cambridge, and while he did 
not work in the Pacific, his initial fieldwork was in an island society, the 
Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal between 1906 and 1908. Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown trained the next generation of British social anthropologists 
and had a significant, but lesser, impact on American anthropology. 
In the United States, Margaret Mead's first field research was in American 
Samoa in 1926 and it led to her famous book Coming of Age in Samoa. Mead 
later worked in several locations in what is now Papua New Guinea. Mead's 
anthropology was definitely influenced by her work in the Pacific; it is an 
understatement to indicate that her own influence both within and without the 
discipline has been nothing short of phenomenal. Her greatest impact was on 
the American public. Mead popularized anthropology. Cultural relativism and 
the importance of culture as a determinant of human behavior have been widely 
accepted because of Mead; she carried the basic messages of American cultural 
anthropology to the world at large. Mead's portrayal of Samoan sexuality 
unintentionally also reinforced the romantic and popular view of Polynesia. 
The next really significant involvement of American anthropologists in the 
Pacific came with World War II. During the very early years of the war in the 
Pacific and under the direction of George Peter Murdock, anthropologists 
helped prepare informational handbooks for the military occupation of the 
Pacific. Immediately after the war, Murdock directed the Coordinated 
Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (ClMA), the largest anthropological 
expedition ever launched at the time. 
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American Micronesia or the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was 
also the scene of one of the most ambitious experiments ever launched in 
applied anthropology. The anthropological involvements in the Trust Territory 
included some of America's best known anthropologists. The names of Homer G. 
Barnett, Ward H. Goodenough, and David Schneider came immediately to mind as 
senior Micronesian hands who have made substantial contributions to 
anthropological theory. A host of others are also well known, and many of 
those who were first involved in the Trust Territory have trained students .who 
have also worked in Micronesia. Those students have in turn tutored the third 
generation of Americans to work in the area, and generation four is now 
emerging. Micronesia is probably the most studied culture area of the world, 
and the overall impact on American anthropology has yet to be measured. 
Thus, the Pacific Islands have had great impact on biological and 
anthropological thought. In both cases, the ,islands have been viewed as 
laboratories. Clearly, islands offered biologists somewhat the equivalent of 
relatively isolated breeding populations, and like Darwin's birds and 
reptiles, island societies were and have been viewed by anthropologists as 
entities in the process of continual modification and adaptation to their 
insular environments. It is not surprising that some of the best work in 
cultural ecology has come from the PaCific. 
The Islands in World Affairs. 
With the exception of Spain's possession of the Marianas beginning on 
Guam in 1668, the partitioning of the Pacific among the colonial powers was 
accomplished in the 19th century. The Pacific was thus the last area of the 
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world to fall under the yoke of European colonialism. The French acquired 
Tahiti in 1842, and the race for colonies was on. The colonial powers hoped 
for profit, but more often than not, national pride and prestige were equally 
at stake. In any event, the colonial division of the Pacific was complete by 
about the turn of the century, and the islands had had some importance in' at 
least European affairs between the 1840's and 1900 when they were the prizes 
in European colonial expansion. 
By the turn of the century, not only was the colonial partition complete, 
but all island groups had been missionized. Trading firms and plantations had 
been established, and the colonial era was firmly in place. Little new was 
occurring, and the Pacific came to be viewed as a relatively unimportant 
backwater of the world. Certainly in America, there was little interest in 
the region. The U.S. Navy had its outposts at American Samoa, Guam, and 
it:'· Hawaii and the comnercial interests in the last were firmly tied to the 
American mainland. Knowledge about the area was also limited, and as a 
result, the aforementioned anthropological research at the outset of the war 
was launched as an emergency effort. 
The Pacific became of world wide importance with the outbreak of the war, 
but not because of the islands or their people. It was the arena in which 
Japanese imperialism was to be fought, and Western propaganda portrayed the 
Japanese as the "yellow peril" to be cast out of the region. When that was 
indeed accomplished, interest in the islands waned once again. 
While the importance of the PaCific in world affairs declined after the 
war, there was a difference from the pre-war years. Partly out of the 
idealism of the global conflict, there was a new social and moral 
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consciousness, and it was no longer respectable to be a colonial power in the 
old sense. In 1947, the South Pacific Commission was formed by the 
metropolitan powers in the region, and there was a belief that more should be 
done in the areas of education, health, and general social welfare. K. R. 
Howe (1974:145-146), suggests that Westerners, especially Americans as a 
consequence of their deep involvement in the Pacific war, felt a sense of 
guilt about what had occurred in the islands since the intervention of 
outsiders. Howe believes this theme is reflected in two works on Pacific 
history of the time: J. C. Furnas's Anatomy of Paradise (1946) and Douglas 
Oliver's The PaCific Islands (1951). Howe also comments that there was "... a 
feeling of growing responsibility for the region in the post-war era" (Ibid.). 
At least in the British Commonwealth, the notion that the region demanded 
some new and a different kind of attention came with the beginning of 
decolonization. The process began with Western Samoa's independence in 1962, 
and at least on official governmental levels, the metropoles have had to pay 
more attention to the region. The eleven recently independent and/or 
self-governing states must be treated as such, and four of them are now 
members of the United Nations. As the two metropoles most reluctant to give 
up their Pacific colonies, France and the United States have been the last to 
show a responsiveness to these developments. The U.S. Department of State did 
not establish an Office for Pacific Affairs until 1978 (previously the Pacific 
Islands were lumped with Australia and New Zealand), but the belated creation 
of that separate office does represent recognition of the new political 
status of the island states. 
14 
There are two other major sets of forces that are shaping contemporary 
views of the Pacific. In one of these, the island Pacific is being overlooked 
and the context is primarily economic. High level government officials in the 
United States, Japan, and elsewhere and the editorial pages of the Honolulu 
newspapers speak of a pan-Pacific community, and it is projected that the next 
century will be the century of the PaCific. There is a Pan-Pacific Community 
Association, Inc. headquartered in Washington, D.C., and it publishes a 
Pacific Community Newsletter. The association is a private organization, but 
its "embers include U.S. ambassadors, congressmen, as well as influential 
leaders in the business world. On the surface, all of this might suggest that 
the Pacific Islands are on the verge of becoming more important players on the 
world stage. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth in the eyes 
of those involved in the discussions. The discussions about a pan-Pacific 
community are now being conducted by the Pacific rim countries and reflect the 
fact that trade among the large Pacific rim countries, particularly Japan and 
the United States, is now larger than trans-Atlantic business. At a Pacific 
Cooperation Conference in Bangkok three years ago, the actors were Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Japan, Melanesia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States. As an after thought, 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea were invited to attend the conference, but neither 
attended. 
It appears relatively clear that in the deliberations among the rim 
countries, the Pacific is viewed as an empty expanse of water to be plied by 
the containerized shipping vessels of the rim's economic giants. The island 
nations are Simply overlooked, or only belatedly remembered, and some island 
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leaders have expressed a fear that the interests of their countries will not 
be considered except as they occasionally might be of relevance to the 
economic concerns of the rim nations. 
While there is some current concern over fishing rights in the region, and 
in the distant future, the mining of the sea beds within the exclusive 
economic zones of Pacific nations may be a source of interest, the resources 
and products of most Pacific countries will not generate much immediate 
attention from the major economic interests in the region. However, the 
second set of forces operating in the region will not allow it to be perceived 
as an unimportant backwater as was the case between the turn of the century 
and World War II. Unfortunately perhaps, the main reasons are the perceptions 
which linger from the war. In the United States, there are strong feelings 
that it would be undesirable to allow any part of the Pacific region to fall 
into hostile hands. The compacts of free association which have been 
negotiated with the Micronesian states include the stategic denial of any 
third parties and reflect this defense concern. The desire of Australia and 
New Zealand to preserve the dominance of English speaking nations in the 
Pacific has roots which date back to the last century. They appear to be 
pleased that the United States will maintain a strategic presence in 
MicroneSia, and the three ANZUS partners are united in their wish to prevent 
the Soviet Union from gaining a toe hold in the Pacific. 
Given the combination of the facts that the West has a strategic interest 
in the region and that nine Pacific nations have achieved independence and two 
others are self-governing in free association with New Zealand, those eleven 
countries have considerable leverage with the Western metropoles that will 
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extend well into the next century. Three Micronesian states may well soon 
join them as even newer self-governing states in free association with a major 
Western power. 
The Pacific is not the paradise as envisaged by the early explorers. Like 
most nations of the world, Pacific countries have real problems which must be 
dealt with, and the following papers make some projections as to what the 
region may look like in the next one and one-half decades. 
My own comments here have been concerned with the changing images of 
Pacific Islands held by the outside world during different historical 
periods. That these have always been, at best, partial or confused should be 
clear, nor is there reason to believe that images of the Pacific in the year 
2000 will be less subject to the distorting effect of other cultural lenses. 
I have not had the time or space to discuss the efforts of Islanders 
-l:it themselves - whether in the field of politics, science or the arts - to 
present different kinds of images to the nations beyond their vast ocean 
realm. The success or failure of these efforts will be a matter of the utmost 
interest as the Pacific enters the 21st century. 
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY 
INFLUENCE OF OUTSIDE POWERS 
by 
Henry S. Albinski 
Harold Wilson is reputed to have remarked that, in politics, two weeks is 
a long time. Looking forward five, ten and even fifteen years is obviously an 
elusive enterprise. But it is not an unprofitable enterprise, and its 
meaningfulness in relation to plausible political and security scenarios of 
the Pacific island scene, more or less as of the year 2000, is particularly 
apropos. It is apropos because it deals with a regional setting whose 
international significance is increasingly recognized, yet which is highly 
susceptible to outside power influence, and for the time continues to define 
and shape its own personality. 
The present assessment undertakes to anticipate outside power political 
and security effects by applying categories of analysis that coincide with the 
island countries' own perceived, dominant concerns. To begin, however, some 
special attributes of the Pacific island region should be noted, since they 
impose more than usual difficulties on efforts to make confident projections. 
At least three, distinctive features that typify the Pacific island 
community invite special caution in forecasting the region's middle range 
future. The first refers to decision-making style within the island 
countries. The resident countries are small with disproportionately modest 
and relatively unspecialized bureaucratic establishments. There in other 
words is not much by way of independently gathered intelligence data, 
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analytical expertise or breadth of applied experience that can be passed to 
political decision-makers. Political parties do not themselves enjoy much 
institutionalized autonomy which otherwise could enable them to influence the 
judgments of political elites. The senior political elites operate in 
contexts of substantial personalized authority, and often are second or still 
first generation national leaders, with wide national visibility and following. 
The upshot is highly individualized decision-making in the Pacific 
islands. Since this condition is not likely to change much in the next ten or 
fifteen years, the region will remain governed in a manner conSiderably less 
routinized, less subject to institutional constraints and therefore less 
predictable than would obtain in more established and complex political 
systems. The intangibles surrounding leadership styles and programmatic 
preferences among the region1s remaining non-independent entities, especially 
those under French control, further obscure efforts at determining 
foreshadowed political behavior, and thereby regional-outside power relation 
outcomes. 
A second factor complicating confident scenario-building refers to various 
intraregional characteristics. Hence, the greater South Pacific region, or 
Oceania, can be construed as a series of subsets as well as a greater region 
in itself. The Melanesian/Micronesian/Polynesian distinction is more than 
cultural. The Melanesians for instance represent the most populous group, 
thereby engendering unease elsewhere as to their possible interest in or 
capacity to dominate South Pacific affairs. Overall, the Melanesians have 
emerged as the most politically militant on international questions. Until 
now most of the South Pacific Forum members have represented a British-New 
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Zealand-Australian colonial background. Consensus has arguably been easier 
than it will be toward the end of the century when there will be more 
independent regional entities, and the newcomers will be of French and 
American colonial/administrative derivation. In other words, the region will 
become more, not less, politically diverse, fragmented and complex, and 
outside powers will find it more difficult to anticipate its behavior and to 
respond to it. 
The subtheme of this phenomenon is that interstate rivalries within the 
region will likely accentuate, beyond the kind of jostling exemplified by 
aspects of PNG-Fiji relations. The reasons for increased interstate rivalry 
could include maneuvering for leadership, widening differences in political 
orientation or in preindependence heritage (for instance the behavior of a 
postindependence New Caledonia), the susceptibilities of regional countries to 
more intense, outside power blandishments, or regional country apprehensions 
about outside power reprisals against offending policies. The latter point 
has been intimated regarding Fiji's periodic reluctance to offend France, lest 
France influence EEC policies that could undermine Fiji's sugar market. 
Domestic disturbances in the island countries could of course severely 
discommode some of the most carefully laid predictions about the region's 
politics. One of the more obvious circumstances would entail social disorder 
over the political future of the French territories. The effects would be 
felt among neighboring states as well as the actual sites of commotion. In 
case of trouble in New Caledonia, there would be especially profound effects 
on Vanuatu's approach. And, in the last resort, conflict in established, 
sovereign nations cannot be entirely discounted; for example plural society 
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tensions in Fiji or secessionist unrest in PNG. Apart from impact on the 
political integrity of such affected nations, serious civil disturbances could 
distract or even incapacitate those nations in respect to their normal role as 
Pacific island community actors. 
A final caution about forecasting conditions in the South Pacific refers 
to outside rather than to resident states. Even assuming that there is no 
overt breakdown in the central balance, or regionally, the essential point is 
that many of the interested outside powers are latecomers to approaching the 
South Pacific region as a whole. They may have had a historically distant 
political presence (e.g., Japan); or they may focus mainly on one segment of 
the region (e.g., the US vis-a-vis Micronesia and the special case of American 
Samoa); or they may have been present for some time but without being 
especially mindful of wider, transregional political/security implications of 
their policies (e.g., France); or they have been rebuffed and to date unable 
to establish a meaningful foothold (e.g., the Soviet Union); or like the ASEAN 
nations they have simply been preoccupied with Southeast Asian affairs and 
have paid little heed to the South Pacific. At bottom, recency, indifference, 
lack of access or other limiting circumstances have prevented a number of 
outside powers from crystallizing and practicing policies that are well honed 
and truly in place. Until such crystallization becomes more evident, outside 
power behavior will be more volatile, or at least more tentative and 
experimental, than those searching for confident projections for the region 
might prefer. 
As a group, the Pacific island countries are economically weak, dependent 
and vulnerable. As populations grow, there is little to compensate through 
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indigenously generated wealth. Most have no industries to speak of. Most 
rely on one or two cash crops or catches. Only PNG and New Caledonia contain 
known natural resources of international market consequence. Pacific country 
EEZ (exclusive economic zones) seabeds have to date not yielded optimistic 
forecasts of natural wealth. The more important companies operating in the 
islands are foreign. The region's trade is only inCidentally intramural. It 
instead flows beyond, predominantly to former or continuing metropolitan 
powers - theANZUS countries, Japan and France. The island countries are 
moreover deeply dependent on outside power technical assistance and a host of 
civil aid measures. We are reminded that PNG, the region's largest and in 
respects most economically viable member, has for years had its ongoing 
budgetary requirements lavishly subSidized by Australia. 
These economic circumstances are familiar, but warrant underscoring for 
purpose of their forseeable political effects. The guiding assumption is 
that, within ten or fifteen years, these circumstances will not materially 
change. The island countries will remain poor and sorely dependent. They 
will not be able to dispense with a sizeable outside power presence, in aid 
form or otherwise. The question therefore is who will likely be providing 
such economic backup, and with what political implications. 
Probably the most plausible forecast is that it is the western outside 
powers that will continue their dominant economic roles. One explanation is 
simply that of habit; recipient countries will continue what has become 
familiar and for the most part has not been overbearing. A second reason is 
that some of the alternatives will probably remain politically unpalatable. 
The Soviets are not welcome politically, are regarded as strangers, and are 
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part of a perceived great power rivalry that could flare up if they were 
allowed greater economic access to the region. Australia's and in degree New 
Zealand's panicked reaction in 1976 to the prospect of Soviet aid to Tonga and 
Western Samoa in exchange for certain facilities will surely remain in the 
consciousness of regional countries. These countries can expect to extract 
more assistance from the ANZUS powers, but credibly cannot afford to push them 
to the brink of alienation. The Chinese are more benignly regarded than are 
the Soviets and have relatively little to offer. But their persistence in 
matching or checkmating Soviet initiatives is theatre that island countries 
will not wish to encourage. 
Carried thus far, our scenario has the strong inference, that, continuing 
in their pervasive regional economic role, outside powers will continue to 
exercise disproportionate political influence. This will likely be the fact, 
but with some variations on prevailing trends being possible and even likely. 
First, the balance between and among donor nations could well shift, 
carrying corresponding political overtones. The subregionalization of aid 
programs is already moving away from the conventional practice of Australia 
being preeminently active in Melanesia, New Zealand in Polynesia and the U.S. 
in Micronesia. So as not to become overdependent on a single donor, PNG 
welcomes New Zealand aid, and Western Samoa welcomes Australian aid. Given 
its far greater resources, Australia already outstrips New Zealand in the 
amount of money it injects into the Pacific island countries, even if 
assistance to PNG is discounted. New Zealand's endemic economic troubles 
could easily contribute to a widening of the gap. After a time, the 
disparities might reach such an order of magnitude that New Zealand's 
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political weight in the region could perceptibly recede. If for sake of 
discussion successive governments in Australia continue to stand closely with 
the United States on regional security issues while New Zealand becomes a kind 
of odd man out in ANZUS, or indeed if de facto or de jure ANZUS is 
reconstituted without New Zealand, from a general western point of view New 
Zealand's relative economic - and by indirection political - retraction in the 
region might not be lamented. 
There are some other calculations to be made, including those involving 
the United States. Apart from its substantial economic commitments to the 
Micronesian territories, the U.S. has only very light aid programs directed at 
the island countries. These programs are in fact of a volunteer and indirect 
character. Should various congressional and other advice prevail and the U.S. 
were to adopt straightforward, bilateral aid programs toward the islands much 
of the present, regional aid/politics equation would shift. If the U.S. 
instituted aid programs of any significance in countries previously served 
mostly by Australia and New Zealand it probably would run the risk of sooner 
or later offending Canberra and Wellington at least on complaints of turf and 
precedent. Probably more importantly, as a newcomer donor who also happened 
to be a great power without satisfactory, pan-regional credentials, the U.S. 
could become embroiled in controversies with recipient countries in ways that 
the Australians and New Zealanders do not precipitate. 
Whatever any forthcoming U.S. aid role in countries presently dominated by 
Australian and New Zealand aid programs, a prospective American role in 
presently French controlled territories could produce a different set of 
political outcomes. Assuming that New Caledonia and/or French Polynesia will 
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have moved to independent or virtually independent status roughly by the year 
2000, it would not be improbable that American commercial interests would take 
a keen interest and that official aid would be proferred. This is said with 
the acknowledgement that former French territories world-wide have for the 
most part maintained close cultural and economic ties with France. The French 
themselves might nevertheless prefer to facilitate an American economic 
presence, perhaps as a form of counterpoint to political influence from New 
Zealand and Australia, the island community's closest western friends and who 
will probably continue to be much more publicly critical of French regional 
policies than will the U.S. 
In the last resort, however economic assistance from outside powers is 
allocated, by the turn of the century the island countries are likely to be 
more feisty about their dependence on such aid and the quid pro quo of their 
political good behavior that they might infer as that being the price expected 
by donors. Or, even if few such inferences are drawn, there will be the 
simple sense of national pride. Already, from various Pacific island 
quarters, have come protestations about Australia and New Zealand playing Big 
Brother, about their undue influence in regional councils, and about the need 
for non-island states to be more sensitive to that somewhat amorphous notion 
of The Pacific Way. 
Defense assistance and protection for island countries can also be 
foreseen as having a more troubled passage by end of century than currently 
obtains. It is well to remember that, even apart from various defense 
cooperation programs, the Pacific island community is substantially covered by 
some form, literal or implied, of outside, western power defense protection. 
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The French territories remain garrisoned by French forces. American Samoa 
will foreseeab1y remain in the U.S. hands and falls directly under the 
American defense mantle. Neighboring Western Samoa has at various times by 
extension been construed as falling within the ANZUS ambit. New Zealand 
retains explicit defense responsibility for the Cook Islands, Tokelau and 
Niue. The U.S. will continue to exercise treaty-linked influence over the use 
of abandoned defense facilities in Tuvalu and Kiribati into the 1990 1s. U.S. 
arrangements for control over the defense of Micronesian territories will 
continue into the 21st century. Australia has no formal commitment to defend 
PNG, but traditional connections and informal understandings impose special 
responsibilities on it. 
It is also well to recall that the ANZUS partnership is welcome throughout 
most of the Pacific island region, and that several island countries have over 
time indicated interest in becoming associated with the alliance in some 
form. TheANZUS nations have sensibly demurred, both because of what such 
additions would do to the integrity and intimacy of ANZUS, and because such 
steps could aggravate regional great power rivalry. 
All the same, outside, western power contributions to regional country 
defense arrangements face more rather than fewer complications in the years to 
come. Even if no local emergencies arise and assistance from protecting 
outside powers is not invoked, sensitivity - indeed hypersensitivity - about 
outside power military intentions is likely to become more standard fare in 
the region. A recent example is the exclamation of a former PNG foreign 
minister that New Zealand's proposed armed forces reconfiguration to enhance 
rapid deployment was an ominous sign of "gunboat diplomacy" in the South 
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Pacific. Another example is the apprehension in the Solomons particularly 
that the U.S. military action in Grenada could quite literally presage 
American gunboat diplomacy in the South Pacific when the U.S. found itself in 
some dispute with a tiny and defenseless regional country. 
It is not likely that the formal or implied outside power defense 
commitments to island countries will need to be invoked against the major 
communist powers. This does not however imply that the region's defense 
security will be carefree. The prospect of an overt clash between Indonesia 
and PNG over Irian Jaya border problems lingers. The Indonesians would not 
appear to have any interest in aggravating their Irian Jaya troubles by 
chewing off parts of PNG and, inter alia, thereby prospectively having to deal 
with Australia. Since no skirmishing on the border beyond a low level is 
likely, Australia will not need to make a hard choice between "defending" PNG, 
and maintaining its special Indonesian relationship. The trend that 
Indonesia's continuing scrapping with PNG could accelerate, however, is that 
Indonesia would continue to forfeit opportunities to become the principal 
bridge between the ASEAN and Pacific island communities. The Malaysians would 
then probably continue to develop the principal ASEAN presence, with political 
influence following economic involvement. 
But, whether the motive is to create a fire brigade for regionwide 
deployment, or somehow to remind potential, outside nation governments such as 
the Indonesian or the French that the island community will not be 
intimidated, a multinational regional force such as Julius Chan once 
recommended has no serious prospect of success. The smaller regional states 
would only become more apprehensive about bigger power (e.g., PNG) 
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aspirations. After all, among the island countries, only PNG, Fiji and Tonga 
have armed forces as such, only the first two have any meaningful capability, 
and PNG's is by far greater than Fiji's. Second, in part because of the 
existing or foreseeably continuing network of outside power defense 
commitments, these same powers will continue to be averse to encouraging 
regional military fire brigades whose composition and utilization could lead 
to an obfuscation of the assumed terms of existing protective aprons and 
defense pledges. An action such as PNG's assistance, with Australian backup, 
to suppress the rebellion on Espiritu Santo on Vanuatu could, as an ad hoc 
event, conceivably be repeated. Even in the Santo case, however, Fiji's nose 
was somewhat bent out of joint over how PNG comported itself. In sum, little 
embellishment to standing features of defense cooperation and protection is in 
prospect. 
The Pacific island community is devoted to the principle of eliminating or 
containing great power rivalry within the region. Being small, frail and far 
removed from the centers of international competition, the resident countries 
wish to avoid becoming pawns or victims. Their means to accomplish this are 
not however straight and easy, and very likely will become more difficult as 
uncomfortable policy dilemmas are imposed. 
The issue of limitation of great power rivalry in the region can be 
approached from both diplomatic and defense vantage points. The first 
dimension entails choices of diplomatic representation and of membership in 
international movements or in blocs and alliances. The recent diplomatic 
pattern in the region is quite straightforward. Western nations and 
especially Australia and New Zealand are the most visible among outside powers 
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in terms of residential diplomatic representation. The U.S. on its part is 
stepping up its own regional representation. The Soviets lack any residential 
representation, while the Chinese are present in PNG, Fiji and in Western 
Samoa. 
The western and especially ANZ predominance is easily explained. 
Australia's and New Zealand's geographic proximity, prior and largely benign 
colonial connections, high level aid programs, innate interest in the region, 
and the personal ties and moderate politics of regional elites all add up. 
The Soviets have been rebuffed because in large measure their situation is the 
reverse of Australia's and New Zealand's regional assets, because their 
invited presence would itself inspire great power rivalry in the region, and 
lastly because of ANZUS nation advice that Moscow be kept out. The Chinese 
have been able to establish some entree because they have not been perceived 
to be as menacing as the Soviets (and indeed behave as friends of the west), 
and because, after initial doubts, the outside western powers raised no 
objection. Vanuatu's case is to date aberrant. As a matter of professed 
neutrality and evenhandedness, no recognition has been extended either to the 
U.S. or to the Soviet Union. Vanuatu has also stirred controversy by 
establishing nonresident relations with Cuba, and has become the only regional 
nation to join the Non-aligned Movement. 
Looking ahead toward the end of the century, the existing general pattern, 
with Vanuatu as the exception, would appear to have reasonable but not 
sanguine prospects to survive. A continuingly elusive variable will be the 
outlooks and political temper of the succeeding generation of regional 
elites. More substantively, the regional pattern could well be disturbed, and 
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there would be "more Vanuatus," or diplomatic proclivities even more extreme 
than Vanuatu's, if the French territories are beset by commotion and then 
emerge with a bruised and angry governing elite that holds little sentimental 
brief for the west. There also is the Chinese factor. Chinese influence, and 
the regional countries' political receptivity of China, will probably either 
be as much as it is now - low key and of little direct impact - or tilting 
toward negative. China's regional role is largely a transposition of its 
dispute with the Soviets. Hence China supports a western political and 
security presence in the South Pacific. In so doing it essentially confirms 
western country regional preferences. But China's anti-Sovietism, which 
dominates its desire to preempt or counteract the Soviets, is to repeat a form 
of major power rivalry transferred to the region. That is an unwelcome notion 
in the region, and its manifestation could spillover and prompt resident 
countries to review their prevailing, essentially pro-western aligned stance. 
In this sense, because of the way it is carried out, China's pro-western 
approach in the region could by indirection be injurious to western interests. 
The comment regarding the plainly pro-western orientation of most Pacific 
island countries leads into the rather more complex issue of outside power 
defense entitlements. Nuclear considerations apart, the basic question is 
whether these western privileges are likely to be challenged as being out of 
keeping with avowed regional interests that stress an escape from major power 
rivalries. Two related perspectives can be applied to this question. The 
first addresses the prospect of the introduction of a non-western military 
presence in or around the island countries. The second addresses prospects 
facing the retention of existing western defense facilities, or the 
introduction of new ones. 
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It is well to bear in mind that the fundamental, western power rationale 
in the area is strategic denial, specifically vis-a-vis the USSR. The island 
countries do appreciate this consideration, but as a regional matter rather 
than as the local manifestation of the global context of great power 
competition. Their perception is that the success of strategic denial means 
exclusion of Soviet footholds and thereby exclusion of intraregional 
competition for political and security advantage. For the time being they do 
not view the preponderance of western power as in itself provocative toward 
the Soviets, and thereby as regionally destablizing. As with diplomatic 
policies, the survival of these attitudes will depend heavily on the next 
generation of elites. But certain special events may intervene. Again, an 
agitated process of decolonization in the French territories could tempt an 
attitude of a curse-on-both-great-power-camp-hauses. While the point is 
stretched, Vanuatu might continue to flirt with such notions as allowing 
Soviet naval visits, and an independent New Caledonia might become equally 
unsporting toward western powers and their interests. In a dozen or fifteen 
years, the U.S. in particular might regard such prospects - not just realities 
- with utmost gravity. The reason is that if the strategic balance in the 
western Pacific were to shift away from the U.S. and its allies, if the 
Philippine bases became untenable, then the strategic lines of communication 
leading southward from the eastern edge of Micronesia, into the vicinity of 
Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and New Caledonia, down into the Tasman Sea and 
round the southern coast of Australia would receive more active attention. It 
would be an open question whether the United States would press Kiribati and 
Tuvalu hard to renew the then-expiring treaty clauses designed to keep 
35 
unwanted third parties out, and to continue arrangements for possible U.S. 
return to abandoned defense facilities. It would also be an open question 
whether in such circumstances the U.S. would exert uncommonly firm pressure to 
insure that Vanuatu and New Caledonia did not permit Soviet interposition. If 
only for the sake of argument, such American pressure, even in a cause the 
remainder of island countries regard as sensible, could offend their 
sensibilities about big power heavyhandedness, and thereby reduce western 
political standing generally. 
The possible loss or degradation of American naval and air bases in the 
Philippines would be a powerful political as well as strategic blow to the 
U.S. For a host of reasons, reconstituting such facilities in Japan or in 
Western Australia would be unfeasible. Despite depreciation of effectiveness 
and the costs involved, the only alternative would be relocation on Guam, and 
very likely the reactiviation of facilities on Tinian and Saipan in the 
Northern Marianas. The U.S. might also find it militarily expedient to 
increase its presence in the Micronesian entities now heading for 
independence, and especially to invoke clauses in its arrangements with Palau 
for contingency use of military reservations. 
Guam and the Northern Marianas are American territory. The Micronesian 
territories will be independent states, freely associated with the U.S. for 50 
years, well beyond the year 2000. These considerations are not immaterial, 
but they could come to lose much of their meaning. should a major U.S. 
strategic shift into Micronesia be undertaken. Right or wrong, peoples on the 
affected land masses could protest. Their governments, which will be included 
in regional councils such as the South Pacific Forum, could raise an alarm. 
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The South Pacific regional countries could well perceive the whole American 
enterprise as chilling reminder of what great powers do when it suits them, 
including introducing military might more squarely into the region and 
conceivably prompting a Soviet riposte. The U.S. and other western powers 
would however probably swallow island country displeasure and loss of 
political welcome as the price of salvaging vital military capabilities west 
of Hawaii. 
The nuclear factor overlaps military basing and weapons systems issues. 
The island community has a collective abhorrence for things nuclear. The 
Americans tested nuclear weapons in Micronesia for years. The French continue 
to do so Mururoa, and have indicated they would probably be proceeding for 
another fifteen years - i.e., until about 2000. China has tested ICBM 
delivery vehicles in the area, and the U.S. continues to do so. Problems 
associated with nuclear waste disposal exercise the island countries. As 
nuclear armed U.S. vessels and occasional Soviet attack submarines ply the 
South Pacific waters, the resident countries are unnerved by the prospect of 
nuclear weapons being employed in anger in the region. 
The middle-range future suggests three ways in which nuclear related 
contingencies could affect the region's political and strategic development. 
One is French testing, which will apparently continue regardless of who 
governs in PariS, and of how strongly the island countries complain. The 
island community's disapproval of France is compounded by dissatisfaction with 
its regional decolonization process. The net effect will likely be more, and 
more severe, attacks heaped on France on both fronts. In the course of these 
attacks the island countries could find themselves frustrated by absence of 
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equal fervor on the part of Australia and New Zealand, which are members of 
the South Pacific regional structure and among the area's most influential 
partners. Similarly, the telescoping of French nuclear testing and 
deco10nization policies could incrementally contribute to political radicalism 
in the region, further upsetting relations with the ANZUS nations. 
A second, nuclear-related domain of contention surrounds proposals for a 
regional nuclear-free zone (NFZ). If adopted, a zone of the type proposed by 
Australia at the 1984 South Pacific Forum meetings would in and of itself have 
little bearing on island country-outside power relations. Prospective 
injunctions against nuclear proliferation, nuclear testing, and nuclear waste 
disposal suit nearly everyone, including most outside powers. Freedom of the 
high seas would not be restricted under an NFZ scheme, and each regional 
nation would decide for itself whether it would allow port visits to outside 
power naval units without reference to their armament or propulsion. The U.S. 
and France would not in any event realistically be expected to accede to 
denuclearizing their own regional territories, namely Guam and French 
PolyneSia, in the face of some hortatory Forum proclamation. 
A potential problem would however seem to lie below rather than on the 
surface of such an NFZ proposal. Since the original, 1975 regional zone 
scheme was adumbrated, a key lesson has been that a great deal of what 
transpires depends on the interest, initiative and pleasure of Australia and 
New Zealand. Until mid-1984 the two ANZAC partners essentially harmonized 
their positions. The election of Labour to office in New Zealand in July 1984 
constituted a major change in New Zealand nuclear matters, both as they 
pertain to ANZUS alliance affairs and in regard to the outlying South Pacific 
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community. Two related consequences are possible. With New Zealand and 
Australia out of synchronization, the island community countries will have 
less firm guidance than in past, thus rendering the regional decision-making 
process, and an approach to consensus-building, more complicated. It could 
also aggravate differences toward the west and nuclear matters specifically 
already manifest among regional members, as for instance between Vanuatu and 
Fiji. Moreover, assuming the New Zealand government's position remains fixed, 
its displeasure with things nuclear could, even in the face of Australian 
objection, induce wider anti-nuclear sentiment among island countries. This 
could mean holding out for tougher NFZ terms or, following New Zealand's 
example, as a matter of national choice refusing to accept visits by nuclear 
powered or armed' vessels. The current user of such privileges in selected 
island countries is the U.S. The loss of occasional port visit opportunities 
in the current South Pacific context would be of little practical 
consequence. But pressures could be exerted on or within the new Micronesian 
entities to forbid such visits. Should this arise, the implications for 
U.S.-Micronesian relations would be most unpleasant, espeCially in light of 
prospective military prerogatives that the U.S. Will. be enjoying there. 
Moreover, speculations about the Micronesian territories aside, a combined New 
Zealand-South Pacific island nation boycott of American ship visits would make 
it more awkward for Australian governments, especially Australian labor party 
governments, to maintain currently hospitable ship visit policies, and could 
carryover into the domain of existing American defense installations on 
Australian territory. Access to Australia is of dramatically greater 
strategic importance to the U.S. than is access to New Zealand or to the South 
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Pacific islands. Hence the spillover effect from the context of a regional 
NFZ, with New Zealand's conduct indicating ANZUS nation discord and tempting 
island countries to follow in kind, could contribute to a profound change in 
the regional security equation. 
The third, nuclear-related scenario brings us back to American defense 
connections with the Micronesian territories. The U.S. does not have nor does 
it contemplate bases as such in the emerging entities. But, even if basing 
problems in the Philippines do not cause the U.S. to invoke contingency 
facility use in the Micronesian areas outside Guam and the Northern Marianas, 
the prospect of heightened local displeasure with a U.S. presence cannot be 
discounted. Whether any such criticism could impair U.S. access is 
problematical. But there already are such precedents as a mass sit-in by the 
Marshall Islanders at the missile testing range at Kwajalein as an assertion 
of land rights, and coordination between Micronesian and French territory 
movements seeking not only independence but comprehensive, regional 
denuclearization. 
Decolonization is another, major political theme that preoccupies the 
Pacific island countries. Both the U.S.-associated Micronesian entities and 
the French territories remain unevolved into independence, but it is the 
latter that really offends regional sensibilities. Resentment of France is of 
course magnified by criticisms of its nuclear testing program. Since France 
has indicated that the testing program will last another fifteen years, it is 
not unlikely to consider an act of self-determination in Polynesia before the 
turn of the century. Indigenous independence sentiment is to be sure weaker 
there than in New Caledonia. In New Caledonia, the French have promised 
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self-determination by 1989. But the indigenous independence parties wish to 
hasten the process and have threatened to boycott interim elections and other 
territorial events. 
The combination of New Caledonian independence party impatience, public 
goading of France by South Pacific island countries and by Vanuatu 
particularly, the complex ethnic composition of New Caledonia and France's own 
economic and political interests there could well become combustible. The 
French themselves have warned of something on the order of a white "Rhodesian" 
outcome if French authority were retracted and radical, indigenous movements 
tried to force their way to power, with bitterness and bloodshed the result. 
Such a scenario aside, it is well to recall that New Caledonia has already 
been disrupted by political violence. More commotion is the likely prognosis. 
A critical consideration is that if New Caledonia is to undergo a sharply 
divisive political transition, and then be governed by Kanaka elites who were 
radicalized in the independence movement, there would be considerably wider 
implications for the region. Militant champions of New Caledonian 
independence, such as Vanuatu, could then be found working with new, regional 
ideological friends rather than remaining a distinct minority within the South 
Pacific community. If only to escape isolation and labels of political 
reaction, other, more moderate island countries could in the meantime have 
been thrust into tough-minded positions. The entire community could in fact 
undergo a tilt toward a more assertive, radical and possibly anti-western 
posture, especially if it was felt that outside western powers had let the 
community down on the New Caledonian issue. 
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A politically radical New Caledonia could feature such measures as 
allowing Soviet diplomatic representation and civil aid, and generally being 
unsympathetic toward western interests. There already have been intimations 
that the Kanak Socialist Independence Front has been establishing links with 
Libya. New Caledonia's geostrategic location would add to misgivings in ANZUS 
capitals as well as in Beijing and in Tokyo. It is also possible that 
anti-colonial momentum generated over New Caledonia would spillover into 
Micronesia. While the U.S. would likely have foresaken its United 
Nations-sponsored, strategic trust political control by the time of New 
Caledonia's independence, the prospective terms of treaties with the 
Micronesian entities could easily be turned on as forms of lingering 
colonialism, inherently unequal and forCibly extracted. Given the strategic 
stakes involved, the United States would not wish to comtemplate a revision of 
the defense terms of the treaties, whether the pressures to do so were of 
local or of broader, Pacific island community origin. The potential 
radicalization of an independent New Caledonia would be disincentive, not 
incentive, to surrender American rights over the Micronesian entities' 
external affairs, or access to defense facilities. 
These speculations about the South Pacific region's future have focused on 
political and strategic themes, primarily as identified by member countries 
themselves, and with particular reference to great power interplay. With all 
the requisite caution about foreseeing conditions at the turn of the century, 
it would appear that the political and strategic format in the region will be 
somewhat different, and more unsettled and troubled than it is today. Outside 
powers will themselves have substantially contributed to the shape of things 
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to come. Their capacity for political management in the region will have been 
attenuated. Vis-a-vis one another, they will not likely be in the kind of 
virtual state of stasis that has characterized the past years. 
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ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
by 
Te'o Fairbairn 
It is often said that the Pacific Basin Region is poised to enter a new 
economic era which will bring new levels of prosperity to its people. Such a 
belief is not totally without foundation; after all, the Pacific contains 
within its boundaries some of the most dynamic and rapidly growing economies 
in the world, many of whom are world leaders in technology and 
industrialization. With its vast ocean areas, the region is rich in marine 
life and its land masses contain substantial quantities of key minerals: 
copper, gold, nickel and phosphate as well as hardwood timbers. Energy 
potential is not insignificant while the strategic value of the region is 
recognised by the Western Alliance which so far as the South Pacific island 
countries are concerned has implications for their ability to secure financial 
aid resources for development. Not for nothing has it been said that the 21st 
century is the era of the Pacific. 
For the small island states of the region, however, the promise of an 
impending 'golden age' needs to be treated with caution. In an uncertain 
world, many key resources may take years to develop, and some with apparent 
promise may yet prove to be commercially nonviable. It is likely that 
meaningful participation by PaCific island countries in the development of 
their fishery resources will continue to be frustrated by lack of capital and 
technical expertise. Distant fishing nations will continue to reap the major 
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benefit until these deficiencies are remedied. And, while rapid growth 
continues to be enjoyed by the Pacific Rim countries, little impact is likely 
to be felt by the smaller islands economies of the region. 
These generalisations aside, it is clear that Pacific Island countries 
differ widely in their resource endowment and their capacity to achieve 
economic growth. The best prospects are held by the larger island countries 
such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji which are relatively well endowed with 
natural resources. With these, the potential is there to sustain cumulative 
growth and to achieve significant economic transformation in the coming 
decade. Far reaching changes in the social and economic life of these 
countries can be expected and these will be manifested through such avenues as 
the attainment of higher levels of social and welfare services; greater 
diversification of economic activity; stronger involvement of foreign capital; 
accelerated urbanisation; and a further decline in subsistence activity. 
In sharp contrast are the prospects for the very small island economies: 
economic growth cannot be envisaged because of poverty of resources combined 
with rapid population growth. Living standards are likely to remain at low 
levels and the absence of economic opportunities will be reflected in 
continuing aid dependence, growing unemployment and pressure to emigrate. 
This paper addresses the contrasting economic condition of Pacific island 
countries, their development prospects and the important influence of regional 
initiatives and foreign. aid. It also reviews recent policy and strategy 
proposals whose implementation could significantly affect future development. 
To simplify, the analysis focuses on three categories of island countries, 
principally those under the Forum umbrella, whose size and resource potential 
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suggest (1) continuing economic growth, (2) limited growth and (3) no growth. 
This three-fold typology is not meant to be all embrasive, e.g., a notable 
omission is the special case of Nauru; but it is convenient for the purpose of 
the present discussion. 
Growth Economics 
This group includes what can be considered the lucky countries of the 
region: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (and arguably New 
Caldedonia). Together this group accounts for an estimated 3.7 million, or 84 
percent of the region's estimated current population of 4.5 million. Each has 
the potential to achieve cumulative economic growth and structural 
diversification based on the exploitation of both land, sea-based and tourist 
resources. Through a disciplined planning approach and backed up by a 
considerable input of private foreign investment, these countries have already 
made notable advances in developing their resources and in improving their 
living conditions. 
By comparison with many other island countries, this group controls 
fishing zones that are relatively well stocked with tuna and have relatively 
large land areas as a basis for achieving significant agricultural 
diversification, whether it be subsistence food, cash crops, livestock or 
forestry. Rich mineral deposits are found in Papua New Guinea and to a lesser 
extent in Fiji and Solomon Islands. Hydro-carbons have been found in Papua 
New Guinea but hydro-power, biogas and solar energy possibilities are present 
throughout. Forestry is a major resource in Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands while exotic forest varieties are being developed on a large scale in 
Fiji. 
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Considerable success in the exploitation of natural resources including 
minerals, is reflected in exports. Although gold and copper account for just 
over half her export earnings ($480 million out of $913 million in 1982) Papua 
New Guinea can boast at least half a dozen other major natural resource export 
products: coffee, cocoa, copra, copra oil, palm oil, logs and tea. Fiji 
exports are dominated by sugar, which accounts for about half her total export 
earnings, but the degree of diversification is also notable here. Important 
exports include coconut oil, gold, canned fish, ginger and an array of 
processed and manufactured goods such as cement, paint, cigarettes and light 
engineering items. For Solomon Islands the range covers fish, wood products, 
palm oil and copra; and for Vanuatu, copra, cocoa, frozen fish and chilled 
beef. 
Though export earnings have generally been static over the past few years 
due to poor commodity prices, they have nonetheless expanded markedly over the 
decade as a whole. From 1975 to 1982, export earnings (in current values) 
more than doubled for Papua New Guinea and Fiji but multiplied five fold for 
Solomon Islands and three fold for Vanuatu. These are impressive 
performances, meaning in effect that there has been a growth in exports in 
real terms, and in the case of Solomon Islands, a very notable one. 
With exports as an engine of growth, the national incomes of these 
countries also expanded markedly. Fiji's GOP doubled from 1975 to 1982; Papua 
New Guinea's rose by 30 per cent from 1977 to 1981 and from the limited 
evidence available, it appears that it more than doubled for the Solomon 
Islands over the past five year period. This suggests positive values for 
economic growth in real terms (which for Fiji has averaged 3 per cent annually 
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in the period 1977-82) and since these rates were above population growth, 
incomes per head have been rising. This is no mean feat when viewed against 
the adverse effects of the recent global recession. According to available 
national income figures, the level of GOP per head (1982) amounted to $1,637 
for Fiji, $820 for Papua New Guinea and $670 for Solomon Islands (see Table 
1). These are well above income levels recorded for most developing countries 
in the world. 
The major factor underlYing these growth performances has been successful 
export diversification through natural resource development. Minerals have 
played a large part, especially for Papua New Guinea and Fiji, but the 
increased processing of natural resources has been significant. This has been 
an important factor in the expansion of industrial sectors, particularly in 
the case of Fiji where industrial activities and processing now account for at 
least 12 per cent of GOP - the highest in the region. 
The growth momentum continues apace with the development of new major 
resource projects. In Papua New Guinea work has reached an advanced stage on 
the Ok Tedi project in the Western Province to develop huge deposits of gold 
and copper. The mine is said to contain 34 million tons of gold deposits, 
yielding 2.9 grams of gold per ton, and 376 million tons of ores bearing 0.7 
per cent copper, 0.6 grams of gold and about 0.14 grams of silver per ton. 
The cost of bringing the mine into operation is estimated at $1.6 billion 
(1981 prices) and the first stage of the mine opened in 1984, beginning with 
gold. When it is fully operational it will dominate the economy of Papua New 
Guinea in much the same way as Bouganville did in the previous decade. 
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Other major projects being developed in Papua New Guinea are the Ramu 
Sugar project which commenced production in 1982 but with its full potential 
not yet realised; a revival of the tuna industry; timber milling; and survey 
work on several newly discovered mineral deposits. 
In Fiji, the harvesting of vast pinewood forests will make a significant 
impact on the econ~ and will open up many industrial opportunities. New 
sugar acreages are being developed while further major expansion can be 
expected from ginger, cocoa and citrus fruits. Productive projects currently 
being implemented in Solomon Islands encompass forestry, tuna fishing, and a 
commercial venture in palm oil and coconut. 
Limited Growth 
Western Samoa and Tonga are illustrative of this middle level group, where 
agriculture and related activities provide scope for growth, but their future 
potential is restricted by a limited land area and opportunities for major 
industrialisation and tourist development. Additionally, there is little 
indication so far of the existence of commercially exploitable minerals. 
Exports are dominated by 'traditional' products: copra and other coconut 
products, cocoa, bananas and coffee, with a variety of other items including 
light manufactures, but these are small in total. Thus, Western Samoa relies 
heavily on coconut oil, cocoa, taro and timber with coconut cream, beer, soap 
and fruit juice providing a degree of diversification. Tonga's exports are 
dominated by coconut products including coconut oil and desiccated coconut, 
with certain fruit and vegetable items also prominent. Between 1975 and 1981, 
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Western Samoa recorded a slight upward trend in copra coupled with strong 
expansion in taro exports, but the overall performance in real terms has been 
static, a situation also seen in Tonga. 
National income per head is among the lowest in the region, varying 
between $400 and $500. Principally because of this, Western Samoa has been 
classified as a least Developed Country (lDC) by the United Nations. Some 
growth in real national income appears to have occurred during the 1970's but 
the recent experience has been one of decline because of adverse terms of 
trade, generally deciining export production and an ever-rising population. 
Subsistence production continues to play a significant part in the 
economic life of the group; as a proportion of GOP, subsistence production is 
equal to 32 per cent in Western Samoa, and 26 per cent in Tonga which 
compares, for example, to only 8 per cent in Fiji. Opinion varies regarding 
the development potential of subsistence sectors, but at the present time they 
remain of considerable importance as a source of livelihood for many island 
countries. As well, they provide a measure of security against the vagaries 
of the world economy as a 'fall back' in times of economic crisis. 
Development prospects mainly depend on ~~e ability to develop presently 
unused land for agriculture and to improve the productivity of existing 
agriculture. Other possibilities lie with the development of agricultural 
processing and tourism. 
Countries in this group must contend with powerful constraints to 
development. Among the most intractable problems are the existence of rigid 
traditionally based land tenure systems, a low capacity to innovate, paucity 
of capital funds and skills, continuing vulnerability to international trade 
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instabilities and rapid population growth. Progress in selected areas will no 
doubt be made, but on a limited scale and irregularly, while adverse changes 
in world market conditions could quickly undermine the economic viability of 
apparently successful projects. For these and related reasons major 
breakthroughs in the foreseeable future cannot be expected. 
No Growth 
These are the I prob 1 em I economi es 
Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands. 
of the region: Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Apart from sea-based opportunities, 
poverty of land-based resources is severe and this combined with tiny domestic 
markets, geographic isolation and expanding populations, provides the 
ingredients for economic malaise and decline. A few countries have been able 
to stave off subsistence poverty through sustained emigration and a heavy 
reliance on foreign aid. 
Copra is the lifeblood of the group but small amounts of handicrafts and 
fresh fruits and vegetables are exported in some cases. Exports of fruit 
juice, processed fruit and clothing are significant in the Cook Islands but 
these are based mainly on two islands -- Rarotonga and Mangaia. On the whole, 
export earnings are not only small but have been static except in the Cook 
Islands, where, in recent years, exports have climbed noticeably. 
Recent estimates of national income per head vary from $600 to $700, 
except for Kiribati and the Cook Islands with $450 and $1,200 respectively. 
These are relatively high and reflect aid dependency rather than domestic 
productive capacity. All have probably suffered a decline in real income per 
head in recent years. 
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An additional handicap suffered by this group (with the notable exception-
of Rarotonga) is the low productive capacity of subsistence sectors reflecting 
poor soils and other unfavourable environmental conditions. Poor subsistence 
sectors explain in part the unusually high dependence on imported food 
compared with the larger island countries, as well as the modest contribution 
of the subsistence production to GOP. Thus in the case of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, it is estimated that subsistence production accounts for between 16 
and 18 per cent of GOP - about half the corresponding share for Western Samoa 
and Solomon Islands. 
With virtually no opportunities for growth, prospects for improved living 
conditions depend on aid, with emigration relieving population pressure. 
Possible regional and aid initiatives for small island countries will be 
discussed below and if implemented could result in major benefits. On the 
other hand, an absence of outside assistance would lead to an unavoidable 
drift to subsistence poverty. 
External Initiatives 
It is clear that by concentrating on natural resources as a basis for 
economic growth I have perhaps painted an unduly bright future for the larger 
of the Pacific island countries. The analysis has neglected the many 
obstacles that have to be addressed and overcome if the resource potential is 
to be realized -- a fact that applies both to large and small countries. On 
the supply Side, there are problems of raiSing development capital and 
securing the necessary expertise at all levels, but with limited local 
capacities, the bulk of these inputs must necessarily come from overseas. 
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Progress can also be obstructed by rigid adherence to customary forms of land 
tenure and socia-traditional attitudes, which impede the development of 
commercial agriculture and are inimical to innovation and development. 
On the demand side, problems arise over securing markets and favourable 
prices and the ability to cope with fluctuations in world market conditions. 
Poor export prices, if accompanied by rapidly rising import costs, can result 
in a serious decline in the terms of trade which can negate the effect of 
increased export production on national income. 
High costs of transport, both sea and air, and of public administrative 
services are further major constraints, particularly onerous for the more 
remote and dispersed countries. Testing social issues that invariably arise 
with development have to be faced, such as ensuring that the benefits of 
development are distributed on a reasonably equitable basis between the 
various social, occupational, ethnic and geographic groups. Also, almost all 
countries currently face serious balance of payments problems which need to be 
brought under control, stenming, in part. at least, from low export price 
levels and high import costs, including that for imported fuel. 
Such constraints remain an ever-present threat, frustrating efforts of 
island countries to realise their development aspirations. However, even from 
the most pessimistic assessment, the economic future of the larger countries 
still remains highly favourable by comparison with the smaller members of the 
region. A growing disparity in the economic circumstances of the Pacific 
islands is evident from the recent experience, but greater polarization can be 
expected in the future even allowing for the effects of foreign aid. One will 
find groups of countries thriving in a state of relative affluence amidst 
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those suffering economic deprivation - dramatic contrast to the traditional 
times when under subsistence conditions, economic status would have been 
fairly unifonn. 
Increasing fragility in the economic circumstances of the small island 
countries could have significant regional implications. Continuing economic 
weakness could leave little choice but to seek radical solutions including 
closer integration with a sympathetic metropolitan power and mass emigration. 
Such approaches will certainly undennine the coherence of the region making it 
difficult to pursue regionalism in a meaningful sense. Serious security 
problems could arise whose impact on the economic life of the region is bound 
to be detrimental. 
In the next 20 years will we see initiatives capable of promoting Pacific 
island development and assisting in particular the small resource-poor 
economies? The most interesting possibilities lie with foreign aid and 
regional initiatives. 
Regional Initiatives 
Much headway has been made in establishing a network of regional and 
sub-regional organizations that promote the economic life of the area and its 
constituent countries. The work of the South Pacific Forum and its 
Secretariat ann, SPEC, is well known at both the political and economic 
levels. SPC has been active over many years in the social and economic 
fields, while a variety of more specialised bodies have been established 
including the University of the South PaCific, the Pacific Forum Line (PFL), 
the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Trade Commissions and the like. 
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Largely under the auspices of the above organizations, a multiplicity of 
regional projects and activities have been designed and implemented, many with 
strong financial support from the United Nations agencies and other 
international bodies. Apart from the activities undertaken by the above named 
organizations, other regional activities include those involving energy, 
telecommunications, the environment, sea-based mineral exploration and various 
aspects of technical assistance and research. 
A notable initiative has been the negotiation of a trade agreement (the 
South Pacific Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement or SPARTECA) between 
two groups of Forum members; island countries on the one hand and New Zealand 
and Australia on the other. The principal aim of the Agreement, which came 
into effect in 1982, is to achieve progressively duty free and unrestricted 
non-reciprocal access into the two metropolitan markets for a wide variety of 
island products, as a possible means of boosting island trade. For the island 
countries it is a significant breakthrough, opening the way for increasing 
exports, and several countries, particularly Fiji, have gained notably from 
it. However SPARTECA is not a free trade agreement and it excludes or 
severely restricts the entry of a certain group of products of interest to 
island countries. Complicated administrative requirements have also provided 
a barrier in some cases. Above all, SPARTECA tends to favour, albeit 
unintentionally, the larger, more industrially advanced countries so that it 
operates as another mechanism for widening regional inequalities. 
Much more needs to be done regionally to increase the benefits to Pacific 
countries from exploiting tuna resources within their 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones. Many countries, particularly those where tuna is 
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concentrated, have high expectations about the development potential of this 
resource which is presently being exploited by distant fishing fleets with 
little benefit to island countries. The Forum Fishing Agency, which was 
established in 1979 with its headquarters in Honiara, carries out useful work 
in certain areas,· such as data collection and dissemination and keeping a 
registry of fishing vessels; but as Herr (1981) has noted, it contributed 
little initially towards policy coordination. Further progress in realising 
the potential of tuna calls for concerted action in the vital areas of 
surveillance (to prevent poaching); policy coordination; applied research on 
tuna stocks and migratory patterns; and planning of regional facilities and 
possibilities for joint venture activity. Indications that the United States 
is about to enter into a regional treaty to permit regulation of the highly 
migratory species is a hopeful sign which, if it eventuates, will undoubtedly 
open the way for a stronger regional effort to tackle some of these urgent 
problems. 
Though outwardly impressive, regional co-operation to date falls far short 
of what could be achieved. Progress has been most notable in the relatively 
'easy' areas where the benefits of regional co-operation are most obvious and 
can be realised without impinging too heavily on national sovereignty. 
Certainly, some tough areas have been addressed as for example, airline 
services and shipping, but an attempt to set up a regional airline failed and 
there is no certainty that the PFL will survive at least in its present form. 
Other difficult areas calling for closer economic integration and 
collaboration have been barely touched: industrial planning, regional trade 
co-operation, applied agricultural research and closer integration of 
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development planning and policy. All these and other related areas provide 
scope for future co-operation with attendant benefits to the region. 
Apart from these, there is scope for other initiatives that could promote 
development, particularly for the small island countries. For example, 
Pacific countries can strive to achieve a single regional voice in certain key 
international forums rather than, as often is the case, participating 
individually or as blocs. Greater unity would enable a truly regional 
viewpoint to be presented and would be advantageous in securing vital outside 
resources for development. 
Regional organizations need to give particular attention to the special 
needs of the smaller countries and ensure that this is reflected in their work 
programnes. Since the larger countries apparently gain the most benefit from 
the work of regional institutions, possible ways to remedy this bias should be 
considered. The provision directly of technical experts at no cost to the 
small islands might be one way of doing this; another is the establishment of 
an aid mechanism based on contributions (a regional tax?) from the larger, 
economically more advanced countries. Limited inter-island migration is 
another possibility. Through such initiatives it may be possible to reduce 
somewhat the extent of future economic polarization and disparity. 
Foreign Aid 
Pac.ific island countries have been receiving increasing amounts of foreign 
aid over the recent period, chiefly in the form of bilateral aid for budgetary 
and development assistance. As Table 2 shows, official development aid to the 
region, both as grants and concessionary loans, totalled just over $1 billion 
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in 1982, or $208 per head. There are several major recipients in aggregate 
terms but a notable feature is the relatively high amounts per head received 
by the ve~ small countries such as Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands. 
Given their limited financial capabilities, aid has played a large part in 
allowing island countries to meet some of their development aspirations. Aid 
has supplemented local budgetary resources rather heavily in some cases and 
this has been important in raising living standards above what would otherwise 
be sustainable; but for almost all countries aid has been crucial in 
supporting national development programmes and without it few such programmes 
would have been viable. 
The rationale for aid giving rests on a complexity of motives that are 
historic, political, economic and strategic in origin. It is clear, for 
example, that political and military considerations underly French aid to her 
Pacific territories and to newly independent Vanuatu, while economic factors, 
particularly access to raw materials, are at the forefront of Japanese aid. 
Australia and New Zealand consider themselves an integral part of the South 
Pacific 'cornnunity' and feel a special obligation to foster development among 
their small neighbours. Underlying this position are strategic conditions 
related to maintaining political stability among island countries and ensuring 
that they remain within the Western Alliance sphere of influence. In effect 
their strategic value is a resource whose economic role can be I measured I , or 
partly so by foreign aid. 
While willing donors are likely to continue to be available, prospects for 
increased aid are not promiSing and indeed, the value of aid in real terms 
could decline markedly. On one side, certain traditional donors are facing 
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difficult economic conditions and have had to limit their aid. There is also 
a belief in some quarters that aid levels are already high and have reached 
saturation point, so that further increases are not justified. On the other 
side, some island countries take seriously their pledge to achieve greater 
self-reliance and may not wish to increase aid dependence. (Note too, that 
Australian 'budgetary' aid to Papua New Guinea of just over $300 million, is 
scheduled to be phased out during the next few years.) 
With aid looking less promising, Pacific island countries will need to 
explore new avenues for augmenting the supply of development capital and 
ensuring its efficient use. They will necessarily have to turn increaSingly 
to domestic sources for mobilising development funds, including new ways of 
raising tax revenue, increasing surpluses from public enterprises, broadening 
the institutional base for mobilising savings and careful control of 
government administrative expenditure. It need hardly be said that among the 
small countries the scope for achieving major increases from these sources is 
severely limited. 
Possible regional measures that may be taken to assist small island 
countries have been suggested in the previous section. Certainly, the 
development of effective regional mechanisms in the fields of fisheries, 
energy, transportation and sea-based mineral exploration could benefit the 
small countries in a major way, but overall, there is a need on the part of 
the international community to come to grips with the development realities of 
the problem economies and to devise innovatory approaches. A possible first 
step is for donors to come to terms with the continuing need for aid support 
and to accept that much of this support is justified on social and welfare 
grounds rather than on strictly economic ones. 
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Australia's aid programme was recently subject to an intense review by an 
officially appointed team (the Jackson Committee). The team report 
highlighted the predicament of Kiribati and Tuvalu and proposed that Australia 
should establish a special immigration quota to help deal with the unique 
problems of these two islands. Such a proposal is under consideration, but it 
represents the kind of regional initiative that could play a crucial part in 
meeting the development problems of the small island states. One hopes that 
Australia will accept this challenge. 
Other Policy Initiatives 
What other possible strategies are there for the category II and III 
Pacific island countries to stave off the seemingly ineluctable march to 
subsistence impoverishment? Recent analysiS point to a number of 
possibilities, some of which call for regional action on a somewhat grand 
scale. Among the more interesting proposals are those suggesting closer 
economic integration with outside countries and special domestic efforts to 
achieve major advances, especially in the fields of population control and 
technological progress. 
In a recent article (1982), Higgins has analyzed the various development 
options facing small Pacific island countries. He points out that attempts to 
develop in isolation as independent sovereign states or revert to old colonial 
and neocolonial ties (in part embodied in multinationals) in an effort to 
become part of a large system are options that would in many ways lead to 
disaster. Much more promising is an option based on the integration of 
Pacific island countries as a means of establishing a 'rational network of 
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interactions and flows among regional economies of the South Pacific' (Higgins 
1982, p. x). He argues in favour of political integration which would pave 
the way for the formation of a regional socio-economic political system which 
would be empowered to decide on vital matters affecting the economic 
development of the region; for example co-ordinated development planning. 
According to Higgins, such a scheme is the only meaningful way for these 
countries to achieve increased prosperity. The benefits are perceived to lie 
not only in co-ordinated planning and agreed economic specialization but in 
the scope for harmonising the relations of Pacific island countries, treated 
as a single unit, with countries outside the system. 
The importance of political co-operation has been emphasized by Fisk 
(1982) as a strategy for Pacific island development. There are many practical 
difficulties in the way of securing such co-operation but Fisk feels that it 
could be achieved through existing regional mechanisms such as the South 
Pacific Forum. By working together in this way, these countries can gain 
extra muscle in the international area. This will have significant 
implications for most Pacific island countries not only in the development of 
major resources, such as fisheries and sea-based minerals, but also in the 
area of aid and migration. 
The development constraints and options facing the small island states 
have also been studied by Doumenge (1983). He maintains that these islands 
lack both the space and the economic volume to set up a durable domestic 
structure, the only guarantee of genuine economic viability (p. vii). Such 
viability, which he defines as the productive capacity required to enable the 
wishes and aspirations of the population to be satisfied, can be achieved by 
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maintaining 'continuous relations' with foreign partners. More specifically, 
Pacific island countries can benefit from establishing 'privileged links' with 
the outside 'power centres' or 'poles' such as are represented by the major 
Pacific rim countries (California, Japan, Hong Kong, eastern Australia and New 
Zealand) and in particular, with the great North Atlantic metropolices (London 
and Paris in Europe, New York and Miami in eastern North America). These 
poles are multipurpose, with the capacity to create 'vital stimuli' as a base 
for generating development among island countries. 
Much the same conclusions are expressed in a report prepared by a team of 
experts in 1979, which, under the auspicies of ADB, surveyed the agricultural 
possibilities and overall economic prospects of selected Pacific countries. 
According to the team's report, a possible solution for the economic plight of 
the small countries is to become more closely integrated with a large 
metropolitan country, such as is represented by the present relationship 
between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. .This would ensure a regular outlet 
for surplus population on the one hand, and ensure a source of foreign aid on 
the other, but the cost would be to compromise economic and political 
independence. 
For the larger countries, closer economic integration with outside 
countries can have significant implications for trade policy as noted by 
Dornmen (1980). Here economic viability depends on the capacity to foresee 
changes in world economic conditions and to adapt to them by moving from one 
form of specialisation to another rather than undertaking a diversity of 
activities simultaneously. Favoured activities will be those that have a high 
income elasticity in world markets; but with few productive options, such a 
strategy has little relevance for the small countries. 
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The importance of domestic initiatives in shaping policies to save the 
economy from subsistence poverty has been highlighted in recent articles by 
Tisdell and Fairbairn (1984) and Fairbairn and Kakazu (1984). Employing a 
theoretical approach, Tisdell and Fairbairn show the island economies facing a 
restricted range of resources and population growth. Economic growth can 
occur but it is only a temporary phenomenon for, in time, the economy will 
revert back to subsistence levels as it comes up against population pressure, 
resources depletion and unfavourable international market conditions. It can 
even fall below subsistence levels if traditional skills are lost during the 
'development' phase. 
Against this scenario, Tisdell and Fairbairn explore the possibility of 
escape through appropriate planning initiatives. A first possibility is 
population control which government can promote through family planning and 
related programmes (and migration). The second is increased productivity and 
strengthening of subsistence sectors through the intensive application of 
technology to productive sectors. Taken in combination, changes in these two 
areas can lead to economic growth and an escape from low-level subsistence. 
But it is apparent that in practice, achieving major improvements in 
productivity calls for structural changes of a kind that few island countries 
would be prepared to undertake, and in the case of small islands, the 
potential is severely circumscribed by the small scale of the productive 
sectors. 
Fairbairn and Kakazu also demonstrate the possibility of economic collapse 
by small countries and a consequent reversion to subsistence poverty for much 
the same reasons noted above. To prevent such a collapse, they propose a 
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development strategy that gives greater emphasis to subsistence sector 
production, especially foodstuffs, as opposed to commercial production for 
export. The advantage of the strategy is twofold: first, it will reduce the 
severity of balance of payments crises that invariably follow' an 
over-commitrnent to export production; and secondly, it will result in greater 
self-sufficiency in food production and hence national economic independence. 
The swing back towards the subsistence economy implies curbing material 
aspirations of the population and this paves the way for achieving a more 
sustainable balance between these aspirations and resource capabilities. 
Finally, two relevant points for the designing of development strategy can 
be noted. First, smallness (especially if associated with compactness) means 
that certain national and community needs can be quickly met often with modest 
expenditure of capital funds. This can apply in the case of health facilities 
(presumably only one major hospital will be required), technical training 
facilities, wharves and airstrips and tar sealed roading. Furthermore, 
smallness can facilitate the spread of new techniques favourable to production. 
Secondly, small island countries have a potential to develop activities 
which exploit the advantages of insular remoteness and isolation. Wace (1980) 
has identified many such opportunities ranging from plant research and export 
of cut flowers to the establishment of testing grounds for noxious materials 
and military bases. leaving aside military bases, such 'remoteness specific' 
activities can provide a useful source of cash income making for greater 
economic security. These possiblities, though they seem unusual, deserve 
close consideration. 
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Concluding Remarks 
With prospects of increasing polarization in the economic conditions of 
Pacific island countries, particular attention needs to be directed at the 
plight of the smaller countries faced with limited or no growth scenarios. 
While continuing growth and improving living conditions can be expected to 
occur among the larger countries, the economic life of the smaller countries 
will remain static and probably decline through the sheer lack of development 
options. Unaided, some may find themselves in the next decade suffering a 
degree of subsistence poverty hithert~ unknown in the region. 
Addressing the needs of the small resource poor countries calls for 
innovatory approaches and this paper has suggested a few such possibilities in 
relation to aid and regional cooperation. But continuing heavy aid dependence 
is anathema in some cases while prospects for· increased aid are not 
promising. Perhaps it is time to take a more serious look at some of the 
recent proposals concerning the establishment of broader-based cooperative 
systems for the region as suggested, for example, by Higgins. A degree of 
political integration would provide the foundation for a stronger South 
Pacific Corrmunity and would, for one thing, clear the way for further major 
regional initiatives in the economic and social fields. Many benefits would 
ensue, but so far as the smaller island states are concerned, such a system 
will provide a valuable framework for focusing regional and international 
attention on their special problems and needs, and above all, will enable the 
development of meaningful solutions in a region-wide sharing partnership with 
their more fortunate neighbours. There are problems aplenty in the practical 
implementation of such a scheme but it may be the most effective means of 
resolving the dilemma of the small states. 
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COUNTRY 
American Samoa 
Cook Islands 
0\ 
0\ Federated States 
of Micronesia 
Fiji 
French Polynesia 
Guam 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Nauru 
Niue 
Northern Marianas 
Table 1 
POPULATION, PER CAPITA INCOME AND MAIN EXPORT 
PRODUCTS OF SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES 
POPULATION PER CAPITA MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS 
1982 (000) INOOME1 ($) 
33.9 4060 Tuna 
16.9 llH}n Fresh fruit and vegetables 
clothing, processed fruit and copra 
82.4 830 Copra, fish 
658.0 163()n Sugar, gold, coconut oil, 
fish 
153.8 4600II Coconut oil, vanilla 
108.4 486()n n.a. 
59.3 42()n Copra 
32.8 n.a. n.a. 
8.4 n.a. Phosphate 
3.2 620p Fruit products, copra 
18.4 4000 Vegetables 
0\ 
"-J 
New Caledonia 145.0 79008 Nickel and products 
Palau 12.4 n.a. n.a. 
Papua New Guinea 3126.6 82Gn Copper and concentrates, 
cocoa, coconut products 
Solomon Islands 243.0 67Gn Fish and fish preparations 
copra, timber, palm oil 
Tokelau 1.5 650 Copra, handicrafts 
Tonga 99.5 460f Coconut oil, dessicated 
coconut, fruit and 
vegetables 
Tuvalu 7.7 590f Copra 
Vanuatu 125.6 550 Copra, fish, frozen meat 
Wallis and Futuna 11.9 1030 Copra 
Western Samoa 157.0 605 Copra, cocoa, taro, timber 
1. Based on official estimates for either 1979 or 1980 except for Fiji and 
Western Samoa which are for 1982 and 1983 respectively. National income 
figures are GOP except for Guam, Vanuatu and Western Samoa which are GNPi 
with GOP at factor cost denoted by f, at market prices by m and producer 
prices by p. 
Sources: South Pacific CommiSSion, Demographic Unit, Noumea (for population 
figures)i Fairbairn 1984, Chapter 3i ADS 1984. 
()\ 
(Xl 
TAeu 2 
OfriCIAl D[VELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (OOA) FL/taiS BY SOURcr AI;D R[CIPI[IH 19J1Z IS Hill 1011) 
~,I ~ .-.. -----. ----. -- - -- -. ---,- -- . _. -, TOTAl I IUTI-AUSTPALIA UIIITEto U/IITED OTIIER I TOTIIl ADa [OF uriOP LATERAL ZEAlAND IUNGDOH STATES BILATERAl 8ILATERAL 
Cook Is l.nds 0.' 
--
9.0 
-- --
0.1 9.7 0.3 
--
0.5 0.1 
fIJI lS.9 0.3 3.1 3.2 2.0 6.1 30.' 
--
2.5 1.4 1.6 
French Polynesia 
--
176.0 
-- -- -- --
176.0 
--
0.6 
-- --
IClrib.tt 2.9 
--
0.4 9.S 
--
1.9 14.7 
--
O.l 0.2 0.3 
lfIuru 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
New C,ledonl. 
--
161 •• 
-- -- -- --
161.4 
--
O.c 
-- --
fUue 0.2 
--
•. I 
-- -- -- I •• 3 -- -- 0.2 --
Plct ftc Is (USA) 
-- -- -- --
160.1 C.5 i lM.6 -- -- 0.2 O.C p, PUI New Gu i net 263.6 0.3 2.0 0.1 
--
10.6 281.6 C.l 18.C 1.1 10.1 
Solo...,,, Is I.nds 7.2 
--
0.6 11.3 
--
J.] 22.4 2.2 2.1 0.6 0.5 
Tokel.u 
-- --
1.8 
-- -- --
1.8 
-- --
0.1 
--
Ton;a 6.1 0.2 2.3 1.1 1.0 1.8 12.S 0.2 2.5 0.8 I. I 
Tuv.lu 0.9 
--
D •• 3.5 
-- 0.8 5.6 
--
0.5 0.2 
--V.nuitu 4.1 9.6 0.9 7.8 
--
0.8 23.8 0.2 1.3 0.5 0.1 
:...1115 , futun. 
--
7.2 
-- -- -- --
1.2 
--
0.2 --
--
Io:es t. m Samoa 5.8 
--
3.3 
-- 1.0 5.6 15.7 1.2 2.5 0.8 2.0 
Unall oc. ted 4.7 3.4 12.0 0.8 2.0 1.3 24.2 
-- -- -- --
TOTAL 317.6 358 •• 39.9 37.3 166.1 36.8 956.1 8.4 31.8 1.2 17.3 
SOURCE: COII1piled from comPuter printouts provided by DECO, Pari5 And Table 1 (Population) 
TOTAL TOTAL 
HULTI- BILATERAL (01'4 
LATERAL HUll 1- f'['! 
LATERAL Hi:;:>lsl 
-
0.9 10.6 627.6 
S.S 36. I 54.9 
0.6 116.6 ' 11:8.4 
0.7 15.4 259.6 
-- -- --
0.4 161.8 1111'.2 
0.2 4.5 14t'2.2 
0.6 165.2 573.0 
35. I 316.1 101.3 
6.0 28.4 117.1 
0.1 1.9 1291.8 
C.6 17. I ! In.2 
0.7 6.3 eZ.1 
I 
2.7 26.5 I 210.9 
0.2 1.4 I 625.5 j 
6.5 2Z.2 i 1'2.3 
--
24.2 ; 
--f 
I 
I -
M.8 1020.9 i 208.5 
I 
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'lHE FU'lURE OF SClJ'lH mCIFIC REGIONALISM 
Richard A. Herr 
'!here is a widespread view in the South Pacific that regionalisn 
will be expressed in the future l::¥ greater organizational simplicity than 
is currently the case. Not only is such a d:Nelopnent expected, but also 
strenoous efforts have been made alreacti to attain this objective. In 
p:1rticular, a substantial share of the efforts toward regionalisn over 
the plst decade has been devoted to establishing a single regional 
organization (SRO).l Yet despite the activity and rhetoric in the 
direction of an SRO, I believe South Pacific regionalisn in the year 2000 
will be characterized l::¥ greater institutional diversity and thus by mre 
organizatioos. Nevertheiess, the p:op:>nents of an SRO will not be 
a::mp1.etely disapP)inted for the p)lic.ymaking process CJ)verning these 
organizatioos will beCDIle more roherent and integrated and thus adrlance 
the most imp>rtant aims of the SRO p:op)sal, in pirt. because of this 
diversification. 
South Pacific Regionalism -ond -SOvereignty 
CEntral to this visiro of the South Pacific's regional. future is the 
assunJ:X.,ion that regionalisn is essentially roncemed with 
intergovernmental re1. atioos. Its priIIary justification is the 
preseIVation and extension of state soverei<,Jlty. Whether there have 
been, or will be, unintended ronsequ:mces that have supranational 
implicatioos for regional integration is iImaterial to this position. 
Both in motivation and in action the rountries of the South Pacific, like 
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roost countries of the world, have sUpfX)rted the concept and practioo of 
regiooalisn princif8lly to secure their own natiooal interests (which, of 
course, may be interpreted as short-tenn or lmg-tenn or both). 
1bis explicitly stat&-centric model of regiooalisn carries with it 
sane implicit assertions about the nature and the role of regionalisn. 
Perhaps the most inportant of these for this assessnent of the future is 
the rejection of the pop.1l.ist-based idealist, and the eoonanic 
reductialist, views of regionalisn. ']he former term to regard 
regiooalisn as a mitigating devioo to moderate the divisive Wl\EJlces of 
sovereignty. ']he realists are inclined therefore to emIilasize 
intemational nongovemnental organizations (Im();) as roore effective 
wilding blocks to regional unity than intergovemnental organizations 
(IG();) since these are Pltatively closer to "the paople." 1be eoonanic 
!", , reductionists are not so much troubled by the morality of govemnent as 
by the roots of its behavior. ']hey parooive the foroos of eoonanics to 
underlie both cbnestic and intemational politics. 
Although popular sentirrents of amnonality have been vital to 
establishing the scopa and maintaining the level of regional activity in 
the south Pacific over the years, I regard this factor as largely 
instrtmental to the actions of govemnent. 1hat is, to the extent that 
govemnents support regional OO();, they <D so to make their p>licies at 
the IGO level IOOre effective and acooptable-not the reverse. ']his 
obseIVation, mwever, cannot be taken as a denigration of work of OO(); 
in the region. Nor can it be regarded as a jud9nent based on the 
compuative oparational efficiencies of nongovemmental organizations and 
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IGOs. Rather it is an assessnent of relative national priorities that 
helps to justify the focus on regional !GOS in this presentation. 
Perhaps more a difficult explanation to put aside is that of the 
econanic reductionists. 'nle view that ea:>nanic rationales underpin 
regional CX>Op!ration currently strikes a responsive chord in the South 
Pacific. R1ch of the demand for an SRO stens fran the same principles to 
whim the ea:>nanic reductionists subscribe. Begional ooop!ration allows 
amnunities of oountries to obtain oollectively ea:>nanic benefits that 
those states oould not secure individually. 'nlus the ea:>nomic 
reductionists allege that behind every politiau act (such as regional 
intergovernmental. ooop!ration) there is an eoonanic motive. 'nle SRO 
proponents would not necessarily reduce all !GOS in the South Pacific to 
such a single cause,blt they cb tend to p!rceive the major elanents of 
regionalisn in faiIly oonventional, ea:>nanicoostjbenefit temlS. 
SUp!rficially the record adds a verifying gloss. to the ea:>nanic 
reductionist interpretation •. All the major IGOs established since World 
War II have been founded to achieve limited developnental. (largely 
ea:>nanic) goals.2 'nle South Pacific Ccmnission (SFC), the Pacific 
Islands Producers' Association (PIPA), the South Pacific Bureau for 
Eoonanic Coop!ration (SPEC), the Fortm Fisheries· Agency (FFA), and the 
Coordinating camnittee for Offshore ProSp!cting/South Pacific 
(COOP/SCI?AC) would fit this mold, al though two organizations-S~ and 
SPEC-have broadened their original responsibilities in the inteIVening 
years. In addition, two important bodies-the University of the South 
Pacific (USP) and Pacific Forun Line (PFL) -have been created both to 
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contribute to the region's econanic developnent and to adlieve eoonanies 
of scale in the provision of needed services. 
Yet against this evidence must be weighed the colUltervailing data 
that the islands cb not p:ly for all¥thing like the major financial costs 
of regional organization. 'lhus reducing the justification for south 
Pacific regionalisn to econanic rationalisn cbes not app!ar to be wholly 
tenable. 'lhe islands contrirute only a minority of the bldget to the 
major IGOs-the highest levels being reached in smc and FFA where, at 
least until recently, the islands were resp:msible for one-third of the 
assessed contr ibutions. With extrabldgetary contribltions and 
supplanental flUlds fran nonisland contributors, txMever, the real levels 
have been probably nearer to 15 p!rcent.3 (Since neither Australia nor 
NS'i Zealand is considered an "island" in this pafer, I am treating their 
contribution as "outside" cbnations even though they are members of 
virtually all the maj or regional IGOs.4) 
Of course, it could be argued that the eoonanic justification for 
regionalisn need not be limited solely to the associated states' capacity 
to p:ly for the collective f:POds and services a<IIuired through regional 
ooop!ration. It may be sufficient that the organizational rrechanisn 
femits outside funding to be channeled into those plI'FOses. SUch an 
explanation, hcMever, begs the question of wlw the outside d:mors would 
seek to strengthen regional relations in the South Pacific or wl¥ the 
islands would acbpt. a regional approach if the outside funding could be 
made available directly on a bilateral basis. 
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'lhe reasons for funding may include ea:manic benefits for the ebnor, 
but they are scarcely amfined to this single PU:tose. 'lhey extend also 
to security interests, tolitical access, humanitarianisn, ideology, and 
the like. Such nonecxmanic factors may even lead to a reversal of 
oonventional eoonanic reasoning in specific cases, such as Australia's 
oontinuing assistance to the EFL despite the gravest econanic ebubts 
regarding this asp!ct of South Pacific regionalisn. 'lhe islands too seek 
more than just econanic advantages through their plrticipltion in 
regimal. coop! ration. 'lhe creation of the ForllI\ is the prim:lIY evidence 
of their wider a>ncems. Nevertheless, as I will argue here, even at the 
solely organizational level there are tolitical justifications for 
plrsuing less than optimally efficient (in ea>nanic teDllS) regiooal 
solutions to problans that might be treated bilaterally. 
'lherefore, without further belaboring this methocblogical toint, I 
slt:mit that the prinaty purtose of regionalisn in the South Pacific today 
and in the imrediate to intermediate future is to assist the anall, 
isolated, and relatively disadvantaged island states to better enjoy the 
benefits, and more effectively discharge the duties, of SOI7ereicpty. 
Further, if the notion is rej ected that ftevetything has a price ft (such 
that all state activities can be reduced to a line entry in an 
acoountant's ledger), the idea of sovereicpty embraces more than a 
siq[istic concept of eoonanic viability. Given the threats to and the 
pressures and limitations on the islands' exercise of sovereicpty noted 
by others during this series of seminars, regionalisn may prove vital to 
the success of the islands as nations on the threshold of the 
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twenty-first amtury. But to have this imp:lct, regionalisn itself must 
grow with the needs of the region. 
With oortain qualifications, I believe we will witness further 
growth in regionalisn (including institutions), as well as increasing 
so};ilistication in the ~ratioo of SOuth Pacific regional mO};eratioo ~ 
the year 2000. lJhe global trends of almost exponential growth in the 
nllIlbers of !G0s since World War II may not be maintained t¥ regional. IGOs 
in the South Pacific, but specialization and regulatory control are 
likely to ensure sane growth. And, as previously suggested, the 
exigencies of managing this growth will enforce a more rigorous pattem 
of interorganizational mO};eration that will be more CDIIlplex and 
so};ilisticated than the existing pattem. 
Rather than develop a mmplex matrix of p:>ssible arrangements based 
on a mlunn of organizations and a row of interorganizational levels of 
mmplexity, I will mllapse then into three basic sCEnarios of 
regionalisn for the future. lJhe three scenarios are presented in order 
of increasing probability. 
scenario 1: " Regionalism:in "Decline 
A decline scenario would arise should there be the same or fewer 
organizations with less CDIIlplexity or fewer numbers with the same level 
of mmplexity t¥ the year 2000. In any of these circtmstances there 
would be sane loss in the current levels of intergovernmental. <DO~ration 
in the South Pacific. Given the present robustness of regionalisn, such 
a decline seems unlikely and yet certain factors muld bring about such a 
developnent. 
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One set of circunstances that conceivably could result in a reduced 
level of regionalisn derives fran the <¥namics of current intemal 
pressures 00 intergovermnental coop:!ration in the South Pacific. SUch 
factors incl ud! the willingness of govermnents throughout the region to 
work together, the p:!rceived viability of altematives to regionalisn, 
and the appuent success or fail ure of existing regional arrangements. 
All of these have arisen as problans at various tines in the p:lSt, and 
they could reanerge with greater force in the future. 
Perhaps the priIIaIy intemal ~diuent to regional action has been 
the app:!al of ·slbregionalisn.· 'Ibis teen has been used frSilEntly as a 
eUIbanistic expression for ethnic division, puticulady between the 
~anesian and Polynesian areas of the South Pacific. Al though such 
differences have been contained heretofore, it is possible that the 
attraction of greater integration into a l£lanesian Alliance (including 
New caled:>nia), divergent security p:!rSp:!ctives l:¥ the EOlynesian states, 
the anergence of a larger Micronesian bloc, or other pressures might 
inhibit the willingness of the island nations to work together 
extensively 00 a region-wid! basis. It is also imaginable that the less 
ethnically based typ:! of slbregionalisn, as evidenced l:¥ the formation of 
the Nauru Agreanent group within the FEA,S could become more iup>rtant if 
the logic of resource management should sanehow concentrate all the 
adlTantages in a single subregional configuration. Again, one would 
expect regiooal institutions to suffer in such a circunstance since as 
with ethnic subregionalism, econanic interest-based stbregionalisn would 
serve as an altemative to, rather than a souraa of additional strength 
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for, the regional approach. 1he example of the Benelux group within 
Euro~an regionalisn shows nevertheless that subregionalisn need not be a 
threat to regional ooo~ration. 
A seoond internal pressure has been the high level of bilateral 
assistance in the region. Bllateralisn has greater ap~a1. than 
regionalisn for fairly explicable reasons. It gives more effective 
cx>ntrol to the recipient oountries in the use of the aid es~cia1.ly for 
national developnent planning. FUrther, for sane nations at least, 
direct govemnent-to-government aid negotiations may be more productive 
in achieving desired levels of assistance. 
A third possible pitfall for regionalisn oould be a Cbmino effect 
resul ting fran the fall ure of a significant regional institution. Were 
the PFL or the SOC to oollapse (in the case of the. latter, recent 
p>litical unrest in New CaleCbnia has added a new dinension of stress) or 
the OSP to follow the pattem of Air Pacific, for example, a general loss 
of esteen for regional ooo~ration might enste within the region. 1he 
ranaining regional bodies then would be subject to more rigorous scrutiny 
and given less benefit of the cbubt in marginal cases. Of oourse, such 
cx>nseqtences would follow ally if the oollapse were to occur in untoward 
circtmstances. Were the a1. tered regional relationship to arise fran a 
general agreanent for a new oourse of action, the loss of an institution 
or a change in one's status oould herald inproved regional ties. 
In addition to these internal pressures, oertain external 
cevelopnents oould undercut SOuth Pacific regionalisn t¥ the year 2000. 
Such developnents might include p>litical reabsorption, external 
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marU};Watioo of regional IGOs, and Cbnor timidity. Although it may seem 
inconceivable to most ohservers that presently independent or 
self-governing states within the South Pacific would be willing to 
surrender their status for a more dependent one, sane qrnics Cbubt that 
the snaller entities will be able to oope with soverei91ty over the loog 
term. Should the most dire foretx:xlings a>me to pass, a regional &ystem 
based on sovereign or near-SCNereign entities would be subject to serious 
stress because it would app;!ar to be I::oth less legitinate and less 
effective. Given that island states are unlikely to volunteer openly for 
such a fate, it seems probable that the reabsorption threat would be 
generated fran outside the region t¥ the misguided efforts of frieOOl.y 
states to relieve embattled island nations of sane of the 
responsibilities of SCNereignty. 
'nle problem of extema! marU};Wation of a regional IGO is likely to 
arise ally in the playing off of the StC against the FOrunrrelated 
agencies. Even here the problem oould arise only if ooe of the three 
major non-Forun members of the StC (i.e., Britain, France, and the united 
States) ma.de the flUldamental. error of judgment of assuning that it would 
be p:>ssible to use the StC as a lever against the FOrun states. Sane 
allege that this is occurring with the distant-water fishing nations 
(I:WFNs) isste, but it a~ars that the current 1:¥play is part of an 
overall negotiating strategy. Nonetheless, a miscalculation on the 
fisheries qtestion or sane other matter oould result in a oonfrontation 
between the region's two major regional p:>liqr-ma.king systems. 
Regardless of the victor, the oontroversy itself would probably reduce 
the level of regional ooop:!ration. 
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lJhe inhibiting influence of nonregional cbnor timidity would arise 
if the cbnor states upon which the current regional systan is based were 
to support sane organizations and ignore others for fear of giving 
offense to certain islands. SUch decisions, which app:!ar already to have 
been made, oould represent either an indirect effort l:¥ sane regional 
states to use the cbnors to resolve the BRO question or a miscalculatiat 
by the cbnors of the regional. states' expectations of than regarding the 
regional. organizations. Either w~, such a developnent oould undemdne 
the viability of an IGO dep:!ment on d.:>nor assistance through a snowball 
effect and thus reduce the number of regional organizations. 
scenario 2 ; . BtatiCRegionalism 
Change has been the hallmark of regionalisn for the IBSt 15 yeam, 
and thus it app!ars inoonceivable that the next 15 yeam would find 
regionalisn l.Ilal tered. lJhe idea of stasis, bJwever, has to be oonsidered 
a relative teDll. In addition to embracing the situation of no 
significant change in the number or <Dl\p1.exity of regional. organizations, 
the scenario of static regionalisn includes situations of greater numbers 
rut less cx:mplexity and of reduced nllllbers with ally JOOderate1.y higher 
soIilistication. were the BRO question less entrenched, this scenario 
would have to be rated less probable than the p:osp!cts for decline. 
Nevertheless, there are elements that oould produce relative stasis over 
an extemed period of tine. 
ontbubtedly the most plausible internal factor would be a failure to 
resolve the BRO question, with the resul. t that a oonsensus at the lOiiest 
OOIl1lOOl'l denaninator oontinued. In this case, as we have seen in recent 
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years, a tililosotilical oommitment exists in sane quarters to resist 
further expansioo rut the absence of agreanent on the SRO p:E!I1ents 
ex>ntraction. '!hus the status qw would prE!l1ail for sane tine. 
A seex>nd ex>ntriWting factor may well be lost or preanpted 
oPlDrtuni ties. Civil aviation is proving to be a classic case here. It 
was once stated categorically, p!rhaps in the eat1.y blush of national 
indep!ndence or the great hop!s held for island CDop!ration, that the 
eevelopnent of a regional approach to civil aviation would be the acid 
test for South Pacific regional ian. Yet events have temed to move this 
iss12 farther and fartb.er fran the regional arena. Given the grCMth in 
partnerships between the island ait1.ines and rim CDuntry ait1.ines 
(particulady Australia's Ansett and QAN'mS ait1.ines), one CDuld even 
regard the matter as being finnly in the bilateral camp. Should this 
pattem becx:me more general, there may be fewer oPlDrtunities for the 
islands to plrsue regional ex>op!ration. 
Externally brio sets of influences ex>uld canbine to maintain the 
present status qm. '!he Cbnors, which pay the larger share of the ex>sts 
of regialalisn, may eecline to supp>rt any further eJq?aIlSion. 
Concurrently the external members of the SPC ~ disex>urage any reduction 
in regiaJalian, at least within the SPC systan. '!he iIIpsse might then 
make ex>ntinuance of present arrangements relatively attractive to all 
parties. 
Scenario :3; . Increa§ed Regional Oxgration 
If the eecline scenario involves an unlikely eenial of the 
advantages of Sp!cialization and institutionalized ex>ntrol that are 
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associated with !G0s and if stasis raises the a1.lOOst a;{ually unexpected 
possibility of a plateau in the rerceived utility of regionalisn, one is 
obliged to oonsider the prosp!ct of an increase in regionalisn with sane 
seriousness. A greater use of regionalisn need not inpl.y merely a growth 
in the nlJllbers of !G0s. 'lhe increase scenario oould arise fran a more 
so{bisticated use of existing bodies, the establishment of replacement 
insti tuticns, or even fewer organizations. It oould also derive fran a 
transfer of greater authority to more, the same n\.Ulber, or fewer n1.lDbers 
of !G0s. In the final analysis, the net resul t would be a higher level 
of ooordinated policymaking t¥ the island states. 
In arrj event, I believe the increased use of regionalisn in the 
South Pacific by the year 2000 will occur in all these facets of regional 
oooreratioo. 'lhere will be more !G0s, a more CX)Il\p1.ex use of those tx>dies 
(including higher levels of interorganizational integration), and a 
greater level of authority for at least sane of than. 
'lhe oonclusioo that there will be more rather than fewer 
organizations stens fran three pranises. Fi rst, the areas of policy over 
which island oountries are expected to exercise sovereign authority are 
widening. 'lhe oceans, the environment, illicit drugs, and similar 
resources and problans have not only been added to national agendas in 
recent years tut have also been given high priority. Serond, the Fortm 
oountries have resisted investing their regional organs with annitus 
responsibility, preferring rather to maintain relatively limited 
functional bodies. Related to this is the third pranise, that 
srecialized (i.e., functionally ooherent) bodies are easier to oontrol 
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and adninister. Such bodies are also easier for extemal a:mors to fund. 
'lhus there will be pressures to establish new regional IGOS to aid the 
island governments in meeting obligations that can be swject to regional 
solutions rut are beyald the goverrnnents l national or existing regional 
resources. 
Nel7ertheless, as the SRO qualms undersoore, the creation of 
addi tiona! organizations is not a p:>pllar or trusted response to such 
pressure. cne would expect other options to be p.1I'sued wherever 
p:>ssible-informal ooordination, bilateralisn, and global institutions 
(the Onited Nations systan) -to list sane of the more CDlIIOOIll.y used 
al ternatives. As for regional op:ions, the existing organizations are 
also likely to be used both more extensively and more intensively. '!he 
former is already occurring as evidenced, for example, t¥ the oontinually 
broadening progran base of SFEC. 'lhis ci!velopnent has its risks, 
OOwever, e~clally mould SPEC prograns be so diversified that they 
beccme bogged cbwn in execution, to the detriuent of an interagency 
ooordinating role. Al though Embryonic, the more intensive use of 
existing organizations will also increase. 
'lhe area of marine resources provides grounds for spaculation on the 
anergence of regional IGOS responsibile for a faiIiy steclal ized area. 
'lhe Fm presently limits its activities largely to the eoonanic 
management of a single resource. Its primuy focus has been to maximize 
the eoonanic returns for the island ooastal states fran IWFNs entering 
the Pacific tuna fishery. However, this restrictive approach can last 
only as lCllg as the fishery is underexploited. When fully utilized, the 
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FFA is alroost inevitably dxmed to accerx a wider mandate for scientific 
management of the stock and thus to asSlJIle a new set of appropriate 
duties related to regulation of effort, gear, entry, am the like. 
Similarly CCDP/SOPAC, which has acbpted a pre<bninantly scientific and 
technical stance toward marine mineral resources, can be expected to 
amplify this role as the ooastal states seek to develop or to adnit 
others to their offshore resources. It would not be surprising to find 
l:¥ the year 2000 that CCDP/SClPAC and the FFA had be<DIne two aIII\S of a 
single Pacific Islands marine resources agency that would provide 
expertise, advice, and ooordinative leadership on a wide range of oceanic 
issues. 
1lle attanrx to limit the growth of regional institutions may lead. to 
more extensive and intensive use of existing bodies, but there can be 
little cbubt that it will also enoourage greater interinstitutional 
ooop!ration. 'lb date, this asp!ct of regionalisn in the South Pacific 
has been p!rceived mainly in negative terins. Organizations have terrled 
to interact in the main to prevent duplication of effort. As will be 
argued in this ~~r, the more p:>sitive benefits of interorganizational 
CDOp!ration are likely to becane more appuent, IBrticul.arly in the area 
of shared or joint progrcrns. 
As alreaqy- indicated, stronger regionalisn in the year 2000 may 
occur with the granting of greater authority to regional institutions. 
By this I mean that we will observe at least the precursory steps toward 
supranational p:Mer in the region. Supranational authority arises when 
an !GO is invested with the rower to make binding regulations on 
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individuals or groups within its anbit and/or when the IGO has the 
cap3.city to le/y iIrp>sts for its own use without having to refer back to 
the natiCl'lal. authority of its menbers. 'lb date this typ! of authority is 
almst exclusively associated with the Euro~an Omnunities and is 
naihere to be fOlUld in the SOuth Pacific. 
Nevertheless, it is oonceivable that sane discretionaxy, regulatory 
authority will be oonferred on sane agencies in the not-too-distant 
future. ']he IX>Wer is likely to be highly circunscribed, but even the 
preliminary steps would be significant. Unlike the EuroJ;:ean eJPerience, 
where supranationalisn was pirt of a grand cesign, the move toward 
su~anationalisn in the SOuth Pacific is more likely to app!ar as a 
pragnatic response to a discrete regional management reed. FOr example, 
the Fm mght be given the p>wer to set binding catch limits, to regulate 
gear usage, and perhaps even to restrict entIy without referral to manber 
governments. It is even :t;X)ssible that the Fm will have the p>wer to set 
its own charges to help finance its o~rations through such d:Nices as a 
licensing surcharge. And, if this oould occur for the Fm, simllar 
developnents oould be plausibly entertained for other agencies. 
A Coherent :Regional -System 
Should the third scenario of increased regional oooJ;:eration be 
realized, one still might question whether or not it would in fact assist 
the islands in protecting and proj~ng their soverei91ty. After all, 
mre IGOs would mean more oosts, IOOre nonnationals res:t;X>nsible for areas 
of natiooal interest, and, granting supranational authority, a direct 
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reduction of national control. All of these are genuine risks (as others 
not listed may be), rut they are not unmitigated ones. 
One cannot make the qLEstion of costs disapp!ar merely by rej ecting 
the regional IGO solution. Since the areas of profX)sed IGO activity will 
prestmably involve matters rEquiring the individual states to aCa!pt 
responsibility in any case, costs of one sort or another will have to be 
oorne. en one hand, nations may choose to ignore the area and thus bear 
as a cost the lost opp>rtunities or denied responsibility. en the other, 
they nay address the iSSLES and finance the eJ!fense through bilateral 
aid, internal transfers fran existing programs to the new area of 
concem, or sane similar mechanisn. Multilateralisn therefore only 
changes the method of dealing with these costs. 
Father than exaa!rbating the islands' financial liability, regional 
cooJ;eration may even lend itself to ameliorating these (Dsts. It can 
prwide for econanic redistribution to help the less adTantaged menbers 
of the regional community by giving than aCa!ss to assistance that they 
would not otherwise obtain, even though the more adTantaged countries may 
have less need of the assistance thanselves. Regionalisn also diffuses 
the impict of most IGOS' deJ;endence on extema! assistance by 
diversifying the range of cbnors and minimizing the fX)litical leverage of 
individual cbnors. ~is can help to reduce the fX)litical risks of 
neocx:>lonialisn inherent in wer-reliance on bilateralisn. 
~e qLEstion of J;ersonality as a factor in regional decision making 
cannot be sidestepp;!d, and indeed every senior-level J;ersonnel change in 
a regiooal IGO raises the iSSLE of geograItlic (subregional) balance. A 
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greater diversity of organization would make the {X>litical necessity of 
geograIilic balance easier to achieve while helping to reduce the anxiety 
felt over filling the occasional vacant p:>sitions in today1s systen. 
S~anationality is unlikely to beCDllle a genuine problEm before the turn 
of the century. 'lb the extent that it beCDllles salient, it can be 
expected to arise in the oontext of a more ooherent and disciplined 
regional {X>lic:..ymaking process in the South Pacific. 
~e rhetoric of the SRO oontroversy has been liberally sprinkled 
with expressions of ooncern over duplicaticn, overlap, waste, ooordinated 
aid, external infl\.ence, and the like. When distilled cbwn to its 
essence, the desire for an SRa is grounded in a wish to maximize the 
{X>litical authority of the islands at the lowest practicable oost. I 
have deal t with· the rationale of the SRa elsewhere6 and thus will not 
review it here. Yet it should be noted that despite the "deoolcnizaticn" 
of national institutions, the oolcnial origin of the SEC renains the 
major iInI2tus for and obstacle to the pltative benef its of an SRO. ~is 
problan epitanizes the current state of SOuth Pacific regionalisn. 
~e growth of regionalisn has been lIlstructured and lIldisciplined, 
notwithstanding the Emergence of the SOO iss\.e in the seoond hal f of the 
1970s. In this re~ct the SOuth Pacific is scarcely different fran lD:/ 
other section of the world ez:ept Western Europ!. Even with the growing 
concern for this topsy-turvy growth, l'o1ever, there has been a reluctance 
in many quarters to consider a bl\.eprint for incranental regional 
cEvel.opnent-that is, a plan for gradual p:ogress toward a ooherent 
regiooal. &ystan. ~ere are of oourse reasons for this hesitanc...y. For 
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sane, the SRO isslE re::luires an iImediate solution and therefore 
gradualisn is unac~ptable; for others, it is a rejection of planning for 
regional integration; and for still others, the question is integration 
itself. 
It is difficult to debate the subjective judgnents on the urgency of 
IGOs in the South Pacif ic although the record of the SRO a:mtroversy 
shCMS in practi~ that more time has been available than critics 
expected. 'lhe r~nt pronouncements suggest that haste will continue to 
be made slCMly en this matter. Reactions against developing a plan for 
regionalisn ap~ar to stan fran a belief that the Euro~an experience of 
regionalisn is irrelevant to the South Pacific. Yet this substitutes 
piety for <}?Od sense. Although the p:lttem of the blueprint may be 
inap{ropriate, haring a plan or vision is scarcely a Eurocentric notion 
in itself. And of course there are aIrj ntEber of IOOdel.s of regional 
integration; a greater degree of p:>licy coordination roes not re::luire 
higher levels of structural integration. 7 
It may well be that the {resent };base of the SRO question will 
produce steps tCMard a plan for a coherent regional p:>liqrmaking process. 
'lhe 1980 joint FbrumlSPC review offered an elaborate institutional 
prop:>sal, rut it did not accommodate all the differing political 
p:>sitions nor did it {rovide a detailed blueprint for implanenting the 
prop:>sed sm. Should the current review (the four ministers· erquiry) 
choose to recommend a p:lttem for the future, its prop:>sals are more 
likely to an};basize general p:>licy ooordination than the narrower 
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organizational features of the 1980 reliew. Its rep:>rt then should 
approximate a plan for regional developnent if not a precise blueprint. 
'Ihe characteristics of a more c1.eady articulated vision of South 
Pacific regionalisn may be indistinct at the margins, rot at least three 
central elanents will be crucial. 'Ihe regional poli~ng process, if 
it is to be coherent and disciplined, will hale to be authoritative, 
cover the enti re region (i. e., mst if not all the anbi t of the SOC), and 
be flexible enough to be adaptive. 'Ihe recognized sticking points on the 
SRC isslE heretofore hale involved the first two characteristics: the 
ForlJIl agencies hale the authority to make effective policy but only the 
SOC can apply its (limited) decisions to the whole region. It may 
transpire, howe'l7er, that the third trait, flexibility, will provide a 
f8ssage between the Olatybdis of geograIilic inadequacy and the Scylla of 
political i.Inp:>tence. 
Much of the substantive energies of South Pacific regionalisn have 
l:een absorl:ed in recent years in the developnent of sp9cific regines. A 
regine is a discrete, largely self-contained set of rules, practices, and 
organizations focusing on the control of a J;8rticul.ar isslE.8 sane 
current examples include fisheries, the envirorment, nuclear material, 
trade relations, and oceanic minerals expressed in J;8rt in manifestations 
such as Fm, the South Pacific Regional Envirormental ProgrCil.'ll'ie (SPREP), 
the nuclear-free zone IXoposal (m), the South Pacific Area Regional 
Trade and Econanic COor;eration Agreanent (SPARTOCA), and COJP/SOPAC. 
Regines, being sr;ecific-p.u:pose arrangements, are not especially flexible 
in than selves, but they cb provide for enormous adaptivity within a 
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regional &ystan. As the examples rE!l7eal, not all regines rEquire a 
separate organizational expression. As each regine is discrete, the 
developnent of any particular ate can incluc2 as many interested parties 
as is app:opriate without necessarily making these external participmts 
a p!rmanent fixture of the general regional J;X>licymaking process. 
Further, the indep!ndently structured character of regines allows a 
series ofp:oblans to be addressed simul. taneously, at speecE, and with 
various approadles. 'lhus such regines tern to mitigate the linkage 
ClS{:ects of problan resolution when distarate questions are treated 
through a single multilateral arena. 
!aken too literally, this omeIVation oould be deaned a c2fense of 
the existing mul tiple !GO arrangements, as well as making a virtue of 
necessity. SUch is not 1l¥ intention, however. If regine management is 
to be an effective solution to ~ regional problans, it would be 
desirable for the regines thansel ves to be supp:>rtive of regional 
aspirations that in turn are ooherent. Interestingly, regines may be 
oontriblting as much toward bringing the regional decision-making process 
together as they are to expressing the results of agreanents reached. 
Since the rationale for an officially cq;x>litical SPC is the 
existence of dep!ndencies and since the first principle of the Forun is 
political authority, neither t:x>qy can merge with the other at the manent 
without making an unacceptable axnpranise. Nevertheless, as evidenced t¥ 
SPREP, the two general J;X>lic..ymaking systans can work together, maximizing 
their resp!ctive strengths rather than their separate weaknesses, to 
develop and execute a Sp!cific regine. It is to be hop!d that a similar 
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p;lttem will be p::>ssible for fisheries and other management issues. As 
these regims overlap and interlock, they will help not only to reinforce 
the validity of the regional approach but also to integrate the 
p::>licynaking process that gave rise to the regims. 
'lhe ties among the various regional IGOs, whim arise fran 
c'Eveloping and sutsequently implanenting a regi1l'e such as SPREP, rSiuire 
addi tional interaction among those todies that rcmifies the formal 
oonsul. tations made at the senior secretariat level. SUch oonnections 
arising fran shared responsibilities will oontinue to mesh the activities 
and the r;ersonnel of the several bodies in COIIlIOOn endeavors. 'lhus even 
though the };resent bifurcated approach (Forun and SOC) is likely to 
continue for a nunber of years, there will be gradual but r;erceptible 
mwanent toward conunon organs. 
'lhe p::>licymaJdng processes will 
increasingly interconnected systan 
then hare to c'Eal. 
of regional roOs. 
with an 
lot>re 
interorganizational direction for the joint };rogrcms and projects is 
alreaqy producing inproved executive oommunication among the governing 
authorities, and this trend can be expected to continLE. It is to be 
hor;ed, mwever, that those bodies will not merely react to the flcw of 
events. Much could be d:me even now to hannonize of regional 
l,X>1 icymaking. 
If the };rolxments of the SRO accept an incranental. p;l th to thei r 
goal, it will be p::>ssible to actively facilitate interorganizational 
ooor;eration. 'lhe ground can be prepared l¥ establishing ex officio 
relationships among the senior adninistrative levels of the various 
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regional !G0s (a measure aCa!pted l:.!f the Sixteenth South Pacific 
Conference in 1976), formal p!rsonnel exchanges and CXJmJIal teDlls and 
oonditions of Emp1.~t (at least within broad guidelines), and 
COJllp!tible retiranent schEmes. SUch changes would eIl<X>urage 
interorganizational ooop!ration and also rEmove sane anxieties whenever a 
new regiooal. bo<li was created. 
Since the val ue of functionally limited meetings and organizations 
derives fran the expertise of Sp!cialization, few adTantages can be 
gained fran reducing the efficiency of such meetings and bodies I:¥ having 
than lI'ldertake more general duties. with better information about 
prop:>sed meetings, it may be p:>ssible to save for sane functional 
gatherings, rut these eoonanies are likely to be minor. 
would be the ooordination of the general p:>lic.y meetings. 
ftt)re iIrp>rtant 
At an early 
Forun meeting it was prop:>sed that the FOrun meet again shortly before 
the South Pacific Conference as a sort of privy oouncil to the 
Conference. ~e idea lapsed owing to a p:>litical accident, b.lt it still 
has sane merit. 
Were the FOrllIl and the Conference to meet at OOJIlIOOn venues and with 
proximate timing, the oonnections between the two p:>licymaking processes 
oould be greatly enhanced. 'lhe savings on <DllIOOIl secretarial seIVia!s 
and meeting facilities would probably be snall but real rererthel.ess. 
ftt)re inq:x>rtantly, the arrangement would facilitate sharing of views on 
resp!ctive agendas and matters of mutual interest. Al though the FOrun 
would take the lead in all matters of high p:>litics and major p:>lic.y, the 
South Pacific Conference would not axne to such an arrangement 
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empty-handed. In addition to enhancing the geographic <X>m~ehensiveness 
of the Cbnference membership, the Cbnference draws together the major 
oonors, intemational actors, and interested parties involved in the 
region. 
'lhe logic of a closer IDlicy relationship between the Forun and the 
Cbnference raises several IDlitical isstes, tut l¥ and large they are 
less imp:>rtant than those IDsed l¥ the setting of IDlicy for an SRO. For 
the manent, OOwwer, the benefits of a more integrated IDlicymaJdng 
process will probably not be as ~rsuasive as the irmediate exigency of 
protecting the Forun and its agencies fran a dilution of IDlitical 
authority. onder the present circumstances the SRO alternative would 
raise this S{:ecter as a genuine IDssibility.9 Recognition of this risk 
has been a major infltence on the course of the SRO debate in recent 
years. 
Yet for whatever the overt reasons, the regional IDl icymaJdng 
process will be more unified and coherent l¥ the year 2000. A merger, 
wen de facto rather than de jure, may be too much to exp;!ct between the 
Forun and the Cbnference, but a close working arrangement will be 
oJ:,"erating. 'lhe IX>licies that result will be iIIplemented through 
sp!cialized agencies, not all of whim will be formally linked. 
Nevertheless CDm.IOOll organs will exist to facilitate and execute 
interorganizational cooJ:,"eration. ~ntral to this systan will be the 
For un , s secretariat, since it will be the prinalY agency for 
coordination; but to undertake this role efficiently SFEC will need to be 
divested of sane of its more technical resp>nsibilities. sane of those 
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responsibilities will cp to functionally appropriate SJ?ecialized 
agencies; others are likely to cp to a more general body, probably a 
sanewhat restyled SPC har ing direct linkages to the Forun systan. 
Conoomitantly with these manges, the member states will revise 
their internal procedures for handling their regional responsibilities. 
'!he cEp:lrtments of foreign affairs will ensure that there will be not 
only greater },:ersonnel oontinuity and internal p:>licy oontrol but also, 
given the anticitBted role of specialized agencies, greater use of 
intercEl,lutmental canmi.ttees to ooordinate the various line cEp:lrtments 
o},:erating directly with their res},:ective functional IGOs. l-t>re effective 
methocS for monitoring the work of the !G0s will be in use so that manber 
states will be able to avoid unintemed duplication of effort. ('Itle 
cEliberate playing off of bilateral and multilateral d>nors will not 
disaptear, ixMever, although it is likely to rEquire more sofhistiCBted 
methocS in future.) 
'Itle Cbnors and other external interests will be affected I::!i such 
changes. Sane states and agencies will llP3rade or otherwise improve 
their tBrticipation in the advisory committees of specialized regional 
IGOs and will take a greater interest in the meetings to draft particular 
management regiroos. Chserver status at SPC and smc meetings will CBrry 
more weight. It is also likely that sane external i.l1terests may seek 
entry nerely to get a foot in the <:bor before it is too late. SUch 
reactions oould assist the islands in furthering their regional oontrol 
because they would hare the opp:>rtunity to help sh~ the form of and the 
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mechanians through whim the external interests cEvelo};ed their 
imol vanent in South Pacif ic regional ian. 
Concluding :Bemarks 
SI;eculation scarcely lenci; itself to a:mcrete oonclusions. !]hus I 
end merely with a few ooncluding remarks on South Pacific regionalisn in 
the year 2000. Regionalisn is ilIp)rtant to the Pacific Islands. It can 
help even the weakest sovereign and near-sovereiCJl states to exercise 
more effectively the rights and responsibilities of their };X>litical 
status. !]he de~ndencies are adtantaged l:¥ having a my in the affairs 
of their neighl:x>roood, l:¥ developing wider external oontacts, and even l:¥ 
experiencing a form of praxis or };X>litical aplX'entiC2ship that will 
assist their further oonstitutional developnent. !]he eoonanic benefits 
to all members of the region should not be gainsaid, rut the diIrensions 
of regionalisn cannot be oonstrained to this one factor. Security and 
political, legal, diplanatic, social, and other advantages are also 
associated with effective regionalisn, and at times any one of these may 
be even more important than the other rationales cxxnbined. 
will South Pacific regionalisn beoome more effective in the future? 
As I have suggested throughout this p:1p:!r, I believe the answer will be 
yes. Bilateralisn is too fraught with the dangers of neocolonialisn to 
be the cnly stb3tantial solution to the islands' developnent lX'oblems. 
Global ian, as expressed through the Onited Nations systan, would 
undermine the elanents of South Pacific oontrol l:¥ in<x>r};X>rating the 
islands' involvement in multilateral. solutions into a larger franework 
were it used too extensively (unless a new ON organization were 
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established to selVe the SPC region and this became a sutsti tute for 
local initiative). National self-reliance cbes not app!ar to be an 
option for all nations, and yet major national failures among sane in the 
islands' oommlllity would p:>se risks for all. 'nlus regionalisn has a 
genuine role to play in the international network of the South Pacific. 
Not only cbes regionalisn have a role to play but also this role 
will be(X)JI1e more Iraninent and clearly defined l¥ the year 2000, I 
believe. 'nle declining regionalisn scenario is certainly not beyond the 
I81e as a p:>ssibility, but it would rEI}uire a greater willingness on the 
ptrt of Ixlth local and external oountries to risk regional instability 
than we have witnessed to date. Given little change in the international 
climate, it is more oonceivable that the Iresent balance of forces will 
maintain the status qll>in South Pacific regionalisn; nonetheless it is 
difficul t to believe that such an equilibrillIl oould endure to the end of 
the century. Hence the j udc}nent that we will see an increase in the use 
of regional isn. 
"" depiction of the influ:mces that would shapa the growth scenario 
and of the cilaracteristics that would emerge fran it has been derived 
fran present indicators that I regard as si~ificant. Since there are 
pressures for a quick solution to the SRO qiEstion and since it is always 
p:>ssible for states to redefine their op!rating pranises at any time, the 
incranental, step-by-step unfolding of a more intricate and disciplined 
regional. p:>licy-making process may never occur. It is p:>ssible that 
informal mechanisns will make up the l:ul.k of the eJrpaIlSion if the 
anti:r;athy to regional IGQ3 proves more satantive than rhetorical, 
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CX)ntraIy to II!{ ~ctations. Nevertheless, I hare no dJubts that a 
student enterin9 the twen~-first century will find SOuth Bacific 
regiooalisn a lively and current thesis topic and that the student will 
not be lookin9 back to the 1970s and '80s as the high point of regional 
cx)op:! ration. 
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Endnotes 
1 '!he iooa for an SRO was appirently first mooted in the report of the 
1976 Aid Reriew Task Force that was initiated ~ the SOuth Pacific 
Forun through SEBC. Many of the same CDncerns were resp:msible for a 
reriew of the SK:, also a>ne in 1976. In 1979 SPEC carried out a 
further study (based on a two-year OOlayed CDnsiceration of the 1976 
report), that in turn gave rise to a Forun prop::>sal for a jOint 
Forllll/SK: stucti. '!he 19th South Pacific Conference agreed and the 
Joint Regional Arrangements cmunittee comp::>red of representatives 
fran three Forun manbers and three Conference manbers OOliberated and 
rep::>rted in 1980. SPEC prepared a further llit;er on the SRO in 1982 
following up the prop::>salsof the 1980 joint stucti. Last year (1984) 
a tean of four forei<}l ministers fran the Forun CDlmtries again 
tacked the isslE, and it apfears certain their work will CDntinLE in 
1985. 
2 Despite its praninence in regional affairs, the South Pacific Forun 
has not been incluced in the list of !G0s because it is not 
technically an !GO. 
3 Uentabo F. Neania, Who :Pays? :Who :senefi1:s? -from-:Regional ~COQperation 
(SlNa: Institute for Pacific Studies, 1982), provices CDnsicerable 
ootail 00. the islands' a:mtritutions to regional IGOs. 
4 '!he only eJCCeption here is that Austral ia has not becx:>me a member of 
CCDP/SOPAC, although it is a major CDntributor. New Zealand's 
p::>si tion in CCDP/SOPAC, OOwerer, may be affected as a resul t of the 
May 1984 change in this IGO's status. 
5 '!his bloc within the FFA was formed ~ treaty in 1982 to give greater 
bargaining strength to the westem CDuntries with major tuna 
resources: Fecerated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, 
Marshalls, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Solanons. 
6 "Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalisn" (Honolulu: 
Pacific Islands Studies Working Pat;ers, Chiversity of Hawaii, 1980) 
and "SK) or SRS: Whither the SOuth Pacific?" (Honolulu: Pacific 
Islands DNelopnent Progran, Fast-W'est Center, 1984). 
7 For an interpretation that en};ilasizes a national rather than an !GO 
approadl to regional integration, see Gunnar P. Nielsson, "The 
Parallel National Action Process: Scandinavian Experiences," in Paul 
'nly lor and A. J. R. Groan (ecs.), International ~ ~Organisation; ~ j I -A 
ConceptualI\Wroach (Lon<Dn: Frances Pinter, 1978), pp. 270-316. 
8 '!he Spring 1982 iSSLE of Intemational-;;Organization (volune 36, 
nlJIlber 2) is cEvoted entirely to the qLEstion of international 
regines and provides useful references for I:x>th sides of the cebate 
on this topic. 
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9 I hale outlined the arcprnents for this interpretation in Il¥ p;1per 
"SRO or SRS: Whither the South Pacific?" 
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Da.roRAPHIC TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
by 
Diana Howlett 
This paper focusses on the smaller countries of the South Pacific which 
are either independent or self-governing: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. American 
Samoa and the territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia are. not 
discussed here, nor is Papua New Guinea, which has a population three times 
larger than the combined populations of the ten smaller nations. The 
considerable diversity of the South Pacific islands in respect of their size, 
environmental characteristics and resources, culture and history, is well 
known. The land area and population, also very diverse, are shown in Table 1. 
Demographic data for the region are not always reliable (although they 
improve with each census), cannot be readily compared between countries and 
usually not between censuses (different questions are asked and the census 
years and intervals differ), and they are not current (in some countries the 
most recent census was in 1976). This paper uses 1981 estimates prepared by 
the South Pacific Commission unless otherwise indicated. Some 
socio-demographic concepts do not translate easily to the Pacific. For 
example, 'fami1y' is not usually a nuclear family in these countries, and no 
definition of 'the economically active popu1ation ' is standard throughout (see 
below). 
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Country 
Cook Islands 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Nauru 
Niue 
Solomon Is. 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Western Samoa 
Table 1 
PEOPLE AND LAND 
Population Are~ 
(mid-1981 estimate) (~) 
17,400 240 
646,500 18,272 
59,500 690 
8, 100 21 
3,200 259 
235,000 27,556 
98,400 699 
7,600 26 
119,900 11,880 
156,000 2,935 
Population density 
(persons/i<Jn2) 
73 
35 
87 
386 
12 
9 
141 
292 
10 
53 
Land per person 
(hectares) 
1.4 
2.8 
1.2 
0.3 
8. 1 
11.7 
0.7 
0.3 
9.9 
1.9 
Source: South Pacific Economies 1981: statistical summary, Table 2, South Pacific 
Commission, Noumea 1984). 
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Many of the population problems of today, and thus for the future, are not 
new. Population problems of one kind or another have characterised the South 
Pacific for at least a hundred years although by the 1940s the widespread 
anxiety about population declinel had changed to a concern about future 
population pressure in some of these countries (Furnas 1950; Oliver 1951; 
Stanner 1953). 
The population of most South Pacific countries now is probably as high or 
higher than it has ever been (Caldwell et al 1980:957), except in the Cook 
Islands and Niue whose people may freely emigrate to New Zealand. The 
estimated combined population of the ten countries in 1981 was 1.35 million. 
Although the populations of these countries are absolutely small by global 
standards they show a wide range between the three smallest which have less 
than 10,000 people each and the largest (Fiji) which is approaching two-thirds 
of a milli on peop 1 e. 
Population distribution and density 
In all the multi-island countries (that is, all except Nauru and Niue) the 
population is very unevenly distributed, with increasing concentrations in 
core islands and towns while the populations of remoter islands remain static 
or in decline. In Kiribati, for example, the population in 'urban' Tarawa 
grew at four percent annually during the 1970s but the annual rate of growth 
on all rural islands was around 0.1 percent (Tira 1982:3). Throughout the 
South Pacific the coastal zones of every island are now the most densely 
settled regions and, although land may be cultivated in the interior of the 
larger islands, few villages and no towns are found away from the coastal 
fringe. 
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Population densities also vary widely, both within and between countries. 
For example, average population densities in Tuvalu are thirty times greater, 
and in Kiribati almost twenty times greater, than in Solomon Islands. The 
information on population densities (Table 1) is fairly simplistic. 
Statistics based on total land area give no indication of the quality of the 
land and inevitably include unproductive areas, nor do they take into account 
the extent to which Islanders use marine resources. In a number of countries 
people are unable to use fully the national land resources because of land 
tenure conditions but Polynesians especially, like many Micronesian and 
Caribbean people, exploit socio-economic fields which extend well beyond the 
nation-state (Marshall 1983:6). Where information on the area of arable 1and2 
is available it indicates a much altered picture of population denSity. Thus 
in the Cook Islands the average population denSity is 75 per kffi2 but on arable 
land the denSity is 487 per kffi2, in Western Samoa the population density 
increases from 53 to 104 per kffi2; and in Fiji from 35 to 54 per kffil. An 
alternative way of considering the relation between people and land is to 
calculate the land available per person. This is shown in the final column of 
Table 1, based on total land area. Only in Niue and the Melanesian countries 
(Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) do people have access to a reasonable area of 
land, aithough again the area per person would be conSiderably reduced if 
arable land only were considered. Elsewhere the land per person is very 
limited indeed. These figures are all the more alarming because over 70 
percent of the people in most of these countries live in rural areas; the 
exceptions are Fiji and Kiribati where the proportions are still high at 
around 63 percent, and Kiribati's drought-prone atolls are of low productivity. 
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Demographic Characteristics 
Present fertility, mortality and migration characteristics vary widely in 
the South Pacific but most of the countries can be clustered into one of three 
types (Table 2). Two countries do not fit readily into this classification. 
Tuvalu achieved low fertility rates following a concerted family planning 
campaign during the 1970s but mortality rates are relatively high; and Nauru 
is a country with high fertility and moderate mortality. Permanent emigration 
from both countries is minor. Both 'Type l' countries are Melanesian and 
both 'Type 3' countries are Polynesian, but 'Type 2' includes people of 
several culture groups: PolyneSia, Micronesia, Fijian and Indo-Fijian. These 
three clusters should not be interpreted as reflecting either environmental or 
cultural determinism, however, as a mix of historical, social, political and 
economic factors account for the similarities and differences. 
Fertility and Mortality. 
Throughout the region in recent decades the spread of education, medical 
and public health services has brought about a general decline in infant 
mortality and enabled more people to live longer. As Lipton describes it, the 
generations have lengthened (1968:343). Life expectancy at birth is highest 
in Fiji, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands and Niue (62-65 years) and lowest in 
Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (52-54 years). In most countries 
the life expectancy at birth of women is several years higher than for men 
(Lucas and Chilcott 1984:11). Completed fertility rates reflect historically 
high fertility levels in a number of countries (Lucas and Ware 1982:45) but 
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Table 2 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS(l) 
TYPE 1: high fertility; high but declining mortality; minor 
international migration 
Solomon Islands 
Vanuatu 
TYPE 2: moderate fertility; low to moderate mortality; low to 
moderate international migration 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Tonga 
Western Samoa 
TYPE 3: low fertility; low morta1ity;high international migration 
Cook Islands 
Niue 
(1) Crude birth rates above 40 per 1000 population are high; between 
30-39 per 1000 are moderate; and be low 30 per 1000 are in the low 
range. Crude death rates of 15 or more per 1000 population are 
high; between 10-14 per 1000 are moderate; and below 10 per 1000 
are low. 
Source: South Pacific Economies 1981: statistical summary, Table 18, 
South Pacific Commission, Noumea, 1984. 
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fertility patterns are now subject to factors which in some countries are 
leading to higher levels and in others to suppressed levels. In the 
Melanesian countries traditional practices of fertility control have been 
widely abandoned resulting in larger families and in increased stress on 
women, who contribute very significantly to rural production. Elsewhere 
factors such as higher levels of education, wage employment, and urban 
residence of women seem to have contributed to some reduction in fertility. 
Temporary work emigration has produced age and sex imbalances which appear to 
have lowered fertility levels in countries such as Kiribati and Tuvalu (Walsh 
1982:6). Migration of men may also mean that people marry at a later age, 
leading to lower fertility levels. Family planning campaigns often bring 
about a significant initial lowering of fertility but are costly for small 
countries to sustain and their impact has been variable. 
Although mortality rates have generally declined in the region in recent 
decades it is not possible to be confident that they will continue to do so in 
all countries. Many current health problems stem from environmental 
conditions and poor hygiene and sanitation facilities, which are responsible 
for serious bacterial, viral and parasitic diseases in the region. The 
resurgence of malaria in Melanesia is particularly worrying. So far, 
mortality seems to have declined faster in towns than in rural communities, 
but this trend may be arrested as chronic degenerative diseases, a relativeiy 
recent phenomenon in the South Pacific, affect the morbidity and mortality of 
growing numbers of urban dwellers. 
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Migration. 
In terms of the future of these island countries it may be most important 
to evaluate their prospects according to whether or not they have the option 
of international migration. The Pacific Islanders are descended from some of 
the world's most adventurous migrants and over the several thousand years 
during which the region has been occupied most Islanders have remained very 
mobile. Even during colonial times it was possible for people of one culture 
group to migrate to or be re-settled in another culture group within the 
sphere of influence of particular colonial powers, as were Melanesians in 
Samoa, Gilbertese in Solomon Islands, and people from Vaitupu (Tuvalu) and 
Banaba (Kiribati) in Fiji. For most, this option is no longer available: the 
movements of people are restricted to within their national boundaries. Thus 
whatever other advantages the Islanders may. have gained through the 
achievement of nationhood, political independence has largely closed off one 
of the principal means by which island people everywhere adjusted the balance 
between population size and the local resource base. In many small Caribbean 
islands, for example, 'migration traditions are so pervasive and of such long 
standing that they are a way of life' (Richardson 1983:xi). 
Internal migration, including seasonal and circular migration, is a 
Widespread phenomenon except in the small, Single-island countries of Nauru 
and Niue. Elsewhere the main flows are from rural to urban areas, but the 
migrants do not always come from the remoter, least-developed islands. It was 
recognised some years ago that 
Migration tends to result from knowledge that 
opportunities have increased, or are better, 
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elsewhere rather from declining real living 
standards on the home islands. Felt wants rather 
than outright necessity stimulate migration and, 
as ••• the contrast in opportunities between small 
and large islands becomes more obvious ••• the 
incentive to migrate increases (Ward 1967:89-90). 
Ward's observation applies to international migration as much as to internal 
movement. Few Melanesians have emigrated to other countries but most of the 
other South Pacific countries have 'international ising' populations (Marcus 
1981:62). Close to 200,000 South Pacific Islanders, mainly Polynesians and 
Indo-Fijians, are now expatriate residents in New Zealand, the United States, 
Canada, Australia and other South Pacific countries (see Connell 1984:54, 
map). In the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu, two of the most hard-pressed 
countries in terms of the population/resource relationship, only temporary 
emigration has been available so far through contract employment in Nauru's 
phosphate industry and as seamen on overseas ships, but neither source of 
employment is very secure. Nauruans, by contrast, are frequent commuters, 
especially to Australia, for goods and services unavailable in their own 
country. 
Age Composition and Dependency Ratios. 
The age composition of a population is a critical determinant of future 
population growth. Apart from Tuvalu, between 40 and 50 percent of the 
population in all these countries is under the age of 15 years (Table 3) thus 
populations will grow rapidly where emigration is not possible. Under these 
conditions, populations are unlikely to stabilise or decline for some years 
even if fertility rates are lowered. Dependency ratios (Table 3) indicate 
the proportion of young and aged dependents in a population relative to the 
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Country 
Cook Islands 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Nauru2 
Niue 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu3 
Western Samoa 
Table 3 
AGE COMPOSITION AND DEPENDENCY RATIOS 
0-14 yrs 
Percent 
49.8 
41.2 
41.0 
44.2 
47.4 
48.5 
44.5 
31.9 
46.0 
48.1 
15-59 yrs 60 yrs 
Percent Percent 
44.2 6.0 
54.8 4.0 
53.0 6.0 
52.9 2.9 
44.0 8.6 
47.7 3.8 
50.4 5.1 
55.8 12.4 
51.0 3.04 
47.3 4.6 
Dependency 
Ratio1 
126 
82 
89 
89 
127 
110 
98 
79 
94 
112 
1 Sum of numbers below 15 and over 60, divided by the number between 
ages 15-59' x 100, except Vanuatu «15>65) 
( 15-64 ) 
2 Nauruans only 
3 Provisional, 1979 
4 Percentage over 65 years 
Source: national censuses 
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number of economically active. The economically active age group is difficult 
to determine precisely, as it varies from country to country, between the 
monetary and subsistence sectors of the economy, and, within the monetary 
sector, between the public and private sectors. In Table 2 the economically 
active age group is set at 15-59 years but in some countries younger children 
contribute to production. In Samoa, for example, 
The number of very young children who are already 
considered bread winners by their families is 
astonishing. They are also the families' 
workhorses. They prepare the food out in the 
cooking houses and they are the last to eat at 
dinner time (Apia Observer, 8 October 1981). 
Overall, the productive members of the population in the South Pacific 
normally support at least twice as many dependents as do their counterparts in 
industrialised countries but the economically active in rural areas generally 
have a considerably higher burden of dependents than urban adults due to the 
out-migration of members of the workforce. As health services enable more 
children to survive and people to live longer, and as education services draw 
more children into the schools, the number of dependents steadily grows. 
The demographic picture then is something of a mosaic. The Melanesian 
countries are at an early state of the demographic transition with estimated 
population growth rates during the last five years of 3.3 percent annually in 
Solomon Islands and 4.2 percent in Vanuatu (South Pacific Commission 1984:5). 
At the other extreme are the Cook Islands, Niue and Western Samoa with either 
little growth or population decline due to the net emigration of people in the 
reproductive age groups. Between these extremes are Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, 
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Nauru and Tuvalu in which the annual rate of population growth in recent years 
has been around two percent. In all but the Cook Islands and Niue, however, 
the impetus for continued numerical growth in the population is high because 
of past fertility levels which have been responsible for the youthful age 
structures of the present populations. Even the Cook Islands seem to have 
reversed the trend of population decline from -1.0 percent annually over the 
last ten years to a growth rate of 1.1 percent annually over the last five 
years (South Pacific Conmission 1984:Table 2). 
Population Projections 
The recent censuses of most of these countries provide population 
projections to the year 2000 (Table 4), based on several sets of assumptions 
about levels of fertility, mortality, and migration. Each set of assumptions 
produces a projected increase in the combined populations of these countries, 
ranging from a combined total of 1.53 million (low growth) to 1.83 million 
assuming moderate growth and 2.23 million assuming high growth. Some 
countries will, however, grow faster than others depending on the stage of the 
demographic transition reached and emigration opportunities. Social 
scientists are often called on, or tempted, to estimate population ceilings in 
situations where land and other resources are limited and in which populations 
are expanding or emigrating. Such efforts have usually proved futile, as 
demonstrated by the case of Mauritius which now has more than double the 
population ceiling of 400,000 predicted early in this century (Brookfield 
1984:19). It is extremely difficult to anticipate the social, technological 
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Table 4 
POPULATION PROJECTIONS TO THE YEAR 20001 
Country Low Percentage2 Medium Percentage High Percentage 
change change change 
Cook Islands 20,000 (10) 22,531 (24) 28,541 (57) 
Fiji 793,202 (28) 874,354 (41) 1,029,424 (66) 
Kiribati 93,296 (63) 101,854 (78) 106,979 (87) 
Niue3 2,790 (-22) 3,370 (-6) 3,940 (10) 
I-' Solomon Islands 331,646 (68) 423,851 (115) 542,304 (175) 
I-' 
I-' 
Tonga 123,000 (37) 128,000 (42) 130,000 (44) 
Tuvalu 11,500 (56) 12,050 (64) 12,500 (70) 
Western Samoa 160,000 (5) 265,688 (75) 381,031 (51) 
1 Nauru, Vanuatu: no data available. 
2 From last census year. 
3. Niue to 1986 only. 
Source: nat'lona 1 censuses. 
and political changes which will alter future relationships between people and 
resources. What follows then, is not so much prediction as an examination of 
some possible consequences of the present demographic patterns. 
Issues for the future 
The implications of present demographic patterns in the South Pacific may 
be considered in a number of ways. The structural problems of smallness must 
be taken into account. Population issues have social, economic and 
environmental consequences (although it is not always easy to distinguish 
clearly between them). The nature of problems differs at national and 
regional scales. Other considerations are whether or not an apparent trend is 
reversible in the short or longer term, and the extent to which the island 
nations themselves can deal with emerging problems without seeking external 
assistance. Finally, an analysis of trends should also take account, however 
imperfectly, of the perspective from the Pacific. We judge these to be poor 
countries by the welfare and income standards of western industrialised 
nations but the South Pacific's nearest neighbours are such nations and many 
Islanders, especially in Polynesia. and Fiji, aspire to the living standards 
which emigrant relatives and friends enjoy in them. 
Structural Problems 
The demographic aspects of smallness are we11-documented (see, for 
example, Smith 1967; Selwyn 1975; Caldwell et a1. 1980; ESCAP 1982; Walsh 
1982). The process of economic development in small countries, and the 
interactions between development processes and population dynamics, are not 
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often the same as in larger countries. Small countries provide few 
opportunities for economic diversification or economies of scale, and scope 
rarely exists for effective competition and the operation of market forces. 
Monopolies arise as economic niches are occupied, often by foreign companies, 
because the domestic markets are too small to support competitors. Thus 
income inequality increases as a community or national population quickly 
separates into richer and poorer groups. Governments are usually the largest 
employers in small nations: in the South Pacific, 50 or 60 percent of the 
paid workforce may be government servants. In micro-states greater conflict 
arises between the goals of individuals and those of their governments in 
matters such as internal and international migration, family planning 
programs, and the use of remittances. Skilled people are a scarce resource, 
expensive to train and often lost to larger countries. Those who serve their 
governments work in considerable professional isolation and often under 
abnormal degrees of stress: many are multiple office-holders, are transferred 
frequently between departments and are required to travel abroad often on 
official business. Much time must be devoted to dealing with visiting 
missions, advisers and experts. The loss of human productivity through the 
premature death of skilled people and those in positions of seniority is now a 
significant problem in the Pacific (Taylor 1983). The island nations of the 
Pacific are all tropical and most are archipelagic, structural conditions 
which pose environmental problems for health and economic activity, especially 
in the production of food for urbani sing populations. 
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The National Implications of Demographic Conditions 
Populations with young age compositions and high dependency ratios will 
require the increasing provision of social welfare services, especially in 
health, education and social security. Until recently little need has been 
apparent in the South Pacific for the public provision of social security for 
aged dependents but as life expectancy extends and younger people continue to 
migrate, and if the trend toward nuclear families becomes firmer, the demand 
will strengthen. Bedford states that although the proportion of people aged 
over 60 years in the region is unlikely to be more than 7 percent by the end 
of the century, numerical increases in elderly people 'will be the most 
spectacular of any age group' (1982:88). In multi-island nations the capital 
and recurrent costs of social service provision to small and scattered 
populations are very high. It seems likely that it will be more difficult to 
maintain the present health levels of the Islanders as populations increase. 
The control and reduction of health problems impose heavy recurrent costs for 
which island governments rarely receive external assistance. High fertility 
rates in a population also add to the strain on 4imited national resources. 
The provision of maternal and child care services, and of sustained family 
planning campaigns, are expensive in terms of both personnel, and capital. 
The implications of the demographic trends for employment are both 
qualitative and quantitative. Many island countries experience the apparent 
paradox of simultaneous shortage and surplus of labour. The paradox usually 
has two dimensions, one related to skills and the other to population 
distribution. A shortage of skills. especially management skills. is 
widespread although if present education policies continue, more countries may 
eventually mirror Tuvalu which has had a surplus of skilled workers for some 
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years (Knapman et ale 1976:15). Meanwhile youth unemployment, especially in 
the towns, continues to increase and the situation in Tonga in 1980 is more 
typical. Here, for everyone of the thirty new urban jobs created, there were 
a hundred school 1eavers of whom ten had New Zealand university entrance 
qualifications. While island governments continue to hope that young people 
will enter rural occupations, their parents and indeed their teachers promote 
the values of urban employment. Swelling urban populations are by no means 
fully employed now and rising unemployment levels are inevitable. Because 
people in towns are less able than villagers to meet their basic needs of 
housing, food, water, sanitation, fuel and transport, greater stress is placed 
on the public provision of these needs, diverting potential development 
capital to the provision of social services. In the allocation of services 
and resources between rural communities and townspeople, governments all too 
often show a bias in favour of the towns where it is simpler and cheaper to 
serve any given number of people, even though more immigrants from outer 
islands may be drawn to the towns in consequence. 
The second part of the paradox, the co-existence of rural labour shortages 
and growing levels of unemployment nationally (Jones and Ward 1981) is 
explained by out-migration from rural areas. In the industrialised nations a 
decline in the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture was part of 
the structural diversification of the econQ~y wnich led to an overall growth 
in productivity, but in South Pacific countries where the agricultural 
workforce has declined, perhaps only Fiji has achieved a degree of sectoral 
diversification and increased productivity. 
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Systems of land tenure and social organisation often mean that absenteeism 
leaves land idle and other resources unused rather than expanding the 
production possibilities for those who remain, although access to land is 
rarely a sufficient condition for rural development in the Pacific. Outer 
islands might retain more people and produce more commodities if their people 
had greater security in matters such as transport, markets and incomes. 
Instead, the production of food and commodities for national development is 
left to fewer people. As households and villages are depleted of their more 
enterprising and energetic members dependency ratios become locally higher, 
placing a greater burden on those remaining (often women) to support families; 
family breakdown, destitution and economic stagnation are not uncommon. 
Further consequences are a rising demand for imported foods and a decline in 
nutritional status, especially of working women and their children in villages 
and towns. Remittances may relieve the strain on some households but the 
contribution of remittances to national welfare is minor and may even be 
negative. 
In those islands in which rural out-migration is not severe, the prospects 
for the future as populations inevitably grow may include the over-use of 
resources, declining yields, land shortage and intensification of land 
disputes, environmental deterioration and declining levels of welfare as more 
household production is needed for consumption. Should the generally high 
levels of rural out-migration be reversed these prospects may be be more 
widely realised. However, it has been found that population pressure may be 
an asset rather than a liability in environmental management. In the 
Caribbean Brookfield (1983:54) found 'little correlation between numbers of 
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people on the ground and the real pressure that they exert on natural 
resources' and that all of the eastern Caribbean islands the best management 
of the environment is to be seen in Barbados, the most dense1y-peop1ed of the 
group. Brookfield concluded that the way in which resources are used and 
allocated, and the sharing of opportunity between advantaged and disadvantaged 
members of the community are 'far more important in environmental management 
than are simple numbers of people' (1983:56). In single-island states like 
Barbados other factors, such as ease of administration, give important 
advantages over archipelagic nations. It remains to be seen whether 
successful environmental management will go hand in hand with population 
growth in the Pacific; meanwhile considerable evidence is available in 
neglected and abandoned farms overgrown with weeds that the converse applies. 
Regional Implications 
These countries meet as equals in various regional political, economic, 
and cultural groupings. In population matters, however, they are far from 
equal. Population dynamics are likely to become a major, and perhaps 
destabi1ising, factor in the growing inequality between the island countries. 
More or less subtle 'pecking orders' already characterise relations between 
the countries but wider differences may be expected as population growth in 
the resource-poor members of the region lowers their standards of living. 
It seems unquestionable that more people will try to emigrate from the 
non-Melanesian countries in coming decades. The need to find alternative 
homes for some of the people of Tuvalu and Kiribati is becoming especially 
acute and some Nauruans have raised again the question of an alternate horne as 
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the end of phosphate mining approaches. No island country these days, 
however, will extend its neighbourliness to the acceptance of any significant 
number of permanent immigrants from other parts of the region. All, whatever 
their numbers and resources, face the accelerating problem of employment 
creation and in most countries, land tenure legislation and customs do not 
permit permanent resettlement of immigrants or allow land to those who marry 
nationals. Schemes have been organised in recent years to enable skilled 
workers to find temporary employment elsewhere in the region but on occasion 
this has resulted in scarce skilled labour being lost to other countries 
offering higher wages. 
Assuming then that the re-settlement within the region of any substantial 
number of people is unlikely in the coming decades, we must turn to those rim 
nations with which the South Pacific has long associations. Most Islanders 
who now reach a rim country legitimately do so through family reunion programs 
or as temporary immigrants for education and training; guest worker schemes 
are not common. Opportunities for the international migration of Pacific 
Islanders to the rim countries have diminished in the last decade due to 
economic recession, rising unemployment, slow growth rates and the influx of 
Southeast Asian refugees. The political climate has thus become increasingly 
unfavourable in these potential host countries for the introduction of 
concessionary immigration policies for Islanders from even the most needy 
countries, although the numbers involved are relatively minor. For example, 
the number of Vietnamese refugees accepted by Australia in recent years is 
almost as many as the total population of Kiribati. Undoubtedly Australia 
could accept a quota of settlers from Tuvalu, Kiribati and Tonga under an 
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immigration policy of positive discrimination, applying the lessons learned 
from the experience of Pacific immigrants in other countries to ease the 
transition. The difficulty with international migration schemes is that all 
too often they provide a short term solution for the island governments but 
create economic and social problems in the longer term unless policies are 
adopted to reduce the negative consequences of absenteeism and remittance 
economies. In an earlier paper (Howlett 1982) I referred to some of the 
strategies considered by Kiribati in confronting its population and employment 
problems. This government now requires its overseas workers to remit 75 
percent of their monthly salaries to Kiribati for family support, savings 
deposits, and union funds (Pacific Islands Monthly September 1984). Unless 
remittances and, for that matter, aid can be directed toward production and 
consumption which promote national as well as personal welfare, and unless 
vacated land can be used productively by those remaining, emigration whether 
temporary or permanent will contribute little to the solution of island 
development problems. 
A number of observers of the South Pacific have forecast recently that the 
future for most countries will include declining levels of welfare, long term 
aid dependency and both increasing incorporation and marginalisation in the 
international economy (e.g., Fisk 1981; Ward 1982; Jackson 1984). . The 
experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue, and of the Micronesian islands, 
offer little hope that high levels of aid and unrestricted emigration will 
lead to national development and improved levels of welfare. Neo-Malthusian 
futures which include exhausted resources, degraded environments and declining 
living standards seem more likely than favourable development prospects. Two 
119 
years ago I wondered whether the Pacific might not gain some advantage from 
the technological innovations which are transforming the economies of 
industrial nations, particularly through reducing the region's joint tyrannies 
of small size and remoteness (Howlett 1982). I have lost what optimism I then 
had in this regard, as the processes have intensified by which people in the 
larger developing countries are incorporated in the international economy. 
Neither the relocation of commodity production and industry to the developing 
world, nor the restructuring of post-industrial societies, seems likely to 
benefit the South Pacific nations. 
The margins between 
population distributed 
over-population and 
in balance with 
under-population, between 
resources and population 
maldistribution, are always much closer and reached sooner in small island 
nations. No country in the South Pacific has room for complacency. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. However, population decline did not occur in all islands and those which 
were affected did not suffer to the same degree. 
2. No definition of arable land is applicable throughout the region, as 
evaluation of land potential depends on cultural and technological as much 
as on environmental factors. Few Melanesians or Samoans would regard any 
land in Kiribati or Tuvalu as arable. 
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Introduction 
EDUCATION IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
by 
Tupeni l. Saba 
I have found it useful in looking at the needs of education in the Year 
2000 to discuss first the concept of education and its application to the 
Pacific islands; second, to examine its development with particular emphasis 
on the development of formal institutions and how these attempted, as they 
were expected, to meet the changing needs of Pacific societies. In the third 
and final part of the paper, an attempt is made to discuss some of the major 
education needs of the next two decades especially those that will have major 
impact on education in the Year 2000. 
It is necessary also to discuss at the outset the particular difficulty 
that one faces in dealing with a wide and diverse area as the Pacific 
islands. A Pacific islander of colour, Dr. Farnafi larkin of Western Samoa, 
was reported to have remarked that the only thing Pacific islanders have in 
common is the water around them. 
The Pacific islands refer to those islands that lie immediately to the 
North and South of the equator in the Pacific Ocean which were settled, though 
not exclusively, by people of Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian 
descents. Since the settlement of these islands by the Melanesians, 
Micronesians and Polynesians, a lot of other racial groups have also moved 
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into them, such as the Indians in Fiji, French Caucasians in New Caledonia, 
Chinese in Tahiti, Japanese and American Caucasians as well as other Asian 
groups in Hawaii. This makes the Pacific islands a very diverse region 
ethnically, culturally, and linguistically. 
The Pacific islands may be grouped in terms of their political affiliation 
and status. First, there are those that are affiliated to or associated with 
the United Statesi these are often called the American Pacific and the group 
includes the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, North Marianas, Guam and 
Marshalls in the North PaCific and American Samoa in the South Pacific--with a 
total population of about 294,000. 1 The second group is affiliated to 
France--the 'French Pacific'--it conSisting of the French colonies of New 
Caledonia, Wallis and Futu~a and French Polynesia, with a total population of 
about 303,000. The third group consists of the independent and/or 
self-governing islands of the South Pacific. This group was administered 
either by United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand and stretches from Papua 
New Guinea in the west to Cook Islands in the easti Nauru in the north to 
Tonga in the south, and has a total population of 4.5 million. 
In this paper, one has to make many generalizations about PaCific 
islanders, and the most common of these either relate to their racial/cultural 
groupings or their political association and statusi these generalizations do 
not deny the diversity that exists within and between each group. In 
addition, the generalizations, when made, are intended only to assist the 
identification of commonalities and/or differences between and within groups. 
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Education and Change 
Education is defined broadly as initiation into the ways of life of a 
community or society2 and includes both the informal initiation that takes 
place in the home and formal schooling. A great deal of change has taken 
place in the Pacific islands particularly during this century and the Pacific 
islanders have had to change correspondingly fast in order to keep pace. 
The Pacific islanders, in the words of Papua New Guinea's Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Mr. Renagi Lohia, "have had to run in order to remain on 
the same spot." Because of the rate of change, education itself--its goals, 
content and fonm--nad to change in order to be effective in initiating people 
into their communities. 
Perhaps the greatest amount of change has taken place in the educational 
systems of the independent or self-governing islands of the South Pacific, as 
they have had to meet the required manpower demands of independence for their 
countries in a very short time and satisfy the rising education aspirations of 
their populace. The French Pacific group, although gradually moving towards 
self rule, are still very much in a colonial situation; their schools' 
curricula and goals are still tied to that of metropolitan France. 
The islands which are a part of the American Pacific group are still very 
much under the influence of the American educational system, but there appears 
to be a growing realization among them, especially those that have achieved 
some degree of self independence like Northern Marianas, Palau and the 
Federated States of Micronesia, of the importance of developing their own 
identities in which education must playa significant part. 
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In order to understand some of the current issues of education in the 
Pacific Islands and to be in a position to identify some major education needs 
in the next two decades leading up to the turn of the century, one needs to 
have a brief look at the development of education in the Pacific islands. 
Education Developments 
Education for Continuity. Education, unlike schooling, was not introduced to 
the islands; it was carried out in villages by older members of society prior 
to the coming of the missionaries. 
A number of early studies by anthropologists3 have captured some of the 
ways in which societies in the islands ensured that their values, skills and 
attitudes were passed on to the younger generation. This type of education is 
referred to as 'informal' to differentiate it from 'formal' education wh1ch 
takes place in a school setting. 
Informal education was (and is) concerned with the continuity of society 
in which adult members passed on to the younger generation what they acquired 
through experience. Much of the learning took place in practical situations 
in which young members of society would observe and imitate the adults and, 
with adult supervision, would learn to develop appropriate skills in various 
fields. Similarly, by observing adults or those older than themselves, the 
young people would learn appropriate attitudes towards their elders, peers and 
members of outside groups. The elders of the tribe or group would relate 
legends and stories to the young which would explain their history, their 
origins, their value systems and their view of the universe. Learning was 
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pragmatic and practical; its outcomes were easily observable in terms of the 
acquisition of food and other necessary materials and comforts for the family, 
and the demonstration of acceptable attitudes, values and behaviour for 
community survival. 
Today, informal education exists side by side with formal education and it 
plays an important role in teaching survival skills, particularly in rural 
areas where the extended family is still largely intact and the economy 
predominantly at the subsistence level. 
In towns, many functions performed by informal education are passed on to 
the schools, but because of the inability of schools to perform such tasks 
much is lost. The parents and elders of the present generation in the South 
Pacific did not receive as much schooling as their children, but when and if 
they move from their villages to towns to join their children and relatives 
who may work there, they might be able to continue to play some role in the 
informal education of the young people in that setting. At best, they could 
pass on to the young in the new setting the cultures of their group and 
thereby maintain some continuity. 
Education for Change 
Mission Schools. The concept of the school was introduced to most of the 
islands of the Pacific by the Christian missions. The mission efforts were 
later followed by government efforts but the objectives of the missions and 
governments in the education field, at least during the pre-independence 
period, were different and even contradictory. 
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The mission schools were primarily concerned with the evangelization of 
the islanders. Wherever they settled, the missionaries translated the Bible 
into the local languages and their schools taught the local people how to read 
and understand their scriptures. The curricula of the mission schools 
focussed on reading and writing in the local languages and in basic numeracy. 
They also taught practical skills like agriculture, house building and 
elementary hygiene. The medium of instruction was usually the vernacular 
language of the local area. 
The missionaries were concerned with total societal changes and both the 
church and the school played a part in that effort. The islanders were not 
only converted--which was the main objective of the missions--they were also 
introduced to new and more "civilized" ways of living, based on Christian 
principles. The school became an agent of change and it taught the package of 
skills necessary for living in what was conceived by each mission group as 
constituting a Christian society. The early schools were conducted in 
churches or in the compound of the missionary who, in some cases, was also the 
teacher. Gradually, separate school buildings were built and a separate cadre 
of teachers came onto the scene. 
Government Schools 
The government entered the field of education fairly slowly and almost 
reluctantly, especially in former British or New Zealand territories like 
Fiji, Western Samoa, Solomon Islands and Kiribati. 
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Government involvement in education preceding independence or 
self-government of many of the islands may be divided into two phases. During 
the first phase, colonial governments in the islands were concerned largely 
with the training of clerks and public servants in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of their administration. The second phase occurred when the 
education systems were expected to respond to the needs of self-government or 
independence, however these needs might be conceived. 
The first phase began with the government entry into the field of 
education and continued until the government recognized the needs for its 
education system to be preparing citizens for political independence. The 
duration of this phase varied from one island to another but it did not occur 
for any of the British colonies (including those in Asia, Africa, and the 
Caribbean) any earlier than the end of World War II when the British 
Government accepted as its official policy to guide colonies along the path of 
full responsible government within the Commonwealth. 
The government schools emphasized different objectives and content from 
mission schools. The governments, unlike the missions, were not as interested 
in total societal change, at least at this stage. Instead, they were 
concerned with the development of an efficient colonial administration and 
they needed clerks, administrators and other kinds of public servants. The 
early government schools were aimed at producing these types of people. 
In terms of the content of education, government schools used the language 
of metropolitan powers, such as English, French and German as the medium of 
instruction and they also introduced foreign curricula and examinations. This 
is still the case in some of the independent countries of the South Pacific; 
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the New Zealand School Certificate and the New Zealand University Entrance 
Examinations, which are taken at Forms 5 and 6 respectively, are still being 
taken by most of the secondary schools of the independent countries of the 
South Pacific. In the past, foreign teachers were brought in to teach at the 
schools from either New Zealand or Great Britain, and a few came from 
Australia. The use of Peace Corps teachers in the American Pacific group was 
aimed at the same purpose. As a result, schooling placed a lot of emphasis on 
academic and often irrelevant learning for the purpose of passing external 
examinations. 
When technical education was introduced, it did not receive the same 
status and emphasis as academic education. In time, it became "academic" in 
orientation through its inclusion as an examinable subject in external 
examinations and thereby received greater respectability. In cases where this 
did not happen, such subjects or courses and others like them were earmarked 
for those who were considered not "bright" academically. 
Government and Christian Mission Relations 
The government and mission schools existed side by side serving different 
functions and different groups in society until the government exerted its 
influence on the mission school through financial assistance. Gradually, the 
mission schools were taken over except for a few which preferred to be 
independent. As part of the conditions of taking over, the governments set 
certain requirements relating to the medium of instruction, curricula, 
examinations, and on the minimum qualification of teachers. In other cases, 
as in the Solomon Islands, the missions were not entirely happy with 
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government intervention and it led to a period of strained relationships. 
However, the development of a more coordinated and rationalized education 
system enhanced the capabi 1 i ty of such systems to respond to greater demands 
such as those associated with self government and independence. 
Meeting the Needs of Independence and Self-Government Education for 
National Development. During the 1950s and 1960s the notion of government 
involvement had became well established at least in the South Pacific region. 
Hitherto, increased government involvement had been hampered by lack of 
financial resources. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, the austerity of 
the immediate post-war years had passed and a more favourable period of 
economic growth had set in. The colonial governments in the islands were 
faced with the need to prepare their countries for their gradual movement 
j~ towards independence. On the international scene, economists were pointing to 
education as a critical component for national development and they stressed 
the importance of developing human resources and manpower, and the need for 
national planning.4 
Increased government participation in education marked the second phase of 
government involvement. In contrast to the first phase, the government was no 
longer just a participant in the venture; it was expected that it should be 
coordinating and direCting not only education, but also the whole social, 
economic and political development of the country. 
The colonial governments in the islands had envisaged for the school a 
much broader role in development as they prepared for independence; and they 
wanted the school to foster a number of broad objectives as for example: 
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• 
• 
The development of national consciousness in Fiji • 
The development of an appreciation for the 
limited opportunities of an atoll environment in 
Kiribati. 
The countering of the prevailing academic trend 
in education in the Solomon Islands and Fiji. 
The outcomes of schemes designed to bring out the above stated objectives 
were not encouraging. In each of the above cases, except perhaps in the 
development of national consciousness in Fiji--the results of which are 
difficult to quantify--the objective has not been accomplished. On the other 
hand, in the case of the objective of preparing manpower for independence, the 
result was an astounding success. 
Academic Evaluation 
As can be seen from the above, much was expected of the school during 
preparation for independence and self-government. which previously the school 
did not have to worry about. Many of the objectives expressed in the 
education plans and reports contained ideals that education planners and 
professional educationists desired. but these were new to the teachers, let 
alone the parents. The latter paid hefty school fees for their children and 
they expected them to receiv~ the kind of education which would give them good 
jobs such as those to be found in the public services of the Pacific islands. 
They knew that these jobs were obtained by people with academic qualifications 
and hence their desire to have a similar type of education for their children. 
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The school can be an agent of reform but it cannot of itself be expected 
to avert or solve certain major problems of society without any program of 
reform based on some widely held ideology such as the Ujamma in Tanzania. 5 
The latter was often referred to but not well understood by the public or its 
teachers. The teachers gave lip service to the new ideas but went on to do 
what they knew best, which was to teach in the formal and academic way. 
Agro-Technical Education 
During the 1970s, governments of the South Pacific countries were 
concerned about the over-emphasis on academic education in their schools and 
plans were devised for the establishment of practically-oriented schools to be 
located in the rural areas to serve the needs of the majority of the 
students. In Fiji, the Education Commission in 1969 endorsed this idea but 
cautioned that because the schools would necessarily be located in rural 
areas, they should not be "second best." The Conmission urged that they 
should be of high standard, and careful consideration should be given to their 
10cation.6 
In the Solomon Islands, the Education Policy Review Committee came to a 
similar conclusion when they recommended the establishment of the (then) Area 
High School in 1974 (later known as the New Secondary School). 
The Community High School in Kiribati-established in 1978-was supposed 
to be anchored in the community and be a center of community adult education 
training. It was to rely on the community for the teaching of traditional 
skills. It was therefore like a halfway house between the school and the 
community, serving the school leavers and the community. Its anomalous 
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position created some difficulties because the villagers looked on it as a 
school trying to teach some of the skills of the village which they thought 
could be better learnt from living in the village. 
In Fiji the number of Junior Secondary Schools mushroomed to about 20 in 
the first two years of operation, and it was not possible to maintain the 
level of quality in both facilities and teachers that the Fiji Education 
Coomission recommended. Insidiously, the pressure for academic programs build 
up and the practical-oriented courses became examinable in the external 
examinations and the school, in time, became a poor replica of its urban 
academic counterpart. 
The Area High School in the Solomon Islands had a difficult struggle to 
survive. It lacked the necessary resources and teachers with appropriate 
orientation, and its role was not well understood by the coomunity. Even if 
it had the resources and the teachers, it would still have difficulty in 
surviving in its original form because it lacked the support of the parents. 
The attitude of the parents in Kiribati towards the Coomunity High School 
was aptly described by its Minister for Education Training and Culture in a 
statement on August 26, 1980, when he announced the results of an 
investigation on this project and plans for its winding up. The Minister said, 
"They (the parents) want an academic type of 
education which would pave the way for paid 
employment. So Government has been trying to 
develop a type of schooling which concentrates on 
practical skills considered to be relevent to 
pupils who will live in the rural areas and not 
obtain cash employment. While all the time the 
people desire an education with an academic bias 
deSigned to prepare children for employment in the 
urban areas."7 
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The statements of the Minister for Education from Kiribati probably echo 
the sentiments of the parents in the South Pacific, particularly in the rural 
areas, in their expectation of the school to provide their children with 
modern skills and the knowledge to enable them to get a good job. It has 
always been the function of the school, since the government entered the field 
of education, to train people for the public service. Employment 
opportunities of educated people have widened with the opening up of other 
sectors of employment, but the parents' view still holds true that education 
leads to employment in the modern sector. Any change in the function or form 
of the school will be difficult to sell to the parents unless it can be 
demonstrated that those graduating from it can gain comparable, if not better, 
financial rewards than those graduating from academic institutions. Only then 
will they see the school as worth their investment and support. 
Education, Manpower and Employment 
One of the things that the school has done very effectively has been the 
production of manpower to meet the needs for independence or self-government 
for the islands, particularly those needs pertaining to posts in the public 
services. Most of the islands, except for the few remaining colonies of 
France and the United States, have now become self-governing or independent, 
and the transfer of responsibilities of governance to the local people has 
been remarkably smooth. Most of the critical positions in the public services 
have been taken over by the local people and the process of localization has 
been largely successful. In some cases, the pace of localization has been 
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thought to be too rapid and that local people without the necessary 
qualifications and experience have been placed in responsible positions 
leading to a drop in the quality of the public service. 
Most of the posts in the public services in the islands have been filled, 
but the education system continues to turn out academically trained people who 
cannot continue to be absorbed. The number of people that can be absorbed by 
the private secto~hich in the Pacific islands is necessarily sma11--is 
limited. As a result, a lot of school 1eavers become unemployed. In the case 
of Fiji only about half of the 15,000 annual school 1eavers can be expected to 
find jobs, the others will have to find alternative occupations or join the 
ranks of the unemp10yed--running at about 10 percent. Even university 
graduates are not finding it easy "to find employment; the hunger strike in 
Fiji in 1984, by students who had completed their teacher-education 
qualifications at the University of the South Pacific but were not offered 
teaching positions, has brought this problem to the fore. 
The relationship between employment and education has now become very 
apparent in the islands. One of the factors of is1andness~limited size and 
popu1ation--puts a constraint on the size of the public service and, more 
particularly, on the extent to which the private sector can expand to absorb 
the" ever increasing number of school 1eavers. This highlights the need for 
rapid job creation, especially in islands with a high proportion of youthful 
population as in the Melanesian and Micronesian island groups. 
Delayed Problems for Non-Independent Islands 
Many of the problems faced by the independent countries of the South 
Pacific group, as discussed above, have not been faced to the same extent by 
138 
the French Pacific group, as the countries involved are colonies of France and 
as such are not at the stage where they have to be wholly responsible for 
funding their education system. Similarly, the American Pacific group of 
islands, including those under the Compact, are still receiving a lot of 
American funds and support and consequently do not feel the full brunt of the 
problems that independent island countries have had to face or are facing. It 
is only a matter of time before the French Pacific group of islands will 
become independent and at that stage, they will have to face up to similar 
education problems which their South Pacific independent neighbours have faced 
over the last two and a half decades. The Compact countries of the American 
Pacific group will have to face up to similar problems soon, perhaps theirs 
will be worse in that the U.S. cultivated policy of dependence conceived in 
the 1960s wi 11 undenni ne not on ly the is 1 anders' wi 11 for greater independence 
I'.' but also their very ability to cope with resultant problems. 
Education in the Eighties and Beyond 
In looking at the major educational needs and directions of the Pacific 
Islands in the next two decades and beyond, I have relied on four assumptions 
which I feel would exert some influence on education in var,ying degrees. 
These are: 
• 
• 
that certain major changes in the educational system 
will continue by virtue of built-in educational 
traditions and institutional pressures; 
that continuing demands on basic education services 
will continue to be exerted as part of democratic 
changes occurring in the Pacific countries; 
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• 
• 
that greater pressure for involvement in the affairs 
of Pacific people will continue to be exerted by 
Pacific rim metropolitan powers in the light of the 
increasing importance of the region; and that 
the development in science especially in the 
information technology area will have major impacts on 
education, language and culture and these will also 
have wider political and socio-economic ramifications. 
Academic Education 
One thing clearly emerges from the previous section. Parents and pupils 
will continue to demand an academic type of education and will continue to be 
reluctant to accept non-academic alternatives, as for example agro-technica1 
education. This is because academic-type education yields better jobs than do 
the other types of education in the Pacific islands setting, and so long as 
this situation exists, it would be reasonable to expect such demand to 
continue. An academic type of education normally prepares people for the 
public sector; this is the major avenue for wage employment in the islands. 
Usually, the smaller the country, the greater is the proportion of people 
employed in the public sector. So despite the efforts of the governments to 
diversity education and build technical, agricultural and other forms of 
non-academic institutions, existing demands for academic type of institutions 
both at the secondary and tertiary levels will continue to grow at least in 
the next two decades. 
As a consequence of this, a lot of school leavers prepared only for 
general skills will continue to be produced every year, of which only a small 
proportion might be absorbed into the workforce. This trend will exacerbate 
the growing unemployment and underemployment especially in the urban centres 
and will generate other associated problems. Such a situation would raise 
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questions relating to what the value and aims of education should be 
especially for those countries that have not faced the full brunt of this 
issue. This would pose a major problem in many of the islands in the Year 
2(K)O. 
Agro-technical Education 
The conventional remedy of education planners to the increasing 
unemployment of school leavers, that of developing agricultural and technical 
schools, is hardly an answer in all the islands because the employment of the 
graduates of these schools would continue to be problematic. Evidences not 
only from African experience, but also from experience of some Pacific 
countries8 indicate that despite expectations, technical and agricultural 
school leavers tend to seek out ·white coll~r· jobs instead of those that 
would require people to ·soi1 their hands·, so to speak. It seems that it 
cannot be assumed that just because they received training in skills which 
predominantly involve the use of their hands, apart from their heads, that 
they should automatically prefer jobs relating to such skills within the 
public sector, let alone generate their own jobs in their respective skill 
areas in the business or private sectors. 
The critical factor to the solution of this problem lies in the creation 
of a structure of incentives within the economic system, generating the need 
for skills to which such agro-technica1 institutions could respond. Unless 
such institutions are responding to identifiable marketable skills, there will 
always be a danger of training people who cannot be employed. 
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In the Pacific islands, there is likely to be a greater demand for more 
specialized agricultural and technical skills in the bigger island groups of 
Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and probably New Caledonia; these 
countries are in a better position to support a system of technical and 
agricultural schools. These islands have a sufficient resource base to 
support a comparatively large population and would also have a greater 
potential for the development of their private sectors than small island 
groups. For these reasons, one would expect to see the development of a 
comprehensive network of agro-technical schools in the above islands over the 
next two decades. 
Non-Formal Education 
In the smaller island groups of the Pacific where the development 
potential of the private sectors is limited as in the case of Tonga, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, Western Samoa, the American group, etc., a greater emphasis would be 
placed on non-formal education. This type of education is aimed at developing 
various types of skills using the resources in the community, to assist people 
generate their own employment. There is already a wide acceptance of this 
type of education as it tends to attract young and no so young adults who know 
the kind of skills they need. Non-formal education and training can be used 
to develop basic practical mechanical and technical skills without reliance on 
the expensive resources of formal institutions; this is being attempted fairly 
successfully in Fiji. 9 Not only is the development of non-formal education 
and training critical, equally critical is the need to coordinate formal and 
non-formal education and to rationalise these activities. Only a few 
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countries in the Pacific include non-formal education in their education 
planning considerations. Non-formal education is particularly pertinent in a 
region where many of the countries cannot afford to commit much more of their 
limited government funds to formal education. Non-formal education could 
assume a much greater importance in the next two decades particularly for the 
smaller island groups. 
Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Education 
One of the things that is difficult to satisfy, especially for newly 
independent countries, is the demand for more education. The independent 
countries of the South Pacific except those in Melanesia have a comparatively 
high rate of literacy. A great push for universal primary education is 
therefore likely to be exerted by the Melanesian islands such as Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and on independence, French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia. 
Those islands whose basic primary education needs have stabilised would be 
looking towards providing more secondary--and tertiary--level education. 
Secondary education is expected to be met loca lly by most countries but 
tertiary education is not as easily available for the islands except perhaps 
for Papua New Guinea. To date, two regional groupings exist in the Pacific 
region either to provide or coordinate the provision of tertiary education: 
the eleven independent or self-governing countries (except for Tokelau) of the 
South Pacific group that support the University of the South Pacific (USP), 
and the Pacific Post Secondary Education Council, membership of which 
comprises all the American Pacific group and which coordinates post-secondary 
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education for the American Pacific islands. Without such co-operation it 
would be inconceivable for any of the Pacific islands given its population 
base apart from Papua New Guinea, to support a full-fledged university from 
its own resources. 10 
It would not, however, be out of the reach of many of the island groups, 
to have colleges of higher education that might meet the needs of middle level 
manpower requirements. In certain cases, the establishment of such colleges 
have involved substantial aid from metropolitan sources. Some of the big 
islands will see it politically desirable for them to have a national college 
of higher education which could provide for various courses in needed areas 
and at the same time, ensure that its services are rationalised with its 
associated regional university (e.g, USP) or with an outside metropolitan 
university. A similar rationalisation of efforts is expected to occur in the 
American Pacific group under the coordination of the Pacific Post Secondary 
Education Council. 
There is a greater potential for increased coordination between the 
various island groups particularly between the American Pacific group and the 
South Pacific group especially in the provision of tertiary education. Most 
of the doctors currently practising on the American Pacific group of islands 
were graduates of the former regional Medical School in Suva, now known as the 
Fiji School of Medicine. In October 1984, the University of Guam Signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the University of the South Pacific and this 
could enhance greater co-operation in the field of education between the two 
regions. The University of the South Pacific and the University of Papua New 
Guinea are represented on one another's Council and they have already 
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identified areas of possible co-operation including an exchange scheme for 
their respective students. Even the idea of the development of a 
confederation of universities in the South Pacific involving the two 
universities in Papua New Guinea and the USP has been raised by Dr. James 
Maraj, the previous Vice-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific. 11 
There is much to be gained in co-operative efforts and indications are 
that this will be much stronger in the Year 2000; such co-operation will 
contribute to a greater Pacific consciousness, provided, of course, that 
metropolitan pressures through bilateral aid arrangements do not undermine 
such co-operation. 
New Colonialism in Education 
For a variety of reasons, a number of metropolitan powers in the Pacific 
rim are exerting increasing influence on Pacific islands. Some of the 
influences are traditional and long standing as is the case with New Zealand 
and its neighbours like the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa; the 
United States with its Micronesian states and American Samoa; Australia with 
Papua New Guinea; and France with its Pacific coloniesa Increasing efforts 
have been undertaken, both by Australia and the United States to exert their 
influences in the independent countries of the South Pacific; with promise of 
increasing aid and assistance, they are beginning to develop affiliations that 
could influence education significantly in the islands. In a recent Foreign 
Affairs report for example, it has been suggested that Australia should accept 
workers from Tuvalu and Kiribati as part of its development assistance 
scheme. 12 If this is implemented the goal of education in these two 
countries would shift to preparing people not only for working but also for 
living in Australia. 
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New Zealand has already been influencing the national curricula of many of 
the South Pacific countries through its examinations; it has also allowed many 
Polynesians to work and migrate to its shores, thus reducing unemployment in 
the islands somewhat. It also admits island students to study there and many 
of them do not return to the islands. This situation has often been referred 
to as aid to New Zealand by the Pacific Islands. 13 
The United States takes in people from the American Pacific group for 
education, employment and also gives them citizenship after a period of 
residency, not to mention the high level of aid or 'handouts' it gives them. 
The same is happening with respect to islanders in the French Pacific group. 
The end result of all this is, of course, a greater degree of dependence, 
a new colonialism. While it may have beneficial effects, it is bound to 
undermine the development of a coherent national educational system of the 
respective groups of islands and to encourage the loss of needed skills and 
manpower. This problem is bound to continue well into the Year 2000. 
Perhaps, the Pacific islanders need to work out very urgently the form of 
assistance they can get without putting themselves in a irreversible situation 
which is now more evident in some of the American Pacific group of islands. 
Science and Information Technolog~ 
The impact of the development of science and technology cannot be ignored, 
although much of the technology is inappropriate to small island states. The 
fact that such high technology is available and that it is in the interest of 
metropolitan powers to have it accepted by the Pacific island states in itself 
helps to perpetuate an incongruent situation between island needs and 
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technological supply. This situation highlights the need to generate a 
greater consciousness for more appropriate technologies especially those that 
depend on renewable energy sources for which the Pacific has a rich resource 
base such as the sun, the wind and ocean currents. 
The availability of modern information technology can be used to enhance 
education developments especially in the area of computers, video cassettes, 
television and satellite. This of course calls for careful identification of 
needs in terms of knowledge and skills, the development of appropriate 
curricula and the choice of suitable media to be used in respective areas. 14 
Apart from the use of satellite in distance education in the University of the 
South Pacific region, and the abortive attempt to introduce education 
television in American Samoa in the 1960s,15 the Pacific Islands have been 
generally slow in making appropriate use of these technologies more 
particularly in the field of education. This is going to lead to the 
wholesale use of imported overseas programmes as is currently the case with 
video programmes in countries like Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The 
availability of satellite television would also mean that the Pacific islands 
could be exposed to overseas television (usually American) programmes at the 
touch of a switch. 
The continual exposure of the Pacific islanders to imported programmes 
through video and or sateilite television cannot be without its efforts on 
their values, cultures and traditions. This would exacerbate a cosmopolitan 
orientation and undermine the development of a stronger Pacific consciousness. 
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Language and Culture 
As the Pacific increasingly becomes an area of competing powers, great 
stress will be placed on technology science and generally on developments in 
the modern sector. While it is desirable and perhaps timely that the Pacific 
should move into the 21st century, it is hoped that it will not do so at the 
expense of its unique Pacific cultures and traditions which have given it a 
distinctive lifestyle. In order to do this, its cultures, languages and 
traditions need to be fostered and developed through various avenues including 
the schools and through whatever modern information technology is used. 
Conclusions 
The school traditions of the Pacific islands were derived from exported 
varieties from metropolitan countries. The schools were set up to support 
imposed systems and were relied upon to produce the necessary manpower 
particularly during the transition of the islands from a colonial to a 
self-governing and/or an independent status. The school systems generated 
their own sets of problems, and attempts made to re-direct their orientation, 
form and content did not meet much success. 
The above problems continue to bedevil the Pacific islanders and they are 
bound to affect their educational developments in the near and distant 
future. These are going to be compounded by other deveiopments such as the 
increasing demand for basic education by new nations achieving greater 
self-determination, the pressure by metropolitan powers to have greater 
involvement in Pacific affairs, and recent developments in science and 
information technology. The directions which Pacific islands education are 
going to take in the Year 2000 are going to depend on the extent to which 
these considerations are utilised by PaCific islanders to their advantage. 
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THE FUTURE OF OUR PAST 
by 
Epeli Hau'ofa 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the 
present century, scholars, colonial administrators, missionaries and the like 
were genuinely concerned that Pacific islanders quite possibly faced physical 
extinction. The voluntary and not-so-voluntary recruitment of Melanesians to 
work on distant overseas plantations, the kidnapping of Polynesians to work in 
mines in South America, greater destructiveness of warfare due to the 
introduction of firearms, and especially the ravages of introduced diseases, 
were some of the factors behind the alarming decline of island populations in 
the PaCific. But with improved health care, better control of labour 
recruitment, the proscription of internecine warfare, and so forth, the 
situation was gradually reversed. 
There is a parallel between the situation that I have just sketchily 
outlined and the preoccupation, toward the end of our century, with the 
continuity or survival of the traditional cultures of the same groups of 
The title of this address has been taken from that of the journal Review 
(USP), No. 10, 1983, by Simione Duruta10. 
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people. With a few exceptions (such as Niue and the Cook Islands because of 
emigration) there is no longer any concern about population decline. What 
seems problematic for many people, islanders and interested outsiders alike, 
is the survival of the so-called traditional cultures. Programmes have been 
mounted in the islands, funded largely by international organisations, for the 
preservation of traditional cultures. I must confess that I am baffled by 
this concern with culture preservation. If we take it that 'culture' means 
the totality of the way of life of a given population at any given time, and 
that this way of life is subject to alteration as its environment changes, 
then I do not see why the cultures of ex-colonial peoples should be singled 
out for preservation, or for that matter, for much concern about their 
survival. Those industrial countries that have dominated the Pacific islands 
over the last two hundred years have not displayed much concern with the 
preservation of their own cultures as such; in fact their position of 
dominance has been achieved and maintained through constant ruthless changes 
in their traditions; the whole idea of growth and development means continuous 
change of technologies and value systems. In view of this, one cannot help 
but suspect that underlying the seemingly humane concern with the preservation 
of the traditions of the islands of the South PaCific, and indeed of the Third 
World in general, are some rather insidious motives including keeping sections 
of communities contented with their relative poverty and oppression. 
But I'm not here to grind an axe, or to make accusations about 
neo-colonial exploitation. I'm in a good mood, so let us as scholars do what 
we are good at, and that is making mountains out of mole-hills, constructing 
realities out of illusions, endowing triviality with significance, and talking 
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about traditional value systems in the year 2000 not knowing exactly what we 
mean by the term 'traditions' in the context of the contemporary South 
Pacific, let alone their potential for survival into the twenty first century. 
If by 'traditional' we mean purely indigenous, as many people have taken 
the term to imply, then there are very few things in the Pacific islands today 
that could be labelled 'traditional.' Of those few things that could be so 
designated, the most important are the native languages spoken by islanders 
today; but even here, the languages have been greatly affected by non-Oceanic 
influences, especially in the area of vocabulary. In most other areas of 
culture, aspects loosely termed 'traditional' are in fact things that have 
either been borrowed ho1us-bo1us or have been mixed to varying degrees with 
introduced elements from Europe, America and Asia. The present aristocratic 
systems of Fiji and Tonga are in fact the creations of the 19th century -
mixtures of indigenous and non-indigenous elements. Yet these systems are 
considered 'traditional' by Fijians and Tongans alike. So, for the purposes 
of this paper, I take 'traditions' and 'traditional values' to mean practices 
and beliefs held by a given population over a period of time, say, one hundred 
or so years. I also consider as traditional, practices and values 
deliberately created and cultivated recently by island leaders for their 
fellow men and their descendants to follow. Here then, we have traditions 
that are old and those that have been relatively recently established but 
increasingly accepted and having potential for long term growth and survival, 
although that potential can only be roughly estimated. 
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The other thing about traditions, and this seems to be the important 
issue, ;s the nature, or more precisely the origins, of the various elements 
that constitute a particular tradition, The question here is the 
identification of the origins of the elements of a particular tradition, which 
elements are indigenous and which non-indigenous. The indigenous elements are 
those whose origins can be traced back to the values and practices that 
existed before the earliest contact with alien cultures, in particular those 
originating outside Oceania. The non-indigenous elements are those aspects of 
a tradition that were introduced from cultures outside the Pacific islands 
region. This distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous elements of 
contemporary traditions is very important because generally, when people think 
of the survival of the traditional value systems, they, in fact, mean the 
continuity or persistence of indigenous (or aboriginal) elements of traditions 
rather than the traditions as such, for as mentioned above, there are very few 
important traditions in the islands today that are purely indigenous. 
Finally, the degree of indigenousness of particular traditions held by a 
people varies according to the extant interests of different classes and other 
divisions within the society. In the internal politics in Tonga, Western 
Samoa, and Fiji, for example, the leaders often emphasise the indigenous 
aristocratic elements of their leadership tradition because it is in their 
interests that this should be so. Those who tend to stress the 
non-indigenousness aspects of leadership are more likely to be members of 
classes other than the chiefly ones. Furthermore, the rural dwellers, who are 
generally poor, are more likely to practise indigenous aspects of traditions 
than the culturally alienated, urban-based elites whose adherence to things 
indigenous is often more professed and idealistic than practical. 
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What I refer to as indigenous values, as distinct from traditional values, 
have their roots in the past of Pacific island societies before the invasion 
of European values. Indigenous values are rooted firstly in subsistence 
economies with non-metal, non-mechanical tools, and with generally highly 
perishable products; secondly, in transportation modes based on foot and 
canoes; thirdly, in the scale of society that was generally small and 
intimate; and fourthly, in exclUSively oral methods of communication. Since 
the economic, transportation and communication systems and the population 
structures of the Pacific have changed and are changing, the value systems 
based on them must necessarily have changed too. But it is often the case 
. that changes in value systems lag far behind changes in other areas of culture 
and society. It is the existence of these persistent values evocative of the 
past that causes concern about the survival of traditional cultures. The 
';t.t persistence of such values is due to the fact that changes in the economic, 
transportation and communication systems are not yet total: subSistence or 
semi-subsistence economic activities exist side by side with modern commercial 
activities; the improvement in transportation systems is limited to certain 
areas of societies; and illiteracy and semi-literacy are still with us. 
Moreover, the persistence of outmoded values can be politically useful to 
powerful interests in modern island societies, and these values seem also to 
provide the essential elements for the formation of distinctive local, 
national, regional and ethnic identities. 
But what were the values that sprang from and were appropriate to the 
conditions outlined above? I am conscious here of the danger of 
over-generalisation, but I am compelled to resort to this tactic because it is 
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only through a degree of over-generalisation that we are able to transcend the 
relativity and the great complexity of Pacific island cultures, of which there 
are probably more than a thousand. Keeping this in mind, I venture to suggest 
that the most important indigenous values held by Pacific islanders were as 
follows. 
1. The primacy of group interests over those of individuals as such. 
Unlike people in Western societies, Pacific islanders stressed the importance 
of groups rather than that of the individual. The main responsibilities of an 
individual were not for himself or herself but for various groups to which he 
or she belonged. Individualism as we know it was considered selfish and 
anti-social behaviour. This emphasis on the group was an essential feature of 
subsistence existence based on primitive tools, and of uncentralised political 
systems that were prone to inter-group violence in the settlement of 
disputes. Economic and political interdependence necessitated the emphasis on 
group solidarity at the expense of individual interests. And Pacific 
islanders grouped themselves mostly according to the principles of kinship 
ties, and secondarily along the principle of locality. 
2. Sharing of goods and services. The ideas of sharing and of mutual 
assistance were highly valued. Most inter-personal and inter-group 
relationships were created and sustained through constant acts of giving and 
taking and sharing. These values were based on the necessity for group 
efforts in the performance of heavy tasks using primitive tools, and for the 
consumption of highly perishable products such as root-crops, fruits and 
meats, given the lack of methods for effective food preservation. 
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3. A sense for place and for social continuity. The sense for place is 
the attachment to the physical locality in which one ancestors lived and died 
and in which one lives. The sense for social continuity is the importance 
people place on their continuity with their ancestors and with their future 
generations. The sense for place and continuity developed out of limited 
physical mobility in the past because of elementary forms of transportation, 
rugged terrain and watery isolation between islands or groups of islands. 
Personal and social identities were rooted in kinship ties and in ancestral 
territories. 
4. Intimacy in interpersonal relationships. This was very important even 
in the relationships between people at different levels of society. 
Personalised. relationships, especially those based on ties of kinship and 
locality, were the order of the day. (Impersonal relationships are still 
alien to most Pacific islanders.) This was a function of the smallness in the 
scale of island societies. Within each socio-political unit everyone knew 
everyone else, and if pressed people could actually trace kinship connections 
with each other. The relationships between leaders and the led were usually 
phrased in terms of kinship relationships. The smallness in the scale of 
societies resulted from elementary technologies of warfare, transportation and 
production, as well as from geographical and demographic factors. 
5. The recording and communication of ideas, of customary laws, 
genealogies, historical events, and rights and obligations of all kinds were 
very fleXible, creative and highly politicised. Truth was, and still is to a 
large extent, negotiable. The idea that Pacific islanders were slaves to the 
dictates of their cultures is a myth; islanders were in fact masters of their 
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cultures - they manipulated them at will. This was made easier because of the 
absence of written records. Pacific cultures were based on oral traditions; 
and as we all know, when everything is transmitted orally and in no other 
form, anything can happen provided that the transmitters have the ability and 
power to make thi ngs happen. So every group had its expert orators, spokesmen 
and other liars to tell, and if possible force through, their versions of 
truth. 
6. Self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Most people provided through 
their own efforts for all their needs. Only a very small number of groups 
depended on trade, which was· conducted as barter between long established 
partners, and hardly ever between total strangers. Exchange was largely in 
terms of luxury goods, or more correctly, items of. ceremonial value -
I 
feathers, shells, mats, tapa and so forth. Self-sufficiency and self-reliance 
was a function of integrated subsistence existence. 
7. Care for members of society - especially for the elderly and the 
otherwise disabled. There were no social welfare services as we know today so 
people had to take care of their own. And because of the close kinship 
bonding that sprang from lifelong togetherness, of reverence for ancestors 
whose spirits had to be appeased as they were considered active in the world 
of the living, and of future security for themselves, people never entertained 
the idea of abandoning their elderly and their disabled relatives. Caring was 
ultimately a responsibility to one's corporate kin-group, which always 
comprised the dead, the living and the future generations. There were very 
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few exceptions, all found in resource poor environments, but the general 
pattern was a described above. This sense of caring for one's relatives is 
still strong throughout the island societies. 
8. The arts and entertainments were integrated into community life. 
There was no such thing as art for art's sake. The sense for beauty was 
always imprinted on objects of utility: tools, implements, houseware, 
personal effects, canoes, buildings and sacred images. Poetry, music and 
dance were mostly integrated into, and usually performed as part of, some 
religious or community festivals or ceremonies. And there was a great deal of 
entertainment and fun in most serious group activities: in gardening, fish 
drives, construction of private and public buildings, and in religious 
ceremonies, even when these were connected with mortuary rites. The easy 
enjoyment of life and the sense of fun that people associate with islanders is 
not just a myth; it is a reality. Perhaps one reason why many islanders do 
not appear willing to give sustained effort to the so-called development 
activities is that such activities are not only foreign, they are also so 
deadly serious and devoid of any sense of enjoyment and fun. The Protestant 
work ethic is a prescription for a life of joyless toil - and it has no place 
in the islanders' view of the good life. 
The conditions under which these indigenous values developed have changed 
over the last two hundred years. I shail not enter into a discussion of these 
changes in the economic, transportation and communication systems and 
demographic structure because we are very familiar with them. Suffice it to 
say that changes in technology and in population must in the long run be 
accompanied by changes in value systems. As far as I am concerned it is 
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impossible to maintain values, however laudable they may be, if their material 
bases have been altered dramatically. Given the changes that have occurred in 
the environment, our problem is to pinpoint the directions of change in 
indigenous values. The rest of the present paper deals with these trends. 
1. We examine first the value related to the primacy of group interests 
over those individuals as such. There is much talk by island leaders about 
islanders leading lives that emphasise the community rather than the 
individual. Fr. Walter lini's concept of Melanesian Socialism is based on 
this value. The fact is that the inexorable shift from subsistence to a 
capitalist mode of production belies the professed value because capitalism, 
at least in its Pacific manifestation, emphasises the individual profit motive 
and accumulation. ·The direction of change is unmistakably from group 
orientation to greater individualism; and national financial institutions, 
especially the development banks, are supporting this movement. We can see 
this very clearly in the changes occurring in the systems of land rights. 
Indigenous land tenure systems vested the major rights to land in social 
groups such as extended families, clans and so forth. But the mode of 
development to which island nations have committed themselves prescribes the 
increasing individualisation of land rights. Tonga was the first Pacific 
island nation so to change its land tenure, and presently there is a move in 
Tonga to introduce a freehold system for the entire country. Fiji leads the 
rest in the individualisation of land holding; and development banks 
throughout the island South Pacific demand as collateral for loans for 
agricultural and other land related development, individual leases on tracts 
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of land held by kinship groups. There are other factors for this trend toward 
individualism at the expense of the indigenous value of group solidarity, but 
the example given above is sufficient to illustrate the point. 
I consider also as a trend toward individualism and the greater 
atomisation of society the emerging decline in the significance of extended 
family systems and the rise of the nuclear family as the basic social unit. 
This is also a consequence of the shift from purely subsistence toward 
commercial production, as well as demographic changes, the influence of 
Christian teachings, urbanisation and modern Western-type education. There is 
also a trend toward family life with absentee fathers, that is toward 
matrifocal family units, because of the increasing labour mobility not only 
from rural to urban areas, but also from one country to another. This is 
especially true of Polynesia because of the relative ease with which 
Polynesians can emigrate to New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii and West Coast USA. 
Individualism is increasingly becoming the life-style of the urban-based 
island elites that often advocate group solidarity for the rural masses. But 
given the opportunity within the capitalist mode of development, rural 
dwellers, if they really want to overcome their relative poverty, will have to 
strive toward individualism, despite efforts by their leaders to get them 
organised into co-operative groupings of various kinds. 
2. Sharing of goods and services. This was relatively easy in the past 
when most people in a society performed roughly the same tasks and produced 
virtually identical goods. But changes in economic activities have meant, 
among other things, that people are performing a much greater variety of tasks 
than before, and producing a much wider range of goods. Goods and services 
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therefore vary greatly in value, making it increasingly difficult for people 
to share things fairly; this affects adversely people's willingness to share. 
As mentioned above, because of the high perishability of goods produced in 
the subsistence economies of the islands, people had to give their surpluses 
to their relatives and friends if things were not to be wasted. But today, 
because money is not so perishable and can be stored at home or in banks, 
there is a mounting inclination for people to keep their money for themselves 
rather than to give it away. 
The indigenous values of sharing and meeting one's social obligations have 
also come under intensifying attack by development officials and agencies who 
consider these values to be inimical to progress. 
Under conditions outlined above it appears that Pacific islanders who have 
always stressed the virtue of generosity, are heading toward being 
increasingly mean and accumulative - values that are appropriate to modern 
modes of development. 
3. The tremendous increase in physical mobility brought about by changing 
modes of production, the introduction of efficient systems of transportation, 
the creation of larger territorial units to which people belong, and so forth, 
have wrought changes in islanders' sense for place and social continuity. 
Although people still identity themselves with the localities of their 
origins, they are also required to identify with several larger units -
districts, provinces and the nations themselves. This is a particularly 
traumatic experience in western Melanesia because of the size and cultural 
complexity of, as well as the recency of their being organised into, national 
entities. But such identifications vary in accordance with the individual's 
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actual mobility and the territorial extent of his or her interests. Those who 
live mostly in villages still maintain the indigenous sense for place. Those 
who occupy positions in national institutions or in large-scale enterprises 
identify themselves more easily with the larger territorial units. Among the 
elites, there is also growing transnational identification with regional 
units, and with international groups with which they have professional or 
business connections. The trend seems to be that the more sedentary sections 
of societies. which are generally poor and rural dwelling, maintain very 
confined social worlds, while the more mobile sections have worlds that are 
far larger than their actual places of ancestral origins. The sense for 
continuity with the ancestors and therefore with the past is strongest among 
the poor and weakest among the more mobile elite groups. Ancestors and 
ancestral spirits do not have significant influences over their lives. They 
are learning to live without them. This alienation from ancestors is part and 
parcel of the broader alienation from the past, and therefore, from the 
indigenous elements of traditions. The greatest danger for the survival of 
the indigenous elements of traditions is posed today not so much by outsiders 
as by the educated, relatively wealthy. urban-based local elites. They are 
the ones who are locally instrumental in deciding the directions of change for 
their countries. 
Paradoxically, it is also from the ranks of the alienated elites that 
conscious efforts for culture preservation and for cultural revival have 
emerged. The sensitive and creative minded people who live outside or on the 
margins of traditions are the most vocal in their efforts to preserve what 
little indigenous elements of traditions they still retain, or to review other 
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elements. This is fine so long as preservation or revival does not cost them 
their modern life styles. They are, therefore, highly selective in what they 
wish to retain or to retrieve. This underlies the belief that people can 
consciously combine the best from the past and the present. It never works 
out that way, for when it comes down to actual choices, the best of the past 
is always sacrificed even for the worst of the present. 
4. Intimacy in personal relationships. The enlargement of the scale of 
society from largely village or small island communities into national units, 
the rapid population growth rates, and the increasing use of money as a medium 
in the relationships between people, are at certain levels transforming the 
nature of interpersonal relationships from intimately personal into remote, 
impersonal and contractual relationships. This trend in changing values is 
distinctly discernible so that by about the turn of the century intimate 
personal relationships, which pervaded entire societies of the past and still 
are relatively pervasive today, will be more restricted and increasingly 
replaced at strategic levels by impersonal, contractual relationships which 
are more appropriate to mass societies. 
5. The flexibility with which social relationships were conducted, with 
which information of all kinds was gathered, interpreted and transmitted, and 
with which truth was negotiated, is rapidly giving way to rigidity because of 
the codification of rules of behaviour, documentary recording of events; 
precisely written contracts and other forms of agreements. The informality 
which characterises much of the interpersonal relationships in the islands is 
giving way to formal and rigidly structured relationships. Spontaneity is 
losing ground to calculation, the ultimate expression of which is canned 
laughter on radio programmes of today. 
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6. The progressive movement away from subsistence existence toward 
commercialism and the progressive adoption of expensive life-styles on the 
part of the ruling elites have eroded the indigenous values of self-reliance. 
Perhaps the most unfortunate effect of modern forms of development on 
islanders is the transformation of hitherto economically independent people 
into wards of rich countries. The idea that the present kinds of 
socio-economic development will restore self-reliance is a falsehood. All of 
Micronesia and Polynesia are heading toward complete neo-co10nia1 dependence 
on their former colonial masters. French Polynesia, Niue, Auerican Samoa, 
Tokelau and the former Trust Territories of Micronesia are retired, pensioned 
societies. Western Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati are in 
semi-retirement, living partly on the dole. To a greater or lesser degree all 
other South Pacific island countries are dependent in one form or another on 
foreign aid. Perhaps the only self-reliant groups of people in the island 
world are the few small communities in Melanesia who prefer to live in their 
remote and almost inaccessible localities, for example, the mountain Kwaio of 
Malaita, the pagans of South Pentecost and some similar groups in Papua New 
Guinea. These people have deliberately made the decision to keep their 
distance from alien influences including Christianity. Their few involvements 
with modern society are very restricted and highly selective. 
7. Caring for members of society. The indigenous method of social 
security in which the elderly and the disabled are taken care of by their 
families is still strong and likely to remain so for a long time to come. 
This is just as well because so far the island states are incapable of 
providing their entire populations with alternative forms of social security 
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services. Nevertheless, Fiji, the most urbanised and highly developed of the 
island countries, already has a number of old people's homes, orphanages, and 
mental institutions. And beggars have started to appear on the streets of 
island capitals. With rapid population growth and increasing poverty in the 
islands, the care for the elderly, the disabled and the destitute will become 
a problem in the region. But this appears to be a long term prospect. 
8. The demise of indigenous religions and their attendant rituals and 
ceremonies, the replacement of wood and bone tools and implements by imported 
factory products, and the passing away of the canoe and indigenous building 
designs, have meant the disappearance of many of the art forms of the islands, 
some of which have been revived in modified forms in recent years for 
commercial purposes, especially for sale to tourists. Indigenous forms of 
entertainment, once performed in communities for people's enjoyment, are 
increasingly deployed for commercial purposes - in connection with tourism or 
with fund-raising for community projects. Where once these entertainments 
were performed by everyone in the community who wished to participate, today 
we have an increasing number of profeSSional entertainers and profeSSional 
dance groups who perform at hotels and even take their shows abroad. 
Commercialism and professionalism go hand in hand, at the expense of community 
participation and amatuerism. 
On the other hand, the rich heritage from the past - of carving, designs, 
music, poetry and mythology - is a source of inspiration for the rising number 
of creative artists in the islands. Modern sculptors, painters, musicians, 
poets and writers are tapping this wealth for their own creations. Melanesia 
tends to produce excellent carvers, SCUlptors and artists, whilst from 
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Polynesia come some really good poets and writers. These artists work in 
modern media to produce art works that are distinctively modern Oceanic in 
character - they are producing new images and new voices for the new Pacific 
Islands. 
The indigenous elements of Pacific island cultures have also been deployed 
for other purposes. In the multi-cultural situations of Melanesian countries, 
national leaders appeal to common cultural elements that their people share in 
their efforts to forge real unity for their countries, and to create new and 
distinctive national identities. In Papua New Guinea Bernard Narokobi 
propounded the Melanesian Way in order to provide the then new nation with a 
philosophy for unity. In Vanuatu, Father Walter Lini, who used the appeal of 
Kastom to unite the New Hebrideans in their fight for independence, now 
propounds the philosophy of Melanesian Socialism for his country. Apart from 
these national political usages of indigenous elements of culture, the idea of 
a Melanesian Alliance based on broad similarities in the indigenous elements 
of the cultures of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu is in the 
air. In reference to the Melanesian Alliance, Father Walter Lini, in the 
September (1984) issue of Islands BUSiness, had this to say. 
"What seems to be the position, as it appears in 
the media, is the creation of a Melanesian bloc. 
That there is going to be a Melanesian bloc and a 
Polynesian bloc. In fact, our view of the 
Melanesian bloc is in trying to encourage 
Melanesian traditions, and to try to see them more 
clearly. We are not talking about a political 
alliance. It is a misconception. We are simply 
talking about Melanesian ways, customs and 
values. It is very important to educate the young 
people to be able to know them again." 
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A rather stunted cousin of the Melanesian Way is the Pacific Way, which 
represents half-hearted attempts by some rather unconvinced politicians and 
regional academics to provide a form of idealogy and identity for regional 
unity among Polynesians, Melanesians and Micronesians. The Pacific Way 
comprises cultural elements, both indigenous and non-indigenous believed to be 
commonly shared by islanders. The Pacific Way has not yet developed into a 
real ideology - and is unlikely to become anything other than a convenient 
label for things that the mobile island elite groups share - especially their 
privileges. Part of the problem is that the Pacific Way as an idea is 
confined to the regional elites; there has been no attempt to have it rooted 
in island societies at large. It is probably not possible to popularise the 
idea beyond a small group of the privileged and the regionally mobile. 
There is also a rising Polynesian consciousness. Despite great distances 
and centuries of isolation, the various peoples of Polynesia have maintained 
close cultural similarities that are rooted in a parental culture of some two 
thousand years ago. They share similar . myths, ancient religions, languages, 
and physical appearances. The population mobility of recent years has brought 
many Polynesian peoples together in places like Auckland, Wellington, Sydney, 
Honolulu and other cities on mainland USA. There are of course mutual 
suspicion and inter-group hostilities, but there is also an increasing mixing 
of these peoples of the same ethnic stock. 
Polynesian writers, poets, artists and scholars are now using images from 
each other's traditions in their own creations. Te Rangi Hiroa was probably 
the first pan-Polynesian man whose works on Polynesian cultures remain a 
milestone in Polynesian scholarship. I myself have only recently established 
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contacts with Polynesian scholars, writers, poets and artists here in Hawaii, 
and with the Maori of New Zealand as well as with those of Fiji, Samoa and 
Cook Islands. It is a very exciting experience - to meet people who were 
totally strangers but who, upon the first meeting, realise instantly a kind of 
affinity - a kinship of spirit - the roots of which go far, far back into 
mythological times. 
What 11m saying here is that although the past two hundred years have done 
much to destroy or change indigenous cultures, the experiences of the late 
twentieth century have brought about an awareness of broad cultural 
similarities among the peoples of the Pacific islands. The Melanesian 
consciousness is rising, and so is that of Polynesians. It is perhaps the old 
gods themselves, Maui, Tangaroa, Kane and others, who have drawn Polynesians 
from their far flung islands to flock to Aotearoa and Hawaili in order to help 
keep their ancient imprints alive. An increasing number of those who have not 
emigrated are establishing links that will help to keep the old spirit of 
Polynesians alive, well into the twenty first century. 
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